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REVISITING KHALID:
SOCIAL AMBIVALENCE IN DECOLONIZATION

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Abstract. *In this review, the author seeks to refocus scholarly attention on Adeeb Khalid's Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR, reviewing it as a classic work in the study of decolonization processes and on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of its first publication. Although Khalid's key premises have been criticized by scholars of religion, the author believes that Khalid's approach remains crucial for understanding the role of the national-progressive bourgeois left in ethno-cultural transformations. Particular attention is given to Khalid's nuanced analysis of the colonists' role in relations with the metropole and his multifaceted assessment of Central Asia's position within the system of imperial-colonial rule. The strength of Adeeb Khalid's approach lies in his ability not to ignore social ambivalences (dualities) within social relations. This review also analyses the events concerning the role of Uzbekistan, which fall outside Khalid's original chronological scope. Furthermore, in our opinion, in contemporary reality, the development of an authentic general social theory claiming universal importance is possible only through comparative methods—an idea exemplified by one of Khalid's intellectual influencers, Pierre Bourdieu, whose research bridged both Eastern and Western contexts.*

Keywords: *Jadids, bourgeois left, empire, social theory, decolonization, social ambivalence (duality)*

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In 2025, the scholarly community marks the tenth anniversary of the first publication of a fundamental monograph by one of the most influential contemporary researchers of Central Asia/Turkestan and a distinguished authority in postcolonial studies and decolonization—Adeeb Khalid's *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR*. Undoubtedly, a hallmark of any classic work is its ability to encourage reverting to it at subsequent critical junctures in historical scholarship. Each era produces its own Aristotle and its own Ibn Sina—interpreters who revisit the canonical texts of earlier thinkers, sometimes in dialogue with, and at other times in opposition to, their original premises. Certainly, Adeeb Khalid does not claim the intellectual stature of either Stagirite or Avicenna in the history of human thought. However, he has gained fame as a remarkably attentive researcher of the Turkestan component of the super-region, which is of particular importance in the world's cultural heritage. In *The Silk Roads*, Peter Frankopan noted:

> … I couldn't understand, why I kept being told of the importance of the Mediterranean as the cradle of civilisation, when it seemed so obvious that this was not where civilization had really been forged. The real crucible, the "Mediterranean" in its literal meaning—the centre of the world—was not a sea separating Europe and North Africa, but right in the heart of Asia. (Frankopan 2016: XIX)

In the second half of the nineteenth 19th century, the influence exerted on Turkestan and the Steppe lands as a result of the "Great Game"—a term popularized by Rudyard Kipling and Arthur Connoly—largely determined the nature of the confrontation between the British and the Russian Empires and the fate of India, the very "heart of Asia", as well as the broader developments in world history. At the same time, from the late 19th to the early 20th century, large numbers of European settlers migrated to these regions. This migratory stream included Eastern Slavs, Poles, Germans, and Bulgarians. A substantial proportion consisted of agrarian settlers from the Great Russian and Ukrainian provinces (including hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian origin new settlers, both from rural areas), migrated particularly to the Steppe zone known as the "Grey Wedge" or "Grey Ukraine", and from urban centers. By the mid-1920s, Ukrainian settlers made up approximately 14% of Kazakhstan's population. Beyond the Grey Wedge, Ukrainian ethnic settlement was most extensive in Kyrgyzstan, where Ukrainians accounted for nearly 10% of its population by the late 1930s. Of particular note is the village of Sadove in the Chuy Valley steppes. Founded at the turn of the 19thand 20thcenturies by Ukrainian settlers, it became a place where Ukrainians lived side-by-side with Dungans, an ethnic group of Chinese Muslims).

East Slavic agrarian migration to Central Asia reached its peak between 1906 and 1913, when the imperial government, as part of Stolypin's land reforms, tried to alleviate the problem of small land parcel owners and overpopulation in the European provinces through relocation. As demonstrated by Olexander Reyent, this policy was actively supported by Russian right-wing nationalist groups, which in this case lobbied the interests of large landowners (Реєнт 2024: 59).

Some descendants of Ukrainian nobility also played active roles in the "Great Game," including Adjutant General Vasily Perovsky, grandson of Hetman Kyrylo

Razumovsky; Lieutenant General Yegor Kovalevsky, nephew of the founder of Kharkiv University Vasily Karazin; Mykola Karazin, Vasyl Karazin's grandson, writer and artist; and Major General Heorhii Arendarenko, a descendant of Hetmans Tymofii Orendarenko and Taras Triasyo, as well as General of Infantry and the first Steppe Governor-General, Herasym Kovpakivskyi, a native of the Kharkiv nobility. During his exile, Taras Shevchenko joined the Aral Geographical Expedition to explore the northern regions of Karakalpakstan: "And there the steppe, and here the steppe."

In the 20th century, the lands of Central Asia became the site of an unprecedented revolutionary-imperial social experiment, initially accompanied by intensive repressive measures. The experiment was aimed at industrial modernization, military mobilization, secularization, detraditionalization, egalitarianism, emancipation of women and constructing a new national identity within a society that, for several decades, sought to fuse Eastern and Western cultures within the communist model, contrary to Kipling's famous assertion that "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet."

Adeeb Khalid's foundational works create preconditions for a significant expansion of the analytical framework in understanding this region that has undergone profound transformation over the most recent decade. Much depends on the trajectory of this transformation for the future of both the "heart of Asia" and the post-Soviet space as a whole.

