

REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES: THE CASES OF SLOVAKIA AND SERBIA ¹

Kateryna Kasatkina

Comenius University in Bratislava
ORCID: 0000-0002-1756-6989

Kateryna Shymkevych

Zaporizhzhia Institute of Economics and Informational Technologies
ORCID: 0000-0003-3796-3292

DOI: 10.36169/2227-6068.2024.02.00009

Abstract. *This article examines the regional dimensions of anti-Americanism in post-communist states, focusing on Slovakia and Serbia. The research aims to analyze the historical roots, government stances, and the impact of global geopolitical shifts, such as the war in Ukraine, on anti-American sentiment in these nations. Methodologically, the study combines political discourse analysis with a comparative approach, supported by a historical-problematic framework, to understand patterns of anti-Americanism in these countries. The scientific novelty of this research lies in its comprehensive approach to exploring the multifaceted nature of anti-American sentiment across two distinct post-communist contexts. The findings conclude that anti-Americanism in Slovakia and Serbia is shaped by complex ties with Russia, Cold War legacies, and current geopolitical dynamics, with Russia's aggression against Ukraine intensifying the East-West divide. Analysis of political discourse in Slovakia and Serbia reveals a contrast between official government positions and public attitudes toward the United States, where prevalent anti-American sentiments are often fueled by political leaders portraying the USA as an aggressor, especially in the context of NATO's actions. This ambivalence is further deepened by historical traumas, such as the NATO bombing in Serbia and Slovakia's pursuit of neutrality.*

Keywords: *Anti-Americanism, United States, Slovakia, Serbia*

Submitted: 12 July 2024; **accepted:** 3 November 2024

¹ The article was prepared under the support of the European Union NextGenerationEU project.

1. INTRODUCTION

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has heightened the geopolitical divide between East and West, shifting threat perceptions across Europe. We can see this shift in post-communist Central and Southeast European countries with complex historical, economic, and cultural relations with Russia. These ties, rooted in the legacy of the Cold War, energy dependencies, and shared Slavic heritage, have typically fostered anti-American sentiments that persist in various degrees across these nations. This legacy continues to influence the politics of these countries in the evolving regional landscape.

This paper proposes to explore the regional dimensions of anti-American in post-communist countries such as Slovakia and Serbia. The selection of these states for the case study might appear challenging due to their differing geopolitical contexts. This approach is grounded in observing how shared post-communist legacies and region-specific experiences shape diverse forms of anti-American sentiment. The states under analysis differ: Slovakia is involved in Western institutions and EU membership, and Serbia has complex relationships with Russia and the West. This divergence makes them fitting case studies, providing insight into regional anti-American sentiment, which varies based on historical alliances, economic ties, and differing foreign policy strategies. This approach also allows for broader insights into anti-American sentiment in post-communist Europe, highlighting shared patterns and regional distinctions.

The study of anti-Americanism engages scholars from various fields, including history, sociology, political science, philosophy, and psychology. Most research has focused on anti-Americanism as a global phenomenon. Significant contributions include the works of Paul Hollander (1995), Giacomo Chiozza (Chiozza 2010), Max Paul Friedman (Friedman 2012), Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (Katzenstein & Keohane 2007a, 2007b), Brendon O'Connor (O'Connor 2019). Theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence of anti-Americanism in Europe are detailed in the works of Heiko Beyer and Ulf Liebe (Beyer & Liebe 2014), Jessica Gienow-Hecht (Gienow-Hecht 2006) and Andrei Markovits (Markovits 2007). Research on the national specificities of anti-Americanism has primarily focused on Western Europe – on anti-communist bloc countries, as examined by Dan Diner (Diner 1996), Sophie Meunier (Meunier 2007), Philippe Roger (Roger 2006), or on post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe, as researched by Walter D. Connor (Connor 2004), Maryna Bessonova (Бессонова 2012), Sharon Werning Rivera and James D. Bryan (Rivera & Bryan 2019).

Despite extensive research on anti-Americanism, the specifics of anti-American sentiment in Central Europe and the Balkans remain underexplored in academic literature. There is also a shortage of comprehensive comparative studies on anti-American sentiments in post-communist countries that were not part of the Soviet Union but were involved in the ideological American - Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. This study aims to fill this gap by examining the case of Slovakia and Serbia, countries with a communist past, providing a detailed understanding of the regional aspects of this phenomenon in a comparative context.

This research aims to analyze the regional dimensions of anti-Americanism in post-communist states, focusing on Slovakia and Serbia. The research objectives include the following: to identify the historical roots that have shaped specific attitudes toward the United States and determine the factors that contributed to anti-American sentiments, particularly those arising from their communist past; to trace the evolution of US perceptions within the political discourse of Slovakia and Serbia in the post-bipolar era; explore how global geopolitical shifts, such as Russian aggression against Ukraine, impact the dynamics of anti-Americanism in these nations.

Before analyzing the regional dimensions of anti-Americanism in post-communist states, it is important first to consolidate existing interpretations of this phenomenon. Researchers define anti-Americanism as an ideology, a tendency, a bias, or prejudice against the United States that manifests in various forms, such as animus (Markovits 2007: 11), “syndrome” (Gienow-Hecht 2006: 1069), or “systematic opposition, a sort of allergic reaction to America as a whole” (Toinet 1990: 219).

Anti-American sentiment is complex and multifaceted, often stemming from a combination of political, economic, historical, religious, cultural, and psychological factors. In his examination of the causes behind the emergence of anti-American sentiments in different nations, American scholar Paul Hollander distinguishes between their “irrational” and “rational” nature. In the first case, it involves hostility towards anything associated with America, while in the second; it pertains to disagreement with US government policies or criticism of certain aspects of American society, which can be quite justified. Another distinction relates to the presumed roots of these two types of anti-Americanism: if irrational anti-Americanism can be attributed to psychological reactions, rational anti-Americanism should be interpreted as a political stance (Hollander 1995). Hollander’s framework offers a perspective on the complex blend of irrational and rational elements within anti-American sentiment in Slovakia and Serbia, clarifying how these attitudes have developed and changed over time.

Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane’s typology is invaluable for a better understanding of regional variations in anti-American sentiments. They define anti-Americanism as a “psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general” (Katzenstein & Keohane 2007b: 12), distinguishing it into four forms: liberal anti-Americanism, highlighting perceived United States hypocrisy and failures in world politics; social anti-Americanism, opposing social disparities within American society and found in European welfare states; sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, protecting national sovereignty and identity from American influence; and radical anti-Americanism, viewing the US as inherently hostile and promoting global violence (Katzenstein & Keohane 2007b: 28–38). Katzenstein and Keohane’s framework emphasizes the need to differentiate between opposition to US policies and more profound, more ingrained anti-American sentiments.

While some scholars measure anti-Americanism through behavioral indicators like protests and riots (Tai et al. 1973: 457–460), most research relies on analyzing political discourse or utilizing survey data. So Giacomo Chiozza identifies anti-Americanism as an “ideational phenomenon, an attitude, and a political belief that can be measured through

the answers individuals give to survey items” (Chiozza 2009: 37). Analyzing individual opinions leads to a deeper understanding of collective attitudes in different cultures, nations, and regions.

This research methodology combines political discourse analysis with a comparative method supported by the historical-problematic framework. This combination allows for identifying the roots of pro- and anti-American sentiments and tracing their evolution. The political discourse analysis focuses on examining speeches and official statements by political leaders, especially during election periods, regarding Slovakia–U.S. and Serbia–U.S. relations, with particular attention to the impact of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This approach identifies recurring themes, arguments, and patterns influencing Slovakia’s and Serbia’s attitudes toward the United States. The comparative method provides insight into broader patterns of anti-Americanism in these states, evaluates Russian influence, and examines the implications for regional security and stability. Comparing anti-American sentiment in Slovakia and Serbia within the context of Russian aggression is essential given their shared communist past, contrasting geopolitical orientations, and the strategic significance of their foreign policy choices.

2. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SLOVAKIA

Slovakia’s independence in 1993 marked a pivotal shift in its foreign relations, notably establishing close ties with the United States. The US played an indispensable role in Slovakia’s transition to democracy and its integration into Western institutions such as NATO. According to Slovak researcher Dušan Fischer, Slovak–US relations “stand on four pillars: culture, politics, investment, and strength” (Fischer 2019: 158). Among these, the political dimension has been the most impactful, both domestically and globally. Significant events like the Iraq invasion and NATO’s bombings in Serbia have drawn considerable public criticism in Slovakia. Fischer highlights that the Slovak public often opposed their government’s pro-American stances, particularly in foreign policy.

Political parties frequently broadcast anti-American narratives as well. Slovak sociologist and political scientist Grigorij Mesežnikov notes this trend mainly within nationalist and populist far-right parties, which support Russia and oppose NATO and Europeanization. Experts linked the rise of anti-Americanism with the “illiberal regression of democracy”, which emboldens these political parties (Mesežnikov 2020: 106). Additionally, the widespread belief in conspiracy theories among Slovaks (54%) further fuels their susceptibility to anti-American sentiments (Hajdu et al., 2022: 11). The cultural dimension has also become more prominent in recent years as local conservatives resist the influence of American liberal values. The global geopolitical shifts, especially the war in Ukraine, have intensified these anti-American sentiments, impacting Slovakia’s domestic and foreign policies.