Adeeb Khalid's conclusions should not be treated as unappealable truth. They invite criticism, particularly regarding the author's central thesis about the allegedly decisive role of the Jadid movement (Islamic liberal enlighteners and reformers, and moderate Turkic nationalists ideologically akin to the Turkish Young Turks) as a key actor in the national and state genesis of Uzbek society and as an agent of social change. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether one accepts or rejects the author's principal propositions, it must be acknowledged that his perspective has proved exceptionally productive in stimulating scholarly debate. His *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR* has defined contours of contemporary intellectual discussion on the formation of national identity among the peoples of Central Asia, the dynamics of nation-building, and decolonization processes in such a way that it is now virtually impossible to ignore Adeeb Khalid's findings. Prior to Adeeb Khalid, the process of nation-building was examined predominantly through the lens of the 1924 national-territorial delimitation in Central Asia, understood as a project initiated externally by the metropolitan center. In *Making Uzbekistan*, Khalid demonstrated how fundamentally significant, in this respect, internal Uzbek factors and mechanisms in fact were. From this standpoint, in our view, Adeeb Khalid's work is one of the key studies through engagement with which contemporary readers are able to relinquish entrenched habits of reductionist simplification.

Under present conditions, at least two factors underscore the continuing relevance of referring to this researcher's works. First, they are essential for achieving a nuanced understanding of the identities of the peoples of Central Asia in the context that has evolved after 24 February 2022, particularly in formulating unbiased expert forecasts concerning the region's development amid growing tensions related to migration.

Currently, Adeeb Khalid himself—reflecting the prevailing views within the scholarly community—adheres to the opinion he articulated on the occasion of the translation of his monograph *Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present* into Kazakh:

> Had you asked me three years ago, I would have said that Russia occupied a strong position: Central Asian economies were closely tied to Russia's, the Russian language played an important role, and Russian media remained prominent. Whenever I visit the region, I still encounter Russian media and television channels; many people continue to use mail.ru email addresses and maintain VKontakte accounts. Those ties cannot be severed overnight. However, the war has altered the situation. While economic dependence persists, trust in Moscow has diminished. I think two factors can coexist: continued use of the Russian language alongside growing political and diplomatic suspicion of Russia. (Орисбай 2025)

Second, the continuing relevance of Adeeb Khalid's work stems from the ongoing debate over decolonization. Scholars have already noted that his academic approach was significantly influenced by the theories of Pierre Bourdieu. Clearly, his description of the confrontation between the reformist Jadids—with their slogans of "progress" and "nation"—and the conservative Ulemas fits into the framework of a struggle for "symbolic capital," while the analysis of the Jadids' way of life aligns closely with the concept of "habitus."

It is well known that Pierre Bourdieu's early works, which laid the foundation for his social theory, were devoted to the study of the East, specifically the Arab-Berber community, in the context of the anti-colonial unrest. These include *Sociology in Algeria* (1964) and *Labour and Workers in Algeria (*1964). Pierre Bourdieu's major work, *Le Sens pratique* (*The Logic of Practice*, 1980), which elaborates the notion of "habitus", also reflects his extensive field research in Kabyle society. His concept of "symbolic violence" remains one of the most appropriate analytical tools for examining the social experience of the "oppressed and despised", particularly among critics of colonial discourses.

From this perspective, Pierre Bourdieu's social theory, marked by a personal anti-colonial ethos, stands at the origins of postcolonial studies and theoretical decolonization discourse.[1] However, the paradox lies in the fact that although virtually every biographical account of Bourdieu inevitably mentions his research on Kabyle society, the significance of his intellectual legacy as a precursor to the decolonization approach is often downplayed.

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[1] Bourdieu's theory is interpreted in this vein, for example, by Julian Go in his study "Bourdieu, Algeria and Postcolonial Thought". Go underscores that, as emerges from Pierre Bourdieu's Algerian writings, colonialism is structured by racism and violence. He argues that "Bourdieu generated a critical approach to colonialism that overcame the limits of the French imperial episteme. While conventional views of colonialism saw it as a neutral medium for cultural transfer, thereby reflecting only the concerns and interests of the metropole, Bourdieu drew upon the experiences and concerns of colonized peoples to theorize colonialism as a social system structured by racism and violence that had important impact upon colonizer and colonized alike. In this sense, Bourdieu's early work was not just about colonialism but was also epistemically postcolonial" (Go 2018: 11).

An even greater paradox is that in the post-Soviet space, Pierre Bourdieu's early works are generally neglected, except in a few specialized studies focused on the Orient. We believe that this phenomenon reflects a peculiar "escape from the East". The style of social and theoretical thinking of leading Western academic communities was formed within societies constituted as large empires, shaped by their experience of expansionist engagement with the Eastern world. French society, for example, cannot be fully understood outside its complex relationship with the Arab-Berber society and the "*pieds-noirs"* of Algeria. However, within the post-Soviet context, on the contrary, there has been a persistent tendency to perceive "the West as only the West"—a construct that, in fact, has never truly existed.

"Escape from the East" may, in this regard, be understood as a highly specific political and, at the same time, academic stance. It took shape from the early 1990s in the European countries of the post-Soviet space. Its conceptual basis may be traced to Mikhail Gorbachev's late-Soviet notion of a "common European home". This stance is predicated on an understanding of these societies as engaged exclusively in a cultural dialogue with the West, while lacking any shared cultural field with the world of the wider East.