The Ideological Framework of Anti-Americanism in Slovakia

In the early 20th century, Slovakia, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, remained predominantly rural and economically underdeveloped compared to other parts

of the Empire, with minimal direct exposure to the United States. While the broader European skepticism toward rising American economic and cultural influence was present to a degree, this sentiment was distinct from the Russophilia found in Slovak intellectual circles in the 19th century. Figures such as Ľudovít Štúr and Ján Kollár promoted Pan-Slavic ideals, which included admiration for Russia as a cultural and spiritual ally rather than an anti-American stance (Kaša 2017: 202–205). Their advocacy focused on the aspiration for greater national rights within the multi-ethnic empire, positioning Russia as a potential supporter of Slovak autonomy. Slovak sociologists and analysts observe that Russophilia in this period reflected a preference for cultural kinship with Slavic nations, which became idealized in contrast to other neighboring influences (Cuprik 2016). Thus, while American influence sometimes met with European skepticism, Slovak Russophilia was more about cultural affinity than direct opposition to the United States.

The formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 marked a significant shift in the political landscape. The new state, as a democratic republic, was oriented toward strong ties to Western powers, including the United States. The initial relationship with Washington was positive, driven by American support for the principle of self-determination, which President Woodrow Wilson championed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2023). However, despite these favorable beginnings, traces of anti-American sentiment developed, influenced partly by leftist ideological trends and concerns over growing US cultural and economic influence, which Europeans viewed as challenging traditional industries and values (Nolan 1994: 108–110).

In the 1920s and 1930s, various political ideologies, including nationalism and socialism, emerged in Central and Eastern Europe. These ideologies often critiqued capitalism and liberal democracy, systems closely associated with the United States. The growing influence of socialist and communist ideas in Czechoslovakia included a critique of American capitalism and its impacts. Additionally, being predominantly rural and conservative, Slovakia had a cultural identity somewhat at odds with the liberalism associated with American culture. Some Europeans saw the spread of American movies, music, and lifestyle as a form of limited but cultural dominance (Kirschbaum 2016: 158–162).

After World War II, Czechoslovakia appeared in the Soviet sphere of influence. Although the country's leadership initially expressed interest in joining the Marshall Plan to support economic recovery, Soviet pressure soon forced a withdrawal, underscoring the limits of their autonomy. The political landscape in Czechoslovakia shifted dramatically as the Communist Party gained significant power, partly due to the country's liberation from Nazi occupation, mainly by Soviet forces, supported by US troops and local resistance groups. The Western Allies, primarily the US Army, paused their advance near an agreed demarcation line, allowing the Soviets to take control of Prague. The initial post-war government was a coalition, but the Communists held significant sway. In February 1948, they executed a coup d'état and solidified their control over the government, establishing Czechoslovakia as a socialist state aligned with the USSR. This

marked the beginning of a four-decade-long period where Czechoslovakia, including Slovakia, adopted a staunchly pro-communist and anti-American position.

The ideological foundations of anti-Americanism during this period were deeply rooted in the Marxist-Leninist doctrines promoted by the Soviet Union. Communist propaganda portrayed the United States as the epitome of capitalist exploitation, as an oppressor of the working class, contrasting it with the socialist ideals of equality and communal ownership. Moreover, that time narratives depicted the USA as an aggressive imperialist power that sought to dominate other nations through economic, military, and cultural means (Dickins 2017: 65–67). The Korean War and, later, the Vietnam War reinforced these narratives as examples of American imperialism.

The Czechoslovak government, under communist rule, implemented extensive propaganda campaigns to instill anti-American sentiment among the population. State-controlled media, education systems, and cultural institutions played roles in disseminating anti-American messages. Newspapers, radio, and later television portrayed the United States in a negative light, emphasizing issues such as racial inequality, crime, and economic disparities. However, as Tom Dickins notes, anti-American sentiments among Czechs and Slovaks were not dominant. This was due to the United States' significant role in supporting the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. Additionally, the significant Czech and Slovak diaspora in the USA, formed during the interwar period, maintained strong connections with their homeland (Dickins 2017: 74–75).

The Prague Spring of 1968 marked a brief period of political liberalization and reform in Czechoslovakia, led by Alexander Dubček, who aimed for a more open and progressive society. However, the Soviet-led invasion in August 1968 crushed these reforms and reestablished hardline communist control. In the years leading up to the Velvet Revolution of 1989, Czechoslovakia remained part of the socialist bloc while still retaining its liberal aspirations, which later influenced its orientation after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Thus, Slovakia's ideological framework of anti-American sentiments has a complex and contradictory structure. These sentiments stem from general European skepticism toward the spread of American influence. Pan-Slavic ideas fostered closer ties with Russia and an orientation towards the East, which Slovak populist parties would later leverage. The communist era and Soviet influence helped embed negative stereotypes of the United States in Slovak society, shaping anti-American sentiments as part of the broader ideological outlook promoted during the Cold War. Nonetheless, the ideological foundation of these sentiments was not entirely solid. The US support for Czechoslovakia's independence and the cultural ties of the Czech and Slovak diaspora challenged the strength of negativism toward the USA. Subsequently, this ideological framework significantly impacted and laid the groundwork for the complex relationship between Slovakia and the United States that evolved in the following decades.

Anti-Americanism as a Strategy for Political Populism in Slovakia

The end of the bipolar confrontation and the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted Central European countries to reevaluate their interests, goals, policies, and alliances within the context of their regained independence. In this environment, the Slovak Republic, which gained independence in 1993, sought to balance Western integration and establish partnerships with the United States while maintaining traditional ties with Russia.

In the early years of independence, the new state faced the challenge of building its political and economic systems. The United States played a pivotal role in supporting Slovakia's transition to democracy and a market economy by providing financial aid, technical assistance, and political backing for the Slovak Republic's bid to join Western institutions. However, those years were politically unstable under the leadership of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. His authoritarian style and reluctance to implement necessary democratic reforms strained Bratislava's relations with the West. Concerns over governance, human rights, and the rule of law led to Slovakia's initial exclusion from the first round of NATO enlargement in 1997 (Nelson & Szayna 1997). This contributed to a political climate that was more receptive to anti-American rhetoric.

The election of Mikuláš Dzurinda as Prime Minister in 1998 marked a turning point. His government prioritized democratic reforms, economic liberalization, and integration with Western institutions. Washington warmly received Bratislava's renewed commitment to these principles. It also provided substantial support for Slovakia's NATO and EU membership bids.

Now, we can evaluate Slovakia's post-communist path as a model of a successful transition to a liberal-democratic regime and a functioning market economy. Nonetheless, the early years of independence demonstrated that Slovakia remained a site of intense political competition between advocates of liberal-democratic values and proponents of illiberal and authoritarian approaches. According to researchers Grigorij Mesežnikov and Ol'ga Gyárfášová, since the 1990s, the Slovak party system has been characterized by polarization driven primarily by contrasting approaches to governance rather than ideological differences. We can divide the country's political parties into two main groups based on this difference. The first group comprises programmatic parties with clearly articulated ideological orientations that uphold liberal-democratic values. The second group includes political parties that favor an authoritarian style of governance, leveraging populism and nationalism to mobilize voters (Mesežnikov & Gyárfášová, 2018: 80–81). The former group tends to be pro-Western and pro-American. In contrast, the latter frequently adopts a pro-Russian stance or argues that Westernization is being imposed on Slovakia at the expense of its traditional values and sovereignty. Despite the marked polarization within the political sector, Slovakia's institutional foundations, principles of constitutional liberalism, European integration, and transatlantic ties have firmly taken root. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of these nationalist-populist parties continues to stoke anti-Western and anti-American sentiments among segments of the Slovak populace, often at odds with the officially declared position of the Slovak government.

Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, anti-American sentiments have intensified in Europe. It was mainly a reaction to NATO's actions in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Iraq War in 2003. The Slovak government's support for US military actions in Iraq was a strategic move aimed at securing NATO membership. However, Slovaks perceived these interventions as examples of American aggression and a destabilizing force in international affairs (Fila 2003). However, it sparked significant public opposition and heightened anti-American sentiments within Slovak society. Opposition forces capitalized on the war's unpopularity to mobilize voters in the 2006 elections. It led to the victory of the left-wing nationalist and populist political party "Direction – Social Democracy" ("SMER – sociálna demokracia"). Robert Fico led the party. He subsequently became prime minister and condemned the Iraq War as "unbelievably unjust and wrong" (*Reuters* 2007). In 2007, his government agreed to withdraw Slovak troops.

In the 2000s, economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties between the United States and the Slovak Republic strengthened significantly. After joining NATO in 2004 and President George Bush's visit in 2008, Slovakia pushed for visa-free travel to the USA, emphasizing its transatlantic integration. The visa requirement was abolished on November 17, 2008. It was a significant political and psychological milestone for Slovakia, marking its integration into Western structures alongside its Schengen and Euro-zone accessions and completing its efforts to join the democratic developed world (Demeš 2023: 72). The visa-free regime facilitated more intensive exchanges between Slovakia and the United States in education, science, and culture. Young people actively participated in various exchange programs, shaping their views on America and its lifestyle through personal experience, contributing to the growth of pro-American sentiments in society. Meanwhile, the older generation felt nostalgia for the perceived stability and social security of the communist era, contrasting with the uncertainties brought by post-communist transitions. This nostalgia frequently manifests as skepticism towards American capitalism and policies. Slovak sociologist Michal Vašečka argues that Slovak anti-Americanism is rooted in a broader rejection of modernity. He observes that while Slovaks may embrace the material aspects of Western life, they resist adopting Western cultural norms and values (*Aktuality.sk* 2022).