Adeeb Khalid's principal emphasis was on highlighting the independent role of the Uzbek intelligentsia in the process of nation-building. He acknowledges that Uzbekistan was formed as part of the Soviet reform of the national-territorial division of Central Asia in 1924-1925, implemented under the leadership of Isaak Zelenksy, head of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the leader of Uzbekistan (from 1924 to 1937, the Uzbek city of Asaka was called Zelensk). However, he argues that the structure that emerged as a result of this reform was not artificial. The Uzbek national project, in his view, reflected the vision of indigenous actors:

> The creation of Uzbekistan was the triumph of a national project of Central Asian Muslim intellectuals who had come to see themselves as Uzbeks. The formation of that republic was, I argue, the fulfillment in contingent Soviet conditions of a national project that long predated the Russian revolution. The intelligentsia came to have a deep fascination with the idea of revolution as a modality of change, for only revolution could deliver the nation from its backwardness. The national project therefore did not defend a pristine traditional culture but sought to revolutionize it. The revolts against convention and tradition with their iconoclastic fervor defined the new culture that emerged in this period. The decade of the 1920s was one of a cultural revolution driven by the energies and passions of the Uzbek intelligentsia. The intelligentsia found much common ground with the Soviets, but ultimately, the logics of the two projects were different... Ultimately, the Uzbek intelligentsia ... perished at the hands of the Soviet state. But the Uzbekistan that had emerged in 1924 was in many ways the lasting legacy of the prerevolutionary intelligentsia. (Khalid 2015: 1–2)

Adeeb Khalid criticizes the perspective of Orientalist scholarship, which traditionally portrays Eastern societies as lacking their own activist role; this approach was most articulated primarily in the works of Edward Said, the founder of decolonization theory. At the same time, Khalid's interpretation resonates with the ideas of another classic of decolonization theory, Frantz Fanon, who emphasized that the creation of nation-state communities requires a critical distance from traditionalism, and the national liberation struggle is incompatible with the mere cultivation of folklore.

In brief, Adeeb Khalid's interpretation of Uzbek nation-building can be summarized as follows:

First, after the colonial conquest, the power of the Khans in Central Asia weakened, creating a vacuum among the elites. This vacuum was gradually filled by the emerging bourgeois class—the "cotton kings"—and the reformist progressist Islamic intelligentsia known as the Jadids. The Jadids were driven by concerns over cultural stagnation in the region, which was once an advanced center of civilization. They prioritized education through new-method schools and promoted the development of literature and theater. Their rise occurred amid conflicts with traditional privileged classes such as the Ulemas and Bais. Among the prominent leaders of this movement were Abdurauf Fitrat, Fayzulla Khojaev, Sadriddin Aini, Abdulla Kadiri, Abdulhamid Chulpan, and Abdulla Avloni. Influenced by the Tatar Jadids and the Turkish Young Turks, the movement increasingly adopted an ethno-nationalist understanding of culture.

After the February Revolution in 1917, the Jadid movement gained new momentum. However, the lack of financial resources and military experiences led to the rapid collapse of the Kokand Autonomy—a state project initiated by these bourgeois progressists. Over time, an alliance emerged between the Bolshevik government and the Jadids. The two forces became tactical allies. While Bolsheviks were primarily concerned with class liberation, the Jadids focused on nation-building. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the subjugation of India, the anti-colonial element of Jadidism grew stronger. Their stance, particularly that of Fitrat, was overtly anti-British. The Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (1920-1924) can be seen as a Jadid project characterized by an etatist ideology. The period from 1917 to 1934 was a "golden age" for the formation of ethno-national culture, with the Jadids playing a leading role. The establishment of Uzbekistan as a result of the 1924 territorial reform embodied their Chagatai-inspired vision of the model of national culture—one that emphasized Central Asian Turkic heritage, tracing its roots back to the empire of Timur, rather than embracing Pan-Turkism. At the same time, language came to be understood as the key marker of culture, and the distinctions among Turkic peoples of the region were increasingly recognized. Under *de facto* biculturalism (Turkic-Persian), this approach led to an intellectual break between Turkic thinkers and the Persian-speaking culture of the region. From the late 1920s onward, the Jadids faced growing pressure from the Soviet authorities, culminating in the purges of 1937-1938, when many of their leaders fell victim to Stalin's repressive policies and fabricated accusations.

Second, all these developments unfolded amid periodically tense relations between the indigenous people and the European, East Slavic colonists. Initially, the local revolutionary leadership was composed primarily of Europeans. By the early 1920s, Moscow began implementing the policy of *korenizatsiya* ("putting down roots") in the region. This shift led to a conflict of interest between Moscow and the settler community.

Third, the issue of Central Asia's colonial status, as Adeeb Khalid argues, is inherently ambiguous:

> … Tsarist Russia was a particularist empire that took difference for granted. …The Soviet Union's cultural agenda—mass education in indigenous languages, fighting illiteracy, public health, political mobilization—had more in common with those of the mobilizational states of the interwar era, while its attempts to engineer society—land reform, organization of marginal groups in society, reshaping the body social—have no parallels in the colonial empires of the era. And yet the gap between ambition and achievement remained wide, and indeed, as stated above, the Soviet state made its peace with the settler population. It could not completely vanquish the habitus of empire. (Khalid 2015: 8, 10)

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As noted above, the thesis asserting the exclusive significance of the Jadids in social processes of the early 20th century is not universally accepted in academic circles. Paolo Sartori, for instance, acknowledges the Jadid movement's contribution to awaking national sentiments and urges not to exaggerate its importance:

> … [T]he ideas of the allegedly conservative 'ulama' who sought to acquire political power in the region also shaped the discourse on Muslim nationalism. In addition, after 1926, the Muslim Communists (and the few Jadids who joined them) no longer had political autonomy and lost whatever space they had once had for cultural maneuvering in the public sphere. Finally (…) cultural engineering on a national basis was deeply affected by the campaign of indigenization led by the centre; as no prosopography of Central Asia's indigenous cadres has ever been made on a systematic basis, it cannot be claimed that all the Muslims who staffed the cadres of the titular national republics were Jadids or Jadid-influenced. (Sartori 2010: 327–328)