The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the subsequent conflict in Ukraine's Donbass region significantly heightened tensions between Russia and the West, including the United States. In response, Slovakia, aligning with the EU Council, condemned the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and supported EU and US sanctions against Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2014). Bratislava also actively engaged with Washington on regional security issues, notably through efforts to bolster the country's defense capabilities. It included the Partnership program between the Slovak Armed Forces and the Indiana National Guard and the training exercise – "Slovak Shield 2015" (Packett 2015). However, political leaders, including Prime Minister Robert Fico, were vocal critics of Western sanctions on Russia, labeling them as "absurd" and detrimental to Slovak economic interests (Tomek & Doroshev 2016). This criticism illustrated a pragmatic approach within the Slovak political establishment, aiming to balance relations with both the West and Russia.

Slovak society's stance on the situation in Ukraine was not unequivocal. While some supported Ukraine's sovereignty and the EU and US responses to Russian aggression, others sympathized with Russia due to historical, economic, and cultural ties, as well as active disinformation campaigns by the Kremlin. Russian propaganda in Slovakia aims to discredit Ukraine, the United States, NATO, and the EU by portraying them negatively and promoting conspiracy theories. It seeks to undermine Ukraine's revolution, depict the United States as seeking global domination, present NATO as an aggressor, and paint the EU as ineffective. Additionally, it promotes a positive image of Russian foreign policy, justifying Russia's actions as defensive against Western aggression (Smoleňová 2015). These efforts focused on creating skepticism and mistrust toward Western institutions and policies.

In 2016 the think tank Globsec studied the influence of Russian propaganda on shaping public opinion regarding East and West geopolitical orientation and support for NATO and EU membership in Central European countries. Public opinion polls revealed that anti-American sentiments significantly contributed to distrust towards NATO. Over 60% of Slovaks believed that the USA used NATO to control small countries like Slovakia, and 48% thought that the USA was responsible for the conflict in Ukraine. Overall, 59% of Slovaks viewed the US's role in Europe and the world negatively (Globsec 2016).

Anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments in Slovakia, fueled by Kremlin disinformation campaigns, led to opposition against an initiative to install a missile defense system in Central Europe. This initiative, which involved neighboring countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland, faced resistance in Slovakia due to concerns about provoking Russia and escalating regional tensions. The Slovak pro-Russian opposition, led by Robert Fico, also strongly criticized a new Slovak–US Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). They argued that the agreement would undermine Slovakia's sovereignty, potentially allow for a permanent US military presence, enable the deployment of nuclear weapons, and provoke Russia (APNews 2022). On 8 February 2022, when lawmakers debated the DCA, thousands of Slovaks rallied to protest a military defense treaty between their nation and the United States, both members of NATO. The protesters waved national flags and banners such as “Stop USA Army” (APNews 2022). The opposition saw the DCA as a counterbalance to Moscow's regional influence but simultaneously portrayed the United States as the aggressor. In his public speeches, Fico frequently utilized entrenched anti-American clichés, including the slogan “Yankees, go home”. Interestingly, Fico supported the treaty when he started negotiations with the US in 2018 but has since turned into a vocal opponent (APNews 2022).

He also accused Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová of being a US agent and asserted that she “should remove her American uniform” (Smer-SSD 2022a). Despite this opposition and large-scale protests in Bratislava, Slovak Republic and the United States of America signed the 10-year agreement in early 2022 (U.S. Department of State 2022), just three weeks before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked Europe, prompting widespread condemnation and expressions of solidarity with Ukraine. It was in stark contrast to the more ambivalent attitude seen since 2014. In Slovakia, initial

public reactions included demonstrations supporting Ukraine and calls for more decisive action against Russian aggression (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic* 2022). It marked a unity with Western policies.

Full-scale invasion prompted a significant shift in Slovak public opinion regarding Russia, the USA, and NATO. According to a Globsec poll from spring 2022, 66% of Slovaks considered the invasion unprovoked and unjustified, which resonated with older generations' memories of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, 62% viewed NATO as vital for Slovak sovereignty and territorial integrity, while 61% felt that the presence of NATO troops on Slovakia's eastern border bolstered national security (Klingová 2022). Additionally, support for NATO and its role in European security increased substantially, with approval for NATO membership rising from 63% in 2021 to 72% in 2022 (Hajdu et al. 2022: 28–29). The United States' prominent role in the Western response improved its image among Slovaks, who now see the US as a crucial ally in countering Russian aggression. Despite this, some residual skepticism persists.

The escalation of Russian aggression has strengthened the strategic partnership between the USA and Slovakia. This collaboration addresses Russia's aggression, enhances security through bilateral military cooperation, and tackles energy security and disinformation (U.S. Embassy in Slovakia 2022). Both Washington and Bratislava have recognized the importance of countering pro-Russian propaganda as a critical aspect of regional security. According to Slovak researcher Miroslava Pisklová, Slovaks are particularly vulnerable to disinformation, propaganda, and conspiracy theories compared to other Central European nations. This vulnerability arises from factors such as political instability, declining trust in institutions, economic challenges, and pro-Russian sentiments (Pisklová 2022: 27–28). Disinformation, mainly when disseminated by political authorities and parties during election campaigns, can significantly influence public opinion, deepen societal divisions, and erode trust in democratic processes and institutions. This issue has been a primary concern for Slovakia's Western partners, particularly the United States.

In the 2023 parliamentary elections, the left-wing nationalist and populist political party “Smer,” known for its anti-American and pro-Russian stance, secured a decisive victory. This return to power signified heightened political instability and economic challenges, further exacerbated by ongoing conflict, pervasive disinformation, and a diminishing commitment to democratic values and freedoms. Public opinion polls revealed that over 88,7% of Slovaks expressed growing concern regarding the economic repercussions of the war (*Ako sa máte Slovensko?* 2022). Additionally, previous surveys indicated that two-thirds of Slovaks were willing to trade some rights and freedoms for better finance (Hajdu et al., 2020). The electoral campaign of the “Smer” party and its leader, Robert Fico, strategically leveraged these voter concerns to gain support.

Several key patterns are evident in examining Smer's anti-American rhetoric from 2022 to 2023. Party leader Robert Fico consistently portrayed the conflict in Ukraine as a broader geopolitical struggle between Russia and the United States rather than a localized issue. He criticized the US for alleged breaches of international law (*Smer-SSD* 2022b). He drew historical parallels with past American military interventions, such as

the bombings of Belgrade and the invasion of Iraq (*Smer-SSD 2022c*). Fico denounced NATO's expansion as a direct threat to Russian security and accused the US of being the primary aggressor. He opposed military aid to Ukraine, asserting that it conflicted with Slovak national interests, and criticized both the Slovak government and President Čaputová for their pro-NATO and pro-American policies (*Smer-SSD 2022d*). Fico argued that the US military presence near Russian borders strategically benefited American foreign policy (*Smer-SSD 2022d*) and opposed Ukraine's potential NATO membership (*Smer-SSD 2022c*). He accused the Slovak government and the EU of exacerbating the conflict and aligning with US interests, advocating for a peaceful resolution to serve Slovakia's national interests better (*Smer-SSD 2022c*; *Smer-SSD 2022d*). Thus, Robert Fico effectively mobilized support by positioning himself as a defender of Slovak national interests. This outcome underscores the enduring influence of anti-American sentiment in Slovak politics. It highlights the complex dynamics that post-communist states navigate in their relations with Eastern and Western powers.

The presidential elections 2024 were pivotal in determining the country's geopolitical orientation and internal political dynamics. Peter Pellegrini, a former Prime Minister of Slovakia, won the runoff election. He leads the "Voice – Social Democracy party" ("Hlas-SD") (a social democratic and populist political party). He is known for his centrist and pragmatic approach, balancing pro-Western and pro-Russian sentiments. His political path also includes close ties to the "SMER" party and its leader, Robert Fico: Pellegrini previously served as vice-chairman of SMER and led its electoral list in the 2020 parliamentary elections.

As a pro-EU politician, Pellegrini will likely maintain Slovakia's strong ties with NATO and the European Union. Commentators expected him to advocate for a robust partnership with the United States, emphasizing shared security interests, economic cooperation, and technological collaboration. Despite this, we can find elements of anti-Americanism in his political rhetoric and policies. So, Peter Pellegrini has voiced concerns about NATO's expansion and the presence of US military forces in Europe (*HLAS 2022a*). While supporting Slovakia's membership in NATO, he has often stressed the need for a balanced foreign policy that does not overly depend on military alliances with the United States (*HLAS 2022b*). He has also been cautious about trade agreements with the USA, emphasizing the need to protect Slovak industries and ensure that agreements do not disproportionately benefit American corporations at the expense of local businesses. Therefore, Pellegrini has expressed reservations about the economic sanctions imposed by the EU and the USA on Russia. He argues that these sanctions are unlikely to bring peace to Ukraine and may harm Slovakia's economic stability (Čop 2022). Despite his criticisms, the Slovak leader carefully maintains a balanced approach, recognizing the importance of Slovakia's alliances with the US and NATO. His anti-American rhetoric is often tempered by pragmatic considerations, ensuring that he does not alienate pro-Western constituents or international partners.

Slovakia presents a unique case in Central Europe where traditional, historically rooted anti-American sentiments coexist with pro-American, Atlantic-oriented ones. This ambivalence is rooted in the historical development of relations between the two

countries and Slovakia's longstanding ties with Russia. Anti-American sentiments stem from general European skepticism towards the spread of American influence, as well as Pan-Slavic ideas, and an orientation towards the East. The communist past and Soviet propaganda contributed to the development of enduring negative stereotypes of the United States, elevating anti-Americanism to a political stance during the Cold War. Since independence, Slovakia successfully transitioned to democracy and solidified its course towards European and transatlantic integration. However, the Slovak Republic remains a battleground of intense political competition between supporters of liberal-democratic values with a pro-Western and pro-American orientation and proponents of illiberal and authoritarian approaches, who use populism, nationalism, and anti-American rhetoric to mobilize voters. It causes polarization in Slovak society regarding American policies and significantly impacts economic and cultural interactions between the two nations. Challenges to regional security, such as Russian aggression against Ukraine, have further deepened the divide among Slovaks regarding the future of their transatlantic partnership.

3. FICTIONAL ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SERBIA AND ITS FEATURES

The February–March 2024 Western Balkans Region Poll of the International Republicans Institute (IRI) shows that 36% of Serbs see the USA as the greatest threat to their country (IRI 2024: 55). This trend is critical in public opinion polls in recent years. Polls demonstrate an increasing anti-American sentiment and a desire to get closer to Russia. Washington understands these negative tensions and tries to change the relationship with Belgrade to a more constructive and positive one. The Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is using it to press on the American position towards Kosovo and get bonuses from the European Union. At the same time, Vučić continues to balance the US, the EU, and the Russian Federation. He often made anti-Western statements and criticized Brussels and Washington, using pro-Kremlin propaganda about the so-called collective West.

On the other hand, Vučić supports ties with Moscow as an ally of different international organizations and the Balkan region. Aleksandar Vučić and anti-American narratives are closely related because he returned anti-NATO and anti-US tensions in Serbian public life and society. He became the prime minister of Serbia in 2014, and since then, Vučić has been trying to ensure absolute support for his authoritarian rule. He chose anti-American sentiments because the NATO air campaign in 1999 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, comprising Serbia and Montenegro) remains an un-lived trauma of Serbian society. It was an excellent method to mobilize Serbs around him and the Serbian Progressive Party (ruled in Serbia since 2014). Also, it was an excellent way to have Russian support in the United Nations and other international platforms, cooperating with Moscow in the gas and oil spheres. Serbs show to Vučić as a defender of their interests and Serbia, its territorial integrity and sovereignty. As a result, citizens in the country have confidence in a strong government, a strong country, and a strong army. They are also sure they can count on the support of friendly Russia. Against this background, in the last decade, anti-Americanism in Serbia deepened and took root in society. It is constantly used to their advantage not only by the Serbian authorities but

also by Russian propaganda. For Moscow, Serbian anti-Americanism has become an additional tool for destabilizing the Balkan region and fighting European integration here.

From Friendship to Anti-Americanism

The United States recognized the Principality of Serbia in 1867 (Амбасада САД у Србији 2020). Establishing full-fledged diplomatic relations lasted until 1881–1882 and benefited both countries (Rastović 2020). Serbia strengthened its position following the Berlin Congress of 1878, which affirmed its independence. As the Ottoman Empire sought to reclaim its former territories, Belgrade sought external allies, including Great Britain, the Russian Empire, France, the Kingdom of Romania, and the Principality of Montenegro. The support of the United States, a significant power in the Americas, was also essential. Serbian leadership believed that US backing could deter the Ottoman Empire and other states from altering borders in the Balkans.

With the outbreak of World War I, Serbia faced severe challenges, prompting US authorities to provide humanitarian assistance. From 1914 to 1916, the Serbian diaspora and citizens sent funds, food, seeds, and agricultural tools while facilitating the relocation of refugees to the United States. According to Serbian historian Radila Vucetic, since 1917, Washington has provided Serbia with \$1 million in monthly aid (Anđelković 2022). On July 28, 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson ordered the flow of the Serbian flag over the White House, which the Serbian government viewed as significant support (Амбасада САД у Србији 2020).

Serbian scholars interpret this as the highest level of US support (Anđelković 2022; Simić et al. 2021: 81–94), which facilitated the US recognition of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1919 (US Department of State n.d.a). Hence, US–Serbian diplomatic relations continued under this new Balkan state, whose establishment aligned with Wilson’s 14 Points. Meanwhile, the United States severed its separate relations with Montenegro, which it had formally recognized on March 31, 1905 (U.S. Department of State n.d. b). With the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, uniting the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs with the Kingdom of Montenegro, the White House deemed separate US-Montenegrin relations unnecessary. From 1920 to 1991, diplomatic ties persisted with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (later Federal Yugoslavia), where Serbia played a central role.

In the interwar years, diplomatic relations were sporadic. The European countries used it for their political interests. Great Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, and Italy competed for spheres of influence on the Balkan Peninsula, seeking to create various military-political blocs on the eve of the Second World War. It couldn’t protect the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; the Germans and their allies occupied it in 1941. The Yugoslav government, formed after the coup on the 27th of March 1941, immigrated to London. The American mission left Belgrade in mid-May of the same year. Relations between the two states continued with emigration. Washington even went so far as to raise the status of its representation in Yugoslavia to an embassy (U.S. Department of State n.d. a). The US Embassy returned to Belgrade in 1945.

Between 1941 and 1945, US–Yugoslav relations evolved as Washington initially backed Draža Mihailović's royalist movement, which sought to reinstate the Karadjordjević monarchy. American officials hoped his forces could collaborate with Josip Broz Tito's communist partisans, comprising not only Serbs but also Croats, Montenegrins, Slovenes, Bosniaks, and Roma. However, Mihailović, representing Serbian royalist interests, was unpopular among other ethnic groups who resisted a monarchy led by the Serbian dynasty. This division prompted the US to shift its support to Tito, whose partisans received formal backing in 1943 following the Tehran Conference. With widespread civilian support, Soviet backing, and an independent approach to liberation without Red Army assistance, Tito's postwar position was strong. His pragmatic approach kept Yugoslavia free from Soviet influence, allowing an independent course in both domestic and foreign affairs (Шимкевич 2023а).

The United States saw Federal Yugoslavia and its leader as crucial partners in curbing Stalin's influence in the Balkans. The rift between Josip Broz Tito and Joseph Stalin in 1948 fostered close cooperation with the US under the Truman Doctrine of 1947, both sides made mutual concessions; for instance, Yugoslavia refrained from supporting Greek communists, prompting the White House to provide economic and financial aid despite domestic ambivalence (*U.S. Department of State* n.d. c). Additionally, with US support, Yugoslavia became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1949, displacing Soviet-aligned Czechoslovakia. The Balkan state also received loans from the US, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. President Harry Truman authorized the export of materials and equipment necessary for revitalizing key industries. This US support enabled Yugoslavia to strengthen economic ties with Italy, the UK, Austria, and other socialist countries. A significant milestone occurred in 1950 when Truman approved \$16 million in aid for Yugoslav armed forces, with further assistance from Great Britain (£2 million) and Norway (a five-year loan to address food shortages). By 1951, cooperation significantly expanded as Yugoslavia joined the American Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Шимкевич 2023а).

Josip Broz Tito didn't pursue full integration of the nation into Western military and economic structures. Although rumors circulated about potential NATO membership, these hopes were unfulfilled. Instead, he and the leaders of Egypt and India established the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 (Шимкевич 2022). In response, the United States gradually decreased economic aid, which frustrated the Yugoslav government. As the political situation in the Soviet Union shifted, Tito moved toward a partial rapprochement with Moscow, resulting in a decline in relations with Washington throughout the 1960s and 1970s. While diplomatic ties remained intact, the US employed political pressure and interference in internal affairs. The Yugoslav leader largely disregarded the changing American stance, continuing his political maneuvers until his death in May 1980. The following decade saw ongoing economic and political cooperation, with the US closely monitoring rising nationalism in Serbia and other republics. Tensions escalated in 1991 with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and subsequent attacks by the Yugoslav People's Army on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On May 21, 1992, the United States declared it did not recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the legal successor to

the previous federation (*U.S. Department of State* n.d. a). The United States recalled the ambassador and established a temporary diplomatic mission instead of the embassy.

Support from Washington for Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with accusations of Serbian aggression, *marked the emergence of anti-American sentiment*. This feeling intensified after NATO began airstrikes on Serb positions in these regions. Serbian scholars note that this shift occurred during Bill Clinton's presidency, particularly in 1993, when pressure was exerted on the Serbian leadership, leading to a disinformation campaign against them. Anti-Americanism grew further amid the escalating situation in Kosovo, especially from 1997 to 1999, when the international community, including the US, sought to mediate the conflict through the International Contact Group. However, the Serbian government, under Slobodan Milošević, refused to withdraw police forces from Kosovo, and negotiations with the Kosovo Liberation Army were fruitless.

On March 24, 1999, NATO began an air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which lasted 78 days. This operation fueled anti-American feelings not only in Serbia and Montenegro but globally, as protests erupted against the bombing of civilian targets. The absence of clear communication from the Atlantic Alliance exacerbated discontent among its member states, leading to widespread anti-NATO and anti-American demonstrations, with the target symbol emerging as a rallying cry (*CNN* 1999; Dobbs 1999; Faiola 1999). Activists, athletes, and members of the Serbian diaspora used this imagery in various forms across Serbia, supported by Milošević, who propagated the narrative of civil resistance (Atanasovski 2016). Additionally, Russia launched a campaign against the US and NATO, further entrenching anti-American sentiment in Serbian society, which became deeply rooted after Washington recognized Kosovo's independence in 2008.

Thus, attitudes toward the United States in Serbia have undergone a significant transformation, moving from initial friendship to a sense of anti-Americanism. Positive relations characterized early diplomatic interactions, particularly during World War I, when the US provided significant humanitarian aid. However, the shift in US support during World War II and the subsequent Cold War alignment with communist Yugoslavia fostered a complex relationship. The 1990s brought a dramatic shift, especially with NATO's military actions in the Balkans and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo's independence, which deepened feelings of mistrust.