During the Soviet period, by the way, the Jadids were likewise viewed critically, particularly for their narrow-mindedness. The criticism, however, did not concern the extent of their influence so much as the temporary nature of the positive social effects their activities produced. This perspective was vividly illustrated in the television series *Fiery Roads* ("*Olovliyo'llar*") broadcast by the Soviet Central Television from 1977 to 1984. The series addressed the revolutionary poet Hamza Hakimzade Niyazi (1882-1929)—a spokesman of the radical left in the Jadid movement. According to the official doctrine of that time, the positive characters in the series were meant to depict the Jadids as a progressive movement only in a limited sense of the historical process—one whose new-method schools contributed briefly to enlightenment. Under the new ideological framework, however, it was no longer the Jadids who were needed, but new heroes like Hamza—figures who embodied social struggle and prepared the ground for revolution ("today the Jadids emphasize their commitment to progress, but tomorrow they will find themselves allied with the most reactionary Ulemas and Bais").[1]

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[1] Apparently, the series — produced by the *Uzbekfilm* studio, with Shukhrat Abbasov as production director—was regarded by the then leaders of Uzbekistan not only as a means of reinforcing the official ideological doctrine, but also as an instrument for promoting Uzbek culture beyond the Uzbek SSR. However, its ideological subtleties were not easily understood by the audiences outside the social and cultural milieu

Without entering into the modern scholarly debate among experts in religion regarding the extent of the Jadid movement's influence, it seems appropriate to view its history from another perspective—within a broader social context. It is well known that the Jadids played a leading role in shaping the ideological foundation of the anti-emir movement of Young Bukharians, whose left-radical branch, led by Fayzulla Khojaev (1896-1938), Abdulkadir Mukhiddinov (1892-1934), and Abdurauf Fitrat (1886-1938), carried particular weight in the political formation of Bukharan People's Soviet Republic (Bukharan PSR). Later, Abdulkadir Mukhiddinov headed the executive power of Tajikistan, while Fayzulla Khojaev did so in Uzbekistan. Moreover, for a considerable period (1925-1937), the Soviet Union was nominally presided over by a former Jadid—descendant of the wealthy merchant class of Bukhara. According to the Soviet Constitution, Fayzulla Khojaev, as head of the Uzbek government, concurrently held the highest formal political office: Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, a position collectively occupied by the leaders of the union republics. Naturally, during the period of Stalin's personal dominance, this office carried little real power. Yet its very existence underscored the considerable informal authority and symbolic significance that Fayzulla Khojaev retained within Uzbekistan.

Thus, the phenomenon of the left-radicalized Jadids and the Young Bukharians is closely related to the broader assessment of the mission of left-bourgeois radical democrats in the revolutionary developments of 1905-1919. These movements—prevalent across territories stretching from Central Europe to Iran—were significantly catalyzed by the cataclysms of the First World War. The revolutionary process of the early 20th century united, in opposition to monarchical autocracy, both anti-bourgeois and liberal-bourgeois currents. The role of igniting agent or "ferment of disturbance" within this process was played by the revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia—mostly descendants of the middle class—who shared a common left- bourgeois habitus and were represented in both ideological camps. The general balance of forces largely depended on which direction their prevailing sympathies would incline. Within the Russian Empire, however, revolutionary movements unfolded amid the national liberation struggle of various peoples seeking to expand their ethnocultural rights under the leadership of their own, predominantly left-bourgeois elites.

Under these conditions, the Leninist leadership of Bolshevism, with its slogans of "developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution," played the role of guarantor and kapellmeister of a dynamic and revolution-oriented unity between the forces of grassroots anti-bourgeois protest and the revolutionary-democratic, radical left descendants of the middle class within the framework of its own party. In the opinion of Pavlo Kutuev,

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of Central Asia. As a result, for much of the general public the history of Jadids remained largely unfamiliar. After Ukraine gained independence, the educated public became somewhat more aware of the Jadid movement through the efforts of Crimean Tatar activists, who helped popularize the legacy of Ismail Gasprinsky (1851-1914)—a Crimean Jadid whose ideas had a profound influence on Turkestan. Yet overall, the Jadids as representatives of a liberal education current within the intellectual strata of Islamic societies in Crimea, Central Asia, Tatarstan, and the Transcaucasus, have remained a topic rather distant from audiences unfamiliar with Muslim traditions.

> Lenin managed to fit into the traditional context of Russian history because of his organic connection with the "revolutionary-democratic" legacy in general and, specifically, the ideas of Petr Tkachev. (Кутуєв 2000: 155)

At the same time, the Leninist leadership, by endorsing the slogan "the right of nations to self-determination," positioned itself as a guarantor of compromise within the Bolshevik environment—between the interests of Russian revolutionary forces and those of the pro-Bolshevik national liberation movement. Ultimately, this approach became the foundation for constructing the Soviet revolutionary-internationalist empire (counter-empire)[1], which preserved the state traditions and much of the territorial integrity of the former Russian Empire, particularly in Turkestan.

From this point of view, such Jadid figures as Fayzulla Khojaev, head of the Bukharan PSR and later of the Uzbek government, stood at the intersection of both compromises. He represented the radical bourgeois left, absorbed by Bolshevism yet striving for national self-determination. It is significant that his close relative and fellow Jadid, Usman Khojaev (1878-1968), former head of the Central Executive Committee of the Bukharan PSR and known for his ties to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, also sought independence for "Red Bukhara". In doing so, he sided with Enver Pasha, the leader of Young Turks, and later headed the Turkestan *émigré* movement in Turkey. However, unlike the Socialist-Revolutionaries or the Ukrainian "Borotbists," the ideological roots of these figures were religious rather than purely social, and they came from the wealthy merchant nobility.

The analysis of the "triangle" of relations among the metropole, indigenous peoples, and colonists—what the author of *Making Uzbekistan* terms the "nationalization of revolution"—stands out as one of Adeeb Khalid's major scholarly achievements. Adeeb Khalid carefully illustrates the conflict that emerged between the revolutionary regime of the red metropole and the leadership of European settlers, a tension that ultimately reshaped relations between the Bolsheviks' revolutionary-imperial center and indigenous communities of Turkestan. He convincingly demonstrates that, in the aftermath of the 1917 Revolution, the Turkestan territories became, to a certain extent, isolated from the European part of the empire, leaving local power—particularly in urban centers—in the hands of the settler activists. However, beginning from April 1918, under the insistent and often coercive efforts of metropolitan emissaries pursuing *korenization* (indigenization), representatives of the Muslim population were increasingly integrated into administrative structures, despite resistance from colonists determined to preserve their privileged status. This process paved the way to the advancement of the phenomenon termed by Alexandre Bennigsen as "Muslim national communism." Yet, as Adeeb Khalid further showed, throughout the 1920s, the metropole's relationship with Islamic national communism remained fraught with tension and periodic conflicts.

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[1] The author of the concept of the "revolutionary-imperial paradigm" is Vladislav Zubok (London School of Economics and Political Science). We approach the Soviet regime simultaneously as the successor to the Russian Empire and, conversely, as its negation. On the one hand, the Soviet system inherited the territory and geopolitical role of the Russian Empire, a classical imperial formation. On the other hand, it incorporated, on an avowedly internationalist basis, the elites of previously conquered territories. It was also, at least initially, animated by a revolutionary mission. The combination of these two components produces the phenomenon of a "counter-empire". Despite the diametrically opposed political systems and social orders, the United States can likewise be conceived as a counter-empire. The tactical convergence of US and Soviet interests in opposing the classical imperial formations of Great Britain and France manifested itself during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

It is worth recalling that since the time when the European great powers imposed colonial rule over much of the world, interactions between imperial centers and colonial entities often took on a conflictual character—not only in relations with subjugated peoples but also with the communities of European colonists. In many cases, the imperial center's attempts to enforce economic dependence upon the colonists were perceived as unjust or exploitative.

This dynamic was clearly manifested, for example, in 1765, when the British Crown imposed a stamp duty on North American colonists—a measure that benefited only the inhabitants of the metropole while proving extremely unfavorable to the colonies through subsequent duties on tea and other goods. These policies led to polarization and the erosion of loyalty among English settlers, ultimately escalating into armed conflict and the War of Independence. However, history offers numerous precedents in which, by contrast, the imperial core showed no overt signs of discrimination towards its colonists, yet separatist sentiments nevertheless gained strength among them.

In this respect, in our opinion, one may argue—setting aside the specific historical situation of the early 19th century wars of independence in Latin America—that a well-known pattern can be observed: when settlers formed a substantial majority compared to autochthones, the colonial settlement tended, over time, to secession. Conversely, when the autochthonous population significantly outnumbered the colonists, the metropole eventually withdrew its support for the settlers. The immediate trigger for secession in such cases could be a crisis in the metropole or an armed uprising by the indigenous population. In the latter scenario, developments were often influenced by social sabotage or, at the very least, by indifference on the part of ordinary people living in the metropole. Unlike those engaged in the "great games" of imperial competition among major powers for global influence, these people did not view participation in the overseas military campaigns—often accompanied by heavy casualties—as a noble cause requiring personal heroism or self-sacrifice. In such crises, the interests of the settler population often compelled the imperial center to resort to military force. To manage this situation, the French government created the French Foreign Legion composed predominantly of foreign mercenaries. From its inception, this corps was prepared for military engagement in Algeria, where, in 1954, an uprising of the autochthonous population erupted. After a prolonged military conflict, Charles de Gaulle eventually recognized the right of Algeria's Arab-Berber population to self-determination. In response, part of the large Algeria's European settler community ("*pieds-noirs*") launched an armed resistance, viewing this decision as a betrayal of their own interests. Following France's recognition of Algerian independence in 1962, most "*pieds-noirs*" repatriated to the metropole, where their descendants later figured among the social roots of the radical right-wing National Front led by Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen.[1]

Evidently, the milieu of the "pieds-noirs" was historically composed of individuals adhering to diverse ideological views. For example, it produced key philosophers of the French Left—Albert Camus and Louis Althusser. However, amid the conflict with the autochthonous population, the left-wing camp in the metropole adopted an anti-colonial stance grounded in sympathy for, and support of, the insurgents. As a result, after 1954, the "pieds-noirs" increasingly evolved toward the French right-radical *Organisationarméesecrete* (OAS). The shift in the ideological attitudes of Maurice Meyssonnier, the principal executioner of French justice in Algeria, represents a characteristic example. Initially, a committed communist who financially supported striking workers, he eventually found himself compelled in desperation to revise his ideological orientation. The situation in Turkestan displayed a different dynamic during the armed struggle of 1917-1922, when the ranks of European colonists became fragmented. Control in the cities was largely maintained by the Red forces. The White camp was represented by the clandestine Turkestan Military Organization, which was closely aligned with Great Britain and led by Vladimir Kornilov, the brother of General Lavr Kornilov. The Slavic peasantry, represented in particular by the Fergana Peasant Army, also known as the Monstrov Army, oscillated between red-green and white-green positions.