Articulation of Anti-Americanism under Aleksandar Vučić's Administration

On March 23, 1999, the US severed diplomatic ties with Serbia, closing its mission in Belgrade. Relations were restored after the 2000 elections in Yugoslavia when Serbian authorities extradited President Slobodan Milošević to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Diplomatic correspondence between US President Bill Clinton and Serbian leader Vojislav Koštunica on November 12, 2000, marked the official resumption of relations, and the US Embassy reopened six months later, with Washington recognizing Serbia as the legal successor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*U.S. Department of State* n.d. a).

However, the extradition fostered a negative perception of the US within Serbian society. Authorities made minimal efforts to communicate the role of the US in the economic recovery of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, leading to a biased portrayal in the media. Coverage often focused on international pressure for cooperation with the ICTY and the conditionality of American financial aid, which primarily benefited Montenegro and Kosovo due to Belgrade's initial refusal to acknowledge the tribunal's jurisdiction. Despite this, the US supported reforms and democratization through various programs.

The government-controlled Serbian media (Reporters Without Borders, 2017) primarily overlooked American assistance, promoting the narrative that Russia was Serbia's largest investor and trade partner (Glavonjić, 2018; Nikoletić, 2023). This silence ignored Serbia's dependency on Western funding established during the conflicts initiated by Milošević in the early 1990s. Following Milošević's extradition, US Congress released \$100 million in aid, with a significant portion allocated to Serbia (Шимкевич 2023c).

Belgrade maintained relations with the US while simultaneously promoting anti-American rhetoric and adopting a hostile stance towards NATO. Following its independence from Montenegro in 2006, Serbia's foreign policy emphasized military neutrality, formally adopted in 2019 (Шимкевич 2023b: 128). This stance allowed Serbian authorities to arm the country while engaging in cooperative military efforts with NATO under the "Partnership for Peace" Program, alongside conducting exercises with Russia and other European nations (*Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia n.d.*).

Despite the potential for strengthened partnerships, the sentiment of grievance in US–Serbian relations persisted, particularly after the fall of the Milošević regime. This attitude intensified with Aleksandar Vučić's ascendance to the premiership in 2014. A long-time member of the Serbian Radical Party, which espouses Serbian nationalism, Vučić transitioned to the ruling Serbian Progressive Party. His experience in managing narratives significantly influenced his leadership approach (Jovanovic, 2019). Anti-American sentiment became a central theme in his public statements, emphasizing perceived injustices towards Serbs, particularly following the 1999 NATO air campaign against the former Yugoslavia. This rhetoric has galvanized domestic support while framing the US as a historical adversary.

Serbia's external partners focused on cooperation with Kosovo under EU guidance and US oversight. The leadership framed Serbia as a victim needing protection, garnering support from Russia, China, and North Korea for its anti-American stance. These nations characterized the US as a global evil, echoing Serbian claims about the illegal NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia, which lacked UN Security Council approval. This alliance allowed Serbia to secure votes in the UN, complicating discussions on Kosovo's independence due to Russian and Chinese vetoes.

Upon becoming president in 2017, Vučić intensified his anti-American rhetoric, amplifying themes of a "collective West", "the countries of the QUINT", and "anti-Serbian positions" from the US and EU. These terms used interchangeably, created a perception that the US led a Western bloc intent on targeting Serbia for the 1990s wars. Vučić's

framing echoed Russian propaganda, portraying the US as an adversary while highlighting “fraternal” ties between Serbs and Russians, deepened through cultural and historical myths (Shymkevych 2023: 9–10). This messaging overshadowed Russia's less favorable actions against Serbia in the past, including supporting sanctions and withdrawing from the Balkans during the 1990s conflicts (*UN Security Council 1990s*).

As Serbia's prime minister and president, Aleksandar Vučić navigated challenges related to Russian aggression against Ukraine, taking a distinct stance toward US and EU policies. Although a European Union candidate, Serbia refrained from fully aligning with European sanctions on Russia, citing Serbia's historical connections with Moscow and Russia's support during the 1990s. Serbia abstained from the UN General Assembly's 2014 Resolution 68/262 vote but later, in March 2022, supported the GA UN Resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine while excluding Crimea-related votes (*Embassy of Ukraine to the Republic of Serbia 2023*). Vučić has aimed to balance relations with Russia and the West, formally supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity in the UN but invoking NATO's 1999 intervention in Serbia to underscore domestic anti-NATO sentiment. This nuanced stance reflects Serbia's complex historical ties and ongoing effort to maintain favorable relations with Western and Russian interests.

The February–March 2024 IRI survey highlights strong anti-Western sentiment in Serbia, with 43% blaming the West for the Ukraine-Russia conflict and 54% favoring Russia's stance (IRI 2024: 83). Serbian public opinion sees Ukraine as a battleground between the US and Russia, with support for Moscow perceived as resistance to US influence in the region. Vučić's administration, with Kremlin-backed media support, promotes narratives reinforcing independence from the West, using outlets like *Russia Today Balkans* and *Sputnik* (Brey 2021: 10–12). The long-standing anti-American sentiment is evident in the low ratings Serbs give US–Serbia relations, consistently between 2 and 3 on a five-point scale (*Institut za evropske poslove 2018–2023*). Optimism for improving ties has decreased – from 40% in 2018 to 28% in 2023 (*Stavovi građana Srbije prema Americi 2023*: 10). However, the perceived value of US relations grew slightly, with 10.7% seeing US ties as crucial in 2023, up from 4.7% in 2018 (*Stavovi građana Srbije prema Americi 2018*: 11; 2023: 18).

While public opinion is mainly pro-Russia, with Serbia seen as Moscow's ally, some respondents (46% in 2023) favor balanced relations with both the US and Russia (*Stavovi građana Srbije prema Americi 2023*: 20). This dual alignment aligns with Serbia's strategic stance of maintaining ties with both powers, influenced heavily by pro-Russian media and a significant Russian expatriate presence that bolsters this pro-Moscow orientation.

These details allow us to conclude that anti-Americanism is unnatural for Serbian society. It is an acquired phenomenon, the birth of which began in the 1990s. The bifurcation point in the development of anti-American sentiments was the year 1999 and the NATO air campaign against the FRY. Almost immediately after the cessation of airstrikes, the signing of the peace agreement (NATO 1999), and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10th, 1999 (*UN Security Council 1990s*), the political leadership of Serbia began to mobilize the country's citizens around them. Serbian authorities offered well-crafted narratives that made it possible to identify, on an

emotional and physical level, who was to blame for the loss of Kosovo, the bombing and sanctions against Serbia and Yugoslavia. Therefore, narratives about “NATO aggression”, “Kosovo is Serbia”, and “Serbs are victims of aggression” have taken root in society. The authorities decided to strengthen the effect by revising textbooks for schools (Весовић 2022: 209–228). They specifically refer to the “aggression of the NATO bloc” against the FRY, the involvement of the alliance and the United States in the secession of Kosovo, and Pristina’s declaration of independence in 2008.

The “top-bottom” construction of anti-Americanism in Serbia, spreading “correct” sentiments through the media and social networks, and financing of relevant scientific research and analytical materials led to strengthening Serbs’ negative perceptions of the USA and NATO. With the rise of Aleksandar Vučić to the top of power, anti-American rhetoric began to intensify at the annual events dedicated to the beginning of the bombing. He has always emphasized and continues to do so that Serbia will never join the alliance. At the same time, he emphasizes the heroism and patriotism of the Serbs and Serbia, who could resist the mighty NATO. In his speeches, the Serbian leader and his entourage justify the need to preserve and develop “military neutrality” through such messages. According to public opinion polls conducted by the IRI, the Institute of European Affairs in Belgrade, and several other sociological institutions, Serbs have a rather negative attitude towards the country’s cooperation with NATO.

In the IRI’s poll for February-March 2024, the question was, “Which relations with NATO will most benefit the country in the future?” the most significant number of respondents answered “no relationship” – 39% (in 2022, this figure was 46%). A little less than 30% believe communication is necessary but not cooperation. 21% of respondents are in favor of collaboration with the alliance (IRI 2024: 98).

A 2022 report by the Institute of European Relations in Belgrade shows that more than 81% of Serbs oppose Serbia’s membership in NATO. However, almost 10% support the country’s entry into the alliance (*Stavovi građana Srbije prema NATO-a* 2022: 8). Such a negative attitude exists in Serbian society, as the results of the report show, since 2016 (*Stavovi građana Srbije prema NATO-a* 2022: 9). The number of respondents ready to see Serbia in NATO is gradually decreasing. The same study cites the main reasons why, according to the Serbs, the alliance began to carry out airstrikes. In the first place in 2022 were the military interests of the USA (military bases, weapons tests) – 10,5%. In 2022, the second most important reason for Serbs was the interest and political reasons of the USA, the West, and major powers – 10,1%. In 2018, 15,2% of respondents considered this the primary cause (*Stavovi građana Srbije prema NATO-a* 2022: 10–11).

Among other reasons, the Serbs cite the creation of an independent Kosovo and its separation from Serbia, economic interests, geopolitical tasks, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the politics of Slobodan Milošević, anti-Serbian politics, etc. The answer of the Serbian respondents is always in the last position in the polls, “the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo”. That is, the Serbs still don’t admit their guilt for the crimes committed in Kosovo. This is another reason for the government’s successful policy regarding spreading and deepening anti-American sentiments in society. The corresponding attitude is also reflected in the answers of the Serbs to the question,

“Would you forgive the Alliance for the bombing?” In 2022, 56,5% of respondents answered “no” and 29,1% “yes” (*Stavovi građana Srbije prema NATO-a 2022*: 16). Serbs aren't ready to forgive and believe that the time for reconciliation regarding the bombing has not yet come. Polls also show that Serbs are willing to consider improving relations with the United States if Kosovo returns to Serbian control. It is the most popular option among respondents in various sociological polls.