And yet, in this case, Adeeb Khalid examines the situation that does not conform to the standard patterns described above. Amid numerous internal and external wars, episodes of unrest, and uprisings involving both the local population and settlers, the central revolutionary-imperial authorities sought to maintain control over Turkestan. As Karl Radek put it, for the Bolsheviks the civil war was a national war aimed at concentrating the empire's territory "in the hands of one dictator—the working class" (Радек 1920: 1). However, this consolidation came at the expense of the European colonists, whose power and career-related privileges were significantly curtailed.

The author of *Making Uzbekistan* demonstrates convincingly that the Leninist leadership (which, like other radical movements in the pre-revolution period, sought to attract national minorities to its side in the struggle against tsarism) made every effort to persuade the autochthonous population of Turkestan that its goal was to break with the imperial-colonial past. This policy was driven by both economic considerations, such as the metropole's continuing interest in cotton supplies, and by a broader geostrategic plan.

We should recall that at that time the red metropole pursued concurrent expansion both westward and eastward, with particular emphasis on the Islamic world. After the collapse of the Soviet republics in Hungary, Bavaria, and Slovakia, as well as the suppression of the rebellion in Hamburg in 1923, the eastern direction—driven by the willingness to undermine the power of the European metropoles in the Asian colonies—gained increasing importance. These developments unfolded against the backdrop of an escalating conflict with Great Britain. Operating from its Indian base, the British Empire launched a campaign in Turkestan by occupying Ashkhabad and Krasnovodsk, and in Transcaucasia, where it established control over Baku, Poti and Batumi. At the same time, together with its allies, Britain occupied Istanbul (1918-1923), and, as the outcome of World War I, its policies were directed against Turkey. The partition of the Ottoman Empire paved the way for radical changes in the balance of power in the Middle East. The Soviet response to these policies was likewise of a revolutionary-imperial nature and manifested in the proclamation of the Persian Soviet Republic in Gilan and in General Brusilov's plan to advance towards India from the Turkestan base.

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[1] In the contemporary world, Donald Trump and Elon Musk have assumed the role of principal advocates of the interests of the descendants of colonists with respect to South African society.

An important aspect of Adeeb Khalid's analysis is his observation that the Jadids' traditional affinity with Turkey played a significant role in their rapprochement with Bolshevik leadership. The Jadids maintained close connections with the Ottoman world and the Young Turks movement.

> Even as he bemoaned the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd, Fitrat wrote that "it had now become clear who the real enemies of the Muslim, and especially the Turkic, world are." The Ottoman defeat, which opened the way to unprecedented British paramountcy in the Middle East, was a turning point of sorts for the Jadids, who lost a great deal of their earlier fascination with the liberal civilization of Europe and turned to a radical anticolonial critique of the bourgeois order. The situation also led the Jadids to a reevaluation of the Bolsheviks… (Khalid 2015: 102)

Overall, a positive aspect of Adeeb Khalid's research, in our opinion, is his unwillingness to oversimplify social ambivalences by resorting to reductionism in explaining social relationships. In this regard, his evaluation of Central Asia's role within the system of imperial-colonial dominance serves as a representative example.

As follows from Khalid's analysis, the ambiguity manifests in the following way. Within the Russian Empire, Turkestan functioned as a typical colony of a European empire. However, the Soviet regime, as Khalid emphasizes, pursued policies of socialist construction and political mobilization—objectives fundamentally distinct from those of classic colonial empires. Yet, in terms of economic rationality, Uzbekistan continued to attract the attention of the Soviet center primarily as a supplier of cotton. This preserved the raw material orientation—typical of a colonial-type economic dependency—and dictated a slower pace of industrial modernization than that observed in European regions. Thus, Adeeb Khalid spotted the situation in which the logic of political mobilization came into conflict with the logic of economic productivity.

Adeeb Khalid also identified similar ambiguities in the process of *korenizatsiya*:

> Eventually, the main impact of korenizatsiia was to provide hope to national cadres; its lack of fulfillment produced discontent that was seen by party authorities and the political police as a sign of disloyalty and 'nationalism.' Central Asia changed enormously in the years after 1917, but it saw little of the equalization the revolution had seemed to promise. The habitus of empire survived the revolution." (Khalid 2015: 158)

During this process, in Adeeb Khalid's opinion, the model of pressure on the intelligentsia of Central Asia was first tested in the case of Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (1930).

We believe it is important to note that the process of *korenizatsiya* in Central Asia was slowed rather than terminated. After Isaak Zelensky was recalled to Moscow early in 1931, the position of the party leader of Uzbekistan was assumed by Akmal Irkamov (1898-1938). Unlike Fayzulla Khodjaev, this revolutionary was neither a Jadid nor a Young Bukharan (*Mladobukharan*). However, he came from a family descended from Sheikh Hovendi at-Takhur, whose lineage is believed to trace back to Caliph Umar—known as one of the founders of the Caliphate and a co-author of the Qur'an. From that time onward, Uzbekistan's highest leadership consisted of representatives of the indigenous population.

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Some later events, whose dynamics are crucial to understanding the process analyzed in the book, serve as the chronological framework for *Making Uzbekistan*. Within the scope of this review, we do not address Adib Khalid's analysis of mature and late Soviet society presented in his subsequent work, *Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present*. In this regard, we make the following observations.