The United States is a hostage in such a situation, although it is trying to change the attitude of the Serbs. After signing the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, Washington chose several directions of cooperation with the Serbs in Serbia and the Republika Srpska (BiH). First, it was political support for pro-European and pro-American politicians, their parties, and various institutions. That is the policy of “educating” Serbs loyal to Washington. According to the plan of the USA, this was supposed to give positive results in the long term – the accession of Serbia and BiH to the EU and NATO, ensuring stability in the region, and developing relations between the Balkan countries.

After Dayton in 1995, the NATO bombings in 1999, and the overthrow of Milošević in 2000, the United States was unable to convey to the Serbs their guilt in inciting wars, forming nationalist rhetoric, and committing several war crimes and acts of genocide. The constant manipulation by the Serbian authorities that the victims are the Serbs and Serbia is not the aggressor country. A similar policy is present in the Republika Srpska (BiH) and Montenegro.

Washington is trying to engage in cultural diplomacy in Serbia, involving politicians, journalists, researchers, and scientists (U.S. Embassy in Serbia n.d.). It is essential for the United States to “whiten” its reputation among Serbs, so it supports various studies on American-Serbian relations and cooperates with non-governmental organizations and opposition media (*Serbian–American Cooperation Grants, Young Balkan Leaders, General Staff project, Congress of Serbian–American Friendship, etc.*). There was also a bet on cooperation with the Serbian diaspora in the USA, formed there during the Second World War. The United States doesn't forget about developing economic, financial, and investment relations, in which the Serbian leadership is highly interested. Unfortunately, the listed areas of American diplomacy do not allow eradicating anti-Americanism or swaying public opinion in one's favor. The USA, like NATO, continues to be perceived by parts of the collective West, towards which Serbs have developed a hostile attitude due to government policy and Russian interference.

Anti-Americanism in Serbia is already clearly instrumentalized and rooted in Serbian society because of artificial processes caused by the actions of the country's leadership and assistance from Russia. Politicians, the media, social networks, the head of state, and Belgrade's friends in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang act as channels for the spread of anti-American sentiments. The development of anti-Americanism among Serbs became possible thanks to the skillful play of the acting president Aleksandar Vučić on the emotions of his citizens, who saw in him a defender against accusations of aggression against neighboring countries, war crimes, and genocide in Srebrenica. This approach allowed Vučić and his entourage to form a network of appropriate mechanisms

that constantly fueled anti-American sentiments in society and led to their escalation at the right moments.

The United States is trying to improve its image in Serbia through cultural and public diplomacy, propaganda, and economic and military cooperation with Belgrade. However, the weakness of such efforts is the reluctance to put pressure on Aleksandar Vučić and develop a stricter course towards Serbia. It allows Belgrade to act as an exporter of anti-Americanism to neighboring Balkan and Central European countries.

4. CONCLUSION

Anti-Americanism in Slovakia and Serbia demonstrates distinct regional characteristics shaped by historical, political, economic, and cultural factors. It is not solely a leftover ideology from the communist era but is an active tool for political elites to mobilize support and consolidate power. Consequently, anti-Americanism functions as a strategic political resource. Notably, the sentiments and regional responses to anti-Americanism are often driven more by intrinsic contradictions than genuine concerns regarding the United States and its policies.

The comparative analysis of the historical roots of anti-Americanism in Slovakia and Serbia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries demonstrates that both countries experienced complex relationships with the United States, shaped by their unique national contexts and geopolitical realities. In Slovakia, the formation of national identity occurred in a context that appealed to cultural kinship with Slavic nations, shaped by a longing for autonomy and a reaction to the perceived cultural imperialism of the United States. This historical backdrop and a later critique of American capitalism fueled skepticism toward American influence, even as the Slovak diaspora maintained connections to the US. Conversely, Serbia's initial engagement with the United States focused on mutual support and recognition. However, the interwar period and World War II tested this relationship. The shift in US support, particularly towards Tito's Partisans, complicated the earlier goodwill, leading to a gradual erosion of trust. Ultimately, while both countries shared moments of positive engagement with the United States, the historical roots of anti-American sentiment diverged significantly, reflecting their distinct political development.

The Cold War era offers a comparison, reflecting both shared features and distinctive regional characteristics. In both Slovakia and Serbia, Cold War-era anti-Americanism was shaped significantly by the Soviet narrative that framed the US as a capitalist threat to socialism and a global antagonist. This portrayal emphasized US militarism, interventionism, and economic exploitation. Throughout the Eastern Bloc, including Slovakia (then part of Czechoslovakia) and Serbia (then part of Yugoslavia), American values were depicted as inherently hostile to socialist ideals. The media and education systems reinforced this image, embedding anti-American sentiment in the public's understanding. As a result, anti-Americanism often took the form of ideological opposition to capitalism and Western democracy.

However, Slovakia and Serbia also had unique features that colored their expressions of anti-Americanism during the Cold War era. As part of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia's anti-Americanism was largely passive and imposed from the top down due to its alignment with Soviet policies. Slovakia's position as a satellite state meant its political discourse closely mirrored the USSR's stance, portraying the US as an ideological adversary without an intense, region-specific enmity. Slovakia's anti-Americanism was thus rational and pragmatic, largely devoid of intense emotion. As part of Yugoslavia, Serbia displayed a more complex form of anti-Americanism rooted in Tito's independent socialist path. Unlike Slovakia, Yugoslavia under Tito pursued a non-aligned stance, openly criticizing both US and Soviet policies. Serbian anti-Americanism was thus more nationalistic and independent, often expressing both sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism and a broader, radical distrust of Western powers. Tito's policies allowed Yugoslavia to engage with the West economically while politically opposing it, making Serbian anti-Americanism multifaceted. It combined ideological criticism with a defense of national sovereignty, especially against perceived Western interference.

In the post-Cold War period, anti-Americanism in Slovakia and Serbia evolved within the context of transitioning political landscapes, contrasting national identities, and influencing the impact of American foreign policy on each region. As post-communist countries, Slovakia and Serbia shared some ideological criticisms of the United States but also displayed distinct regional variations in the forms and expressions of anti-Americanism. After the Cold War, both countries experienced shifts in political ideology as they transitioned from communist regimes to more open societies. Anti-Americanism in both nations reflected ambivalence toward US influence in the region, often combining critique of American policies with broader apprehensions about Western dominance and interference.

The US interventions in the Balkans, specifically in the 1999 NATO bombings, contributed to anti-American sentiment across both regions, though with different intensities and underlying motivations. In Slovakia, anti-Americanism remained moderate and essentially politically pragmatic. Slovakia pursued integration with Western Europe, joining NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2004, and positioned the US as an essential ally, albeit overbearing. Slovak political discourse exhibited liberal anti-Americanism: a critique of US foreign policy that focused on promoting democracy while engaging in military actions abroad. Thus, Slovak anti-Americanism remained rational and policy-oriented, lacking the deep-rooted hostility visible in other parts of Eastern Europe. In Serbia, anti-Americanism during this period was more intense and culturally rooted, influenced heavily by the legacy of the 1990s Yugoslav wars and NATO's intervention in 1999. Serbian anti-Americanism was both sovereign-nationalist and radical. Serbians saw the US as an enemy of Serbian sovereignty and identity, especially following NATO's air campaign, which left a profound impact on the Serbian collective memory. US support for Kosovo's independence in 2008 exacerbated this hostility because Serbia viewed it as a direct affront to its territorial integrity. As a result, Serbian anti-Americanism developed into a combination of rational and irrational elements: rational in its political opposition to specific American policies but irrational in its cultural rejection of American values.

In the last decade, anti-Americanism in Slovakia and Serbia, two post-communist countries, evolved in response to geopolitical events, particularly the Russian aggression in Ukraine and broader East-West tensions. While both nations displayed some ideological critiques of the United States, the nature and intensity of their anti-Americanism reflected distinct regional influences, political motivations, and socio-historical backgrounds. Since 2014, pro-Russian narratives impacted Slovakia and Serbia, who now see the United States as a threat to regional stability. This view often reflects liberal and sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism. Both countries exhibit skepticism toward US influence, particularly around NATO's military presence, portraying it as undermining national sovereignty. The key differences between these two countries during this period were as follows. As an EU and NATO member, this sentiment is typically pragmatic for Slovakia, showing up as critique rather than deep-seated opposition. Slovakia's political alignment with the West tempers any anti-American sentiment that might otherwise be more pronounced. Slovak discourse often reflects liberal anti-Americanism, critiquing specific US policies while supporting cooperation on security issues. Criticisms tend to focus on opposition to American unilateralism in foreign policy, particularly visible around the war in Ukraine and subsequent NATO responses, which Slovak officials and the public saw as overly aggressive or escalatory. Slovakia's government generally supports sanctions against Russia, and although some public sentiment remains mixed, political rhetoric has avoided the intense anti-Americanism seen. In Serbia, anti-Americanism since 2014 has been markedly intense and culturally rooted, with a dominant sovereign-nationalist orientation. Serbian political rhetoric regularly portrays the US as a central antagonist, drawing on historical grievances. This period has reinforced radical anti-Americanism, as US support for Ukraine is viewed as another instance of American interference, echoing its stance on Kosovo. Under President Aleksandar Vučić, Serbian political discourse increasingly uses anti-American narratives to underscore Serbian independence from Western influence. Vučić's alignment with Russia on many issues has strengthened Serbian skepticism of the West, particularly around US-backed efforts for Kosovo's independence, which Serbia sees as a direct affront to its sovereignty. Moreover, the Serbian media often amplifies Russian narratives, portraying the US as a supporter of regional instability and a driver of anti-Serbian policies.