Following the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, who was of Transcaucasian origin, the ethnic balance of Soviet power substantially changed. The influence of the powerful Transcaucasian lobby, which had already suffered its first setbacks in 1951 during the Mingrelian Affair, weakened significantly. In an effort to prevent developments that were unfavorable to Caucasian officials, their informal leader, Lavrentiy Beria, shortly before his downfall, attempted to intensify the policy of *korenizatsiya* in the Soviet "national republics." At the initiative of L. Beria, government decrees on ethno-national policy were adopted in May and June 1953. They aimed to transfer power in the union republics of the USSR to representatives of the titular ethno-nations. This shift was already noted at the time by outside observers (Schwartz 1953: 6).

However, as one could assume, this initiative caused anxiety among many of its intended targets in the local communities, since it appeared to serve primarily as the protection of the career interests of its author. In particular, Lavrentiy Beria clashed on this issue with Nuritdin Mukhitdinov (1917-2008), the head of the Uzbek government.

One of the consequences of Beria's defeat was a shift in the position of Central Asia elites and of Nuritdin Mukhitdinov personally. Between 1957 and 1961, Nikita Khrushchev appointed him to the highest and narrowest governing body—the Presidium (Political Bureau) of the CPSU Central Committee[1]. This appointment coincided with a period of fundamental activation and renewal of Soviet engagement in the East. Nuritdin Mukhitdinov—believed to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson and the fifth "rightly guided" caliph, Imam Ali—was elected as its chief curator.

These events unfolded during the first wave of global decolonization and amid the Bandung Conference of 1955. Concurrently, after the Suez Crisis of 1956-1957, the confrontation over the redistribution of power in the Middle East intensified dramatically. Under these circumstances, the Soviet leadership sought to emphasize that its country supported decolonization and belonged not only to the European but also to the Eastern world. Meanwhile, Moscow and Beijing were engaged in intense competition for influence over developing countries and the national liberation movement. To some extent, the Soviet leadership returned—though through peaceful means—to the "Eastern activism" of the early 1920s. The rise of Nuritdin Mukhitdinov to the upper echelons of power signaled to the Islamic world the special role of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, within the Soviet system. Conventionally, Mukhitdinov's line may be tagged as a "foreign-policy neo-Jadidism" aimed at expanding the policy of social alliances by aligning with the nationalism of Islamic countries—yet without hostility toward Israel.

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[1] To present the activities of N. Muhitdinov we refer to the source: Мухитдинов 1995.

In Mukhitdinov's opinion, the Soviet leadership needed to fundamentally revise Joseph Stalin's ideological legacy in its approach to the East. At the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1952), Stalin sharply criticized the national bourgeoisies of the East. Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, by contrast, sought to move in the opposite direction, advocating rapprochement with progressive circles in the anticolonial movements—distant foreign analogues of the Jadids and Young Bukharans. Symptomatically, during his visit to China, he travelled to Yarkand in Xinjiangto attend the burial site of the Uzbek poet Furkat (1868-1909), whose works had significantly influenced the formation of Jadidism. It is also evident that in the sphere of interethnic relations, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov positioned himself as a determined opponent of Mikhail Suslov, the chief party ideologist, who most consistently promoted the Great Russian ethno-cultural model and the need for accelerated rapprochement and homogenization of the nation.

Subsequent developments in the sphere of affirmation of Uzbekistan's status largely followed the said logic of social ambivalence. On the one hand, the republic retained its monocultural specialization in cotton production, which is typical of agrarian neo-colonial dependency. Several regions, particularly the Fergana Valley, experienced social stagnation. Despite high birth rates, much of the population lived in severely constrained economic conditions. The Aral Sea region suffered an ecological catastrophe. On the other hand, resource transfers were directed to the region. Industrialization proceeded, albeit selectively (for example, the aviation and electronic industries were established, whereas the automotive industry remained underdeveloped); social, cultural, and research-and-education infrastructure continued to expand. Many layers of the administrative apparatus became—to a significant extent—korenized. In 1966, Tashkent was selected as a place to host the historic Indo-Pakistani peace negotiations. This underscored the prestige of Uzbekistan's capital as *de facto* "Eastern gateway" of the Soviet Empire. Even after Mukhitdinov's removal from top political positions in 1961, Uzbekistan remained represented in the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee. Thus, during that period, the political system of Uzbekistan combined contradictory characteristics: it was simultaneously an object of extraction and a front line of the Soviet neo-imperial (counter-imperial) structure.

At the same time, growing discontent with the state of affairs in Central Asia was becoming evident within the Soviet imperial center. The high-profile "Cotton Case" (1984-1989), inspired by political bosses, though presented as an anti-corruption campaign, appears to have had an unofficial political dimension. It provided a mechanism that, if not dismantling the well-integrated korenized ruling elite groups in Central Asian leadership, at least significantly curtailed their power. Yet the exposure of actual cases of corruption concealed a long history of the Soviet center's imposition of unrealistic production quotas on Uzbekistan—a policy that had itself incentivized systemic corruption and abuse.

The next step in the metropole's recentralization efforts was directed toward Kazakhstan, which traditionally had the largest proportion of European population in Central Asia. In December 1986, the position of head of Kazakhstan was filled under the USSR's central order by a protégé from the Russian interior. This decision triggered mass protests among Kazakh youth (known as the "Zheltoksan uprising"). It may be assumed that these events reflected an underlying conflict between two competing models within the bureaucratic empire: between the center and peripheries. The korenized elites, through covert means, sought to preserve—under new political conditions—a level of political and, above all, personnel autonomy not lower than that which had existed in the Emirate of Bukhara in 1917. The Soviet-imperial center, by contrast, increasingly viewed the administrative situation as ideal from the 1930s, when it could, by directive, immediately replace top officials, even if they had no connection to Central Asia. The resulting *status quo* represented a fragile compromise, periodically disrupted by incidents like Zheltoksan. Parallelly, a growing sense of distance from Central Asia developed within the Russian population, most of which expressed concerns over financial transfers and risky projects such as the proposed diversion of Siberian rivers to water-scarce South[1]. Latent ethnocultural anxieties also emerged, driven in part by disproportion of birth rates in Asia and in European parts of the USSR.