To conclude, anti-Americanism in Slovakia and Serbia demonstrates both rational and irrational aspects, where Slovakia leans toward a more measured, rational critique of American policy. At the same time, Serbia exhibits more entrenched, emotionally charged anti-Americanism due to historical and cultural influences. These dynamics underscore how regional differences and historical legacies shape the nature and depth of anti-American sentiment in post-communist Europe.

Bibliography:

Ako sa máte Slovensko? (2022). Na Slovensku rastú najmä obavy z ekonomických dôsledkov vojny. Iba tretina Slovákov by bola ochotná bojovať za svoju krajinu. *Ako sa máte Slovensko?* 13 April, https://www.akosamateslovensko.sk/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ASMS_rastu-obavy-z-ekonomickych-dosledkov-vojny_apri%CC%81l22.pdf (accessed 1 June 2024).

- Aktuality.sk*. (2022). Vašečka: Náš antiamerikanizmus je odmietaním moderného sveta. Chceme byť Západom materiálne, nie hodnotami. A čo nové v Pekingu? (podcast) *Aktuality.sk*, 4 February, <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/3cjhtqe/vasecka-nas-antiamerikanizmus-je-odmietanim-moderneho-sveta-chceme-byt-zapadom-materialne-nie-hodnotami-a-co-nove-v-pekingu-podcast/> (accessed 1 June 2024).
- Andelković, Nataša. (2022). Politika: Srbija i Amerika obeležile 140 godina diplomatskih odnosa, *BBCnews na srpskom*, 27 Decembar, <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-64096549> (accessed 7 May 2024).
- APNews*. (2022). Slovaks Protest Defense Treaty with US as Lawmakers Debate. *APNews*, 8 February, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-russia-slovakia-bratislava-35b125a38e65e5556aee0c655861e151> (accessed 11 May 2024).
- Atanasovski, Srđan. (2016). 'The Song Has Kept Us': Soundscape of Belgrade during the NATO Bombing. *Comparative Southeast European Studies*, 4(4): 482–499.
- Beyer, Heiko & Liebe, Ulf. (2013). Anti-americanism in Europe: Theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence. *European Sociological Review*, 30(1): 90–106.
- Brey, Thomas. (2021). Ruski mediji na Balkanu. Studija slučaja: Kako moskovska propaganda utiče na Srbiju. *Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Western Balkans*.
- Chiozza, Giacomo. (2009). *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- CNN*. (1999). Greeks angered by NATO strikes clash with riot police. Toronto braces for Friday night protests. *CNN*. 26 March, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/26/kosovo.protests/> (accessed 1 June 2024)
- Connor, Walter D. (2004). Anti-Americanism in Post-Communist Russia. In *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad*, Hollander, Paul (ed). NY: Oxford University Press.
- Čop, Michal. (2022). Pellegrini: Ak sa bude vláda zaoberať len Ukrajinou, atmosféra v spoločnosti sa zmení. Apeluje na finančnú pomoc Slovákom. *Štandard*, 6 April, <https://standard.sk/190852/pellegrini-ak-sa-bude-vlada-zaoberat-len-ukrajinou-atmosfera-v-spolocnosti-sa-zmeni-apeluje-na-financnu-pomoc-slovakom/> (accessed 4 June 2024).
- Cuprik, Roman. (2016). Survey: Anti-Americanism is Still Strong. *The Slovak Spectator*, 21 Septembe, <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20280783/survey-slovaks-trust-russia-more-than-us.html> (accessed 28 May 2024).
- Demeš, Pavol. (2023). Priateľ, partner, spojenec. Príbeh slovensko-amerických vzťahov od Nežnej revolúcie dodnes. *Slovak Foreign Policy Association*. https://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/fpa_2023.pdf (accessed 29 May 2024).
- Dickins, Tom. (2017). The Political Slogan in Communist Czechoslovakia (1948–89). *Central Europe*. 15(1–2): 58–87.
- Diner, Dan. (1996). *America in the Eyes of the Germans. An Essay on Anti-Americanism*. Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publishers.
- Dobbs, Michael. (1999). Targets Hit Bull's-Eye for Defiant Serbians. *Washington Post*: Page A, 19 April, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/belgrade040999.htm> (accessed 5 April 2024).
- Faiola, Anthony. (1999). Air Campaign Ignites Anti-U.S. Sentiment. *Washington Post*: Page A1, 18 May, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/anger051899.htm> (accessed 25 May 2024).
- Fila, Lukáš. (2003). US Woos Slovakia on Iraq. *The Slovak Spectator*, 3 February, <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20018299/us-woos-slovakia-on-iraq.html> (accessed 31 May 2024).

- Fischer, Dušan. (2019). Relations between the United States and Slovakia: Friends and Allies between 1989 and 2017. In *The Relations of Central European Countries with the United States*, Péczeli, Anna (ed). Budapest: Dialóg Campus. 157–174.
- Friedman, Max Paul. (2012). Rethinking anti-Americanism: the history of an exceptional concept in American foreign relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gienow-Hecht, Jessica. (2006). Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century. *The American Historical Review*, 111(4): 1067–1091.
- Glavonjić, Yoran. (2018). Građani Srbije ne znaju za pomoć EU i SAD. *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, 16 maj, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-eu-pomoc-sad-rusija-gra%C4%91ani-neznanje/29230454.html> (accessed 2 June 2024).
- Globsec*. (2016). GLOBSEC Trends: Central Europe under the Fire of Propaganda. *Globsec*, https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/glb_trends_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2024).
- Hajdu, Dominika & Klingová, Katarína. (2020) Voices of Central and Eastern Europe: Perceptions of democracy&governance in 10 EU countries. *Globsec*, <https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Voices-of-Central-and-Eastern-Europe-read-version.pdf> (accessed 1 June 2024).
- Hajdu, Dominika, Kazaz, Jana, Klingová, Katarína & Szicherle, Patrik (2022). GLOBSEC Trends 2022: Central and Eastern Europe amid the War in Ukraine. *Globsec*. <https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/GLOBSEC-Trends-2022.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2024).
- HLAS – sociálna demokracia*. (2022a). Tlačová konferencia strany HLAS – sociálna demokracia na tému: Sme HLASom mieru. *HLAS – sociálna demokracia*, 7 February, <https://strana-hlas.sk/aktuality/video-galeria/7-2-2022-tlacova-konferencia-strany-hlas-socialna-demokracia-na-temu-sme-hlasom-mieru/> (accessed 4 June 2024).
- HLAS – sociálna demokracia* (2022b). Celý prejav Petra Pellegriniho – II. pracovný snem strany HLAS. *HLAS – sociálna demokracia*, 2 October, <https://strana-hlas.sk/aktuality/video-galeria/cely-prejav-petra-pellegriniho-ii-pracovny-snem-strany-hlas/> (accessed 4 June 2024).
- Hollander, Paul. (1995). *Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- IRI*. (2024). Western Balkans Regional Poll. February–March 2024, *International Republican Institute (IRI)*. <https://www.iri.org/resources/western-balkans-regional-poll-february-march-2024-full/> (accessed 17 June 2024).
- Jovanović, Mladenov Srđan. (2019). Confronting Recent History: Media in Serbia During Aleksandar Vučić's Ministry of Information in the Milošević Era (1998–1999). *Hiperborea. Journal of History*, 6 (1): 61–74.
- Káša, Peter. (2017). Od poézie a praktickej humanistiky k politickej utópii a rusofilstvu (Slováci a slovanská idea: Ján Kollár, Pavel Jozef Šafárik a Ľudovít Štúr). *Limes Slavicus*. (2): 201–209.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., & Robert O. Keohane. (2007a). The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism. In *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Katzenstein, Peter J. & Robert O. Keohane (eds). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1–6.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., & Robert O. Keohane. (2007b). Varieties of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis. In *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Katzenstein, Peter J. & Robert O. Keohane (eds). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 9–38.
- Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. ([1995] 2016). *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival*. NY: St. Martin's Press.

- Klingová, Katarína. (2022). War in Ukraine: A wake-up call for Slovaks. *Globsec*, 2 May, <https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/publications/war-ukraine-wake-call-slovaks> (accessed 11 June 2024).
- Markovits, Andrei S. (2007). *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mesežnikov, Grigorij & Olga Gyárfášová. (2018). Slovakia's Conflicting Camps. *Journal of Democracy*. 29(3): 78–90.
- Mesežnikov, Grigorij. (2020). Neliberálna regresia demokracie a rast pravicového extrémizmu na Slovensku: navzájom prepojené trendy? *Геополітика України: історія і сучасність*. 2(25): 91–107.
- Meunier, Sophie. (2007). The Distinctiveness of French Anti-Americanism. In *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Katzenstein, Peter J. & Robert O. Keohane (eds). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ministry of Defense Republic of Serbia* (n.d.) Serbia-Ohio State Partnership Programme, *Ministry of Defence Republic of Serbia*, <https://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/4364/program-drzavnog-partnerstva-srbije-i-ohaja4364> (accessed 10 June 2024).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic*. (2014). Statement of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic on current developments in Ukraine. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic*, 4 March, https://www.mzv.sk/en/pressreleasedetail?p_p_id=sk_mzv_portal_pressrelease_detail_portlet_PressReleaseDetailPortlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&groupId=10182&articleId=514745 (accessed 29 May 2024).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic*. (2022). The Slovak Republic condemns the attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine in the strongest terms. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic*, 24 February, https://www.mzv.sk/en/pressreleasedetail?p_p_id=sk_mzv_portal_pressrelease_detail_portlet_PressReleaseDetailPortlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&groupId=10182&articleId=4801277 (accessed 30 May 2024).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic*. (2023). The Pittsburgh Agreement remains a symbol of the strong ties between the US and Slovakia 105 years later. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic*, 26 May, <https://www.mzv.sk/en/web/en/slovakia/history/the-pittsburgh-agreement-remains-a-symbol-of-the-strong-ties-between-the-us-and-slovakia-105-years-later> (accessed 31 May 2024).
- NATO. (1999). Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. *Official site of the NATO*, 9 June, <https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (accessed 7 May 2024).
- Nelson, Daniel N. & Szayna, Thomas. (1997). The Politics of NATO Enlargement in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia. In *NATO Enlargement. The National Debates over Ratification*. Serfaty, Simon & Cambone, Stephen (eds). <https://www.nato.int/acad/conf/enlarg97/nelson.htm> (accessed 9 June 2024).
- Nikoletić, Ivana. (2023). Prorusku propagandu širi domaća vlast: Ko je građane ubedio u to da je Rusija najveći donator i trgovinski partner Srbiji. *Danas*, 26 December, <https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/rusija-ruska-propaganda/> (accessed 29 May 2024).
- Nolan, Mary. (1994). *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- O'Connor, Brendon. (2019). *Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism: Prejudice and Pride about the USA*. London: Routledge.
- Packett, Lasima. (2015). State Partners Indiana and Slovakia Continue Relationship with Exchange of Troops. *National Guard*, 2 October, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/621676/state->