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As mentioned above, an evident consonance can be traced between Adeeb Khalid's views and Edvard Said's theory of Orientalism regarding the proportion of roles of East and West in social processes. Both scholars reject the worldview that denies the active agency of Eastern societies. Nevertheless, notable differences in their approaches can also be observed.

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[1] It was precisely the large-scale public environmental resistance within the Russian Federation in 1986 to the project of diverting Siberian rivers to Central Asia that may be regarded as evidence of a growing distance vis-à-vis Central Asia. The project did, indeed, bear all the hallmarks of controversial megalomania. However, the protest was led by Russian nationalist writers and nationalist activists, which imparted to it a nationalist, anti-Asian inflection. Under these conditions, the problem of the desiccation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was not brought into discussion. The issue has been examined in detail, with particular attention to the role of the nationalist factor, inMicklin 2011. At the level of the struggle for symbolic capital, this tension had manifested itself earlier in a literary-critical conflict around the key medieval work of Kyivan-Chernihiv Rus', The Tale of Igor's Campaign. The conflict unfolded between Mikhail Suslov and the literary scholar Dmitrii Likhachev, on the one hand, and the Kazakh writer Olzhas Suleimenov, on the other (1976).

It is particularly striking that Adeeb Khalid consistently and attentively traces such social ambivalences. This applies to the dual nature of relations between the progressive Muslim intelligentsia and the Bolshevik system in the 1920s, tension between the "red" metropole and colonists, and the ambiguous status of Central Asia within the Soviet neo-imperial system.

Edward Said's views, as articulated in *Orientalism*, differ in significant ways. As is well known, Said's work was created under the strong influence of Michel Foucault's theory of discourse, particularly as presented in *The Archaeology of Knowledge (L'archéologie du savoir*) and *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (*Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison*). Within Michel Foucault's worldview, knowledge is discursive in nature, embedded within relations of domination and power. Power and knowledge, in this sense, are inseparable—a connection Michel Foucault analyzed through numerous examples, all drawn from the Western European context rather than from studies of the Eastern world. Despite the model's great analytical value, Foucault can be criticized for a form of Occidental reductionism typical of modern European thought. "Something complex" (knowledge) is reduced to "something simple" (in this case, relations of dominance). This approach is always rather vulnerable when we face social ambivalences and ambiguities—realities that exist everywhere. Even the deepest love may conceal traces of hatred; the sincerest loyalty may harbor a measure of doubt. Knowledge, indeed, functions within systems of power, yet it remains viable when such dominance is limited enough to allow a minimum of space for intellectual freedom and debate. In this sense, knowledge paradoxically depends on two irreconcilable forces—mechanisms of dominance and of freedom.

When extrapolated to the East, Michel Foucault's model—developed outside comparative research on societies—led to the construction of a model that might be called the "hermetic model of East-knowing," which served as a source of Orientalism, with its stereotypical images of a static East. Undoubtedly, much of the criticism directed at this model is well grounded. However, historical evidence suggests the reverse: through numerous Oriental studies, the Western world itself becomes the object of reciprocal influence from Arab, Persian, Chinese, Japanese, Central Asian, and Indian cultures, whose intellectual and cultural achievements are indisputably profound.

In contrast to Edward Said, Adeeb Khalid's intellectual legacy, with his attention to social ambiguities, was formed in a dialogue with the works of Pierre Bourdieu, whose social theory emerged at the intersection of research on both Eastern and Western societies. In this respect, it is important to note that any relevant social theory claiming universal relevance would hardly exist in the modern world outside such comparative analysis. The capacity of the social sciences (with the possible exception of psychology) to conduct scientific experiments is extremely limited and can be substituted solely through the comparative research of dissimilar cultures. Likewise, theoretical knowledge that arises from intercultural communication constitutes authentic panhuman philosophy. From the standpoint of universal values, it is not the legacy of Aristotle the Stagirite or Avicenna taken separately that matters, but rather Aristotle's influence on

Avicenna and further Avicenna's influence on Thomas Aquinas and Western science in general.

However, if the object of comparison is a historical period rather than cultures, a striking difference emerges between the era analyzed by Adeeb Khalid and the present. Reflecting on his own career, Jozef Pilsudski once remarked: "Comrades, I took the red tram of socialism to the stop called Independence, and that's where I got off." Addeb Khalid described progressive figures who took the red tram of socialism from the stop called Religion to the station called Nation, but ultimately died tragically during the Stalinist purges, leaving behind the carefully nurtured and noble project of Uzbekistan. They acted within a geopolitical context marked by conflict between Turkey and Great Britain against the backdrop of India's struggle for independence. However, the creation of Uzbekistan, as well as other Central Asian republics, produced a lasting effect of dual containment. It limited political interference in religion within Central Asia and simultaneously constrained the Great Russian nationalism in the former imperial metropole. Today, however, this historical trajectory reveals a new paradox: the journey from the "Religion" station to the "Nation" station has become deeply problematic. In conditions of independence, the secular states of Central Asia have only one critical ideological alternative: religious-political radicalism.

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