- partners-indiana-and-slovakia-continue-relationship-with-exchange-of-troop/ (accessed 9 June 2024).
- Pisklová, Miroslava. (2022). Slovakia's European policy in 2022 – the year of war in Ukraine and its impact. In *Yearbook of Slovakia's Foreign Policy 2022*. Brezáni, Peter (ed.): 16-35. <https://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Rocenka-ZPSR-2022.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2024).
- Embassy of Ukraine to the Republic of Serbia* (2023). Political issues. *Embassy of Ukraine to the Republic of Serbia*. 13 June, <https://serbia.mfa.gov.ua/en/partnership/536-politichni-vidnosini-miz-ukrajinoju-ta-serbijeju> (accessed 6 June 2024).
- Rastović, Aleksandar. (2020). History of Serbian Diplomacy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia*, <https://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/ministry/history> (accessed 12 June 2024).
- Reporters Without Borders*. (2017). Who owns the Media in Serbia. *Reporters Without Borders*. <https://rsf.org/en/who-owns-media-serbia> (accessed 20 May 2024)
- Reuters*. (2007). Slovaks pull soldiers from Iraq, PM says war wrong. *Reuters*, August 9, <https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/slovaks-pull-soldiers-from-iraqpm-says-war-wrong-idUSL02237730/> (accessed 31 May 2024).
- Rivera, Sharon Werning & Bryan, James D. (2019). Understanding the Sources of Anti-Americanism in the Russian Elite. *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 35(5–6): 376–392.
- Roger, Philippe. (2006). *The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shymkevych, Kateryna. (2023a). A Forgotten Friendship: Serbo-Ukrainian Relations and Pro-Russian Narratives. *Belgrade Centre for Security Policy*, April. <https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/prijateljstvo-ENG-02-1.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2024).
- Simić Dragan R., Živojinović, Dragan. Srpsko – američki odnosi od uspostavljanja diplomatskih odnosa do ulaska Sjedinjenih Američkih Država u Prvi svetski rat 1917. *godine, Projekat Americano*, <https://americano.rs/srpsko-americki-odnosi-od-uspostavljanja-diplomatskih-odnosa/> (accessed 20 May 2024).
- Smer-SSD*. (2022a). Zhromaždenie "proti vojne, proti zdrazovanju, za predčasne volby. *Smer-SSD*, 27 January, <https://www.strana-smer.sk/aktuality/video/post/zhromazdenie-proti-vojne-proti-zdrazovanju-za-predcasne-vo> (accessed 30 May 2024).
- Smer-SSD*. (2022b). Stanovisko strany Smer-SSD k aktuálnej situácii na Ukrajine. *Smer-SSD*, 24 February, <https://www.strana-smer.sk/aktuality/video/post/stanovisko-strany-smer-sd-k-aktualnej-situacii-na-ukrajine> (accessed 1 June 2024).
- Smer-SSD*. (2022c). Tlačová beseda predstaviteľov strany Smer-SSD na tému: aktuálne politické dianie. *Smer-SSD*, 1 March, <https://www.strana-smer.sk/aktuality/tlacove-spravy/post/tlacova-beseda-predstaviteov-strany-smer-sd-na-temu-aktualne-politicke-dianie> (accessed 1 June 2024).
- Smer-SSD*. (2022d). Na vojnu medzi USA a Ruskom na Ukrajine nesmú doplacať naši občania zníženou kvalitou života! *Smer-SSD*, 4 April, <https://www.strana-smer.sk/aktuality/clanky/post/na-vojnu-medzi-usa-ruskom-na-ukrajine-nesmu-doplacat-nasi-obciana-znizenou-kvalitou-zivota> (accessed 1 June 2024).
- Smoleňová, Ivana. (2015). The Pro-Russian Disinformation Campaign in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. *Prague Security Studies Institute*, June, https://www.hom-bre.cz/images/253_is-pro-russian-campaign.pdf (accessed 10 June 2024).
- Stavovi građana prema Americi*. (2018). Stavovi građana prema NATO-a. Istraživanje javnog mjenja. *Institut za evropske poslove*, Jul.

- Stavovi građana prema NATO-a.* (2022). Stavovi građana prema NATO-a. Istraživanje javnog mjenja. *Institut za evropske poslove*, Mart.
- Stavovi građana prema Americi.* (2023). Stavovi građana prema NATO-a. Istraživanje javnog mjenja. *Institut za evropske poslove*, August–September.
- Tai, Chong-Soo, Peterson Erick J., & Gurr Ted Robert. (1973). Internal Versus External sources of Anti-Americanism: Two Comparative Studies. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 17 (3): 455–488.
- Toinet, Marie-France. (1990). Does Anti-Americanism Exist? In *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, Lacorne, Denis, Rupnik, Jacques & Toinet, Marie-France (eds). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Tomek, Radoslav & Doroshev, Anton. (2016). Slovak Premier Meets Putin Before Hosting EU Leaders at Home. *Bloomberg*, 25 August, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-25/slovak-premier-heads-to-moscow-before-hosting-eu-leaders-at-home> (accessed 29 May 2024).
- U.S. Embassy in Serbia* (n.d.) Grants Programm. *USEmbassy in Serbia*, <https://rs.usembassy.gov/grants-programs/#bold> (accessed 15 June 2024).
- U.S. Department of State* (n.d. a) A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Kingdom of Serbia/Yugoslavia. *Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/countries/kingdom-of-yugoslavia> (accessed 3 June 2024).
- U.S. Department of State* (n.d. b) A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Montenegro. *Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/countries/montenegro> (accessed 3 June 2024).
- U.S. Department of State* (n.d. c). The Truman Doctrine 1947. *Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine> (accessed 26 May 2024).
- U.S. Department of State* (2022). Agreement On Defense Cooperation Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of the Slovak Republic. *Treaties and Other International Acts Series 22-401. U.S. Department of State*. 3 February, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/22-401-Slovakia-DCA.pdf> (accessed 30 May 2024).
- U.S. Embassy in Slovakia.* (2022). Joint Statement on the Third Strategic Dialogue between Slovakia and the United States. *USEmbassy in Slovakia*, 28 October, <https://sk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-third-strategic-dialogue-between-slovakia-and-the-united-states/> (accessed 30 May 2024).
- UN Security Council* (n.d.) Resolutions of the UN Security Council, *UN Security Council* <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-0> (accessed 10 June 2024).
- Амбасада САД у Србију.* (2020). The flag on the White House. *Амбасада САД у Србију*, <https://common.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/77/2020/01/7-Serbian-Flag-Day-Detroit-News-report-1.jpg> (accessed 17 June 2024).
- Бессонова, Марина. (2012). Антиамериканські гасла під час виборчих кампаній у незалежній Україні. *Гілея* (63): 113–117.
- Весовић, Александра, Гордић, Јован. (2022). Образовање и васпитање младих у средњим школама о НАТО агресији - стање и тенденције. *Двадесет година од НАТО агресије на СРЈ: поводи и последице: зборник радова са националне конференције са међународним учешћем*, (Београд, 10. јун 2019. године) / приредили Живојин Ђурић, Милош Јевтић. - Београд : Институт за политичке студије, 2019: 209–229.
- Шимкевич, Катерина. (2022). Рух Неприєднання та Югославія: “втєча” Тіто від СРСР. *Militarnyi*, 17 липня, <https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/ruh-nepryuednannya-ta-yugoslaviya-vtecha-tito-vid-srsr/> (accessed 8 May 2024).

- Шимкевич, Катерина. (2023a). Американські ігри з Югославією за роки президентства Гаррі Трумена (частина 1). *Militarnyi*, 30 травня, https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/amerykanski-igry-z-yugoslaviyeyu-za-roky-prezydentstva-garri-trumena-chastyna-1/#google_vignette (accessed 8 May 2024).
- Шимкевич, Катерина. (2023b). Особливості “військового нейтралітету” Сербії у контексті регіональної системи безпеки Балкан. *Міжнародні відносини та міжнародне право в постбіполярній системі міжнародних відносин: науковий збірник. Київський університет імені Бориса Грінченка*. Київ: 127–133.
- Шимкевич, Катерина. (2023c). Як продавали Мілошевича. Історія екстрадиції югославського президента. *Militarnyi*, 15 січня, <https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/yak-prodavaly-miloshevycha-istoriya-ekstradytsiyi-yugoslavskogo-prezydenta/> (accessed 10 June 2024).