

## THE ELUDING DREAMS: UKRAINE AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

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**Abstract.** *This study focuses on the democratic development of Ukraine. Unlike most works devoted to this topic, the Ukrainian case is considered in the context of European (and global) political processes related to the crisis of democracy. This study also emphasizes the dynamics of Ukrainian democratic development. The comparative analysis of longitudinal studies of the level of democracy in Ukraine has demonstrated that an increase in crisis trends in democratic development followed the period of significant improvement in the situation with ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens to political participation. The manifestation of these crisis trends is the continuing high volatility of Ukrainian voters and the growth of absenteeism, as well as the search by citizens for non-institutional ways to influence the authorities.*

*As argued in the article, the current crisis of democracy, the third time in a hundred years, is associated with the alienation of citizens from political decision-making and restrictions on the pluralism of opinions. This crisis is a consequence of the internal problems of the democratic model, which was formed in the second half of the 1970s under the influence of neoliberal politics and widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of majoritarian institutions in political governance. The post-Soviet states such as Ukraine have been integrated into global economic and political processes. On one hand, this integration has provided a powerful impetus to the democratic development of its political institutions. However, the democratic development was influenced by the same negative factors that had an impact on the political institutions of liberal democratic states.*

**Keywords:** *democracy, crisis, Ukraine, democratization, political participation*

## 1. Introduction: The third crisis of democracy

We are living through the third crisis of democracy in the world of the last hundred years. Claims that democracy was in crisis were first widely circulated shortly after the First World War, at a time when it seemed to many that democracy had just achieved an impressive victory. Woodrow Wilson's famous statement made on April 2, 1917, that the rejection of the policy of neutrality and the entry of the United States into the war had aimed at making the world "safe for democracy," led many to hope for democratic transformations in the world. Indeed, the collapse of several empires and the establishment of democratic governments in a number of European countries after the end of the war made these hopes seem very plausible.

However, it soon became apparent that these hopes may have been overly optimistic. In 1932, Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile published "The Doctrine of Fascism," which gave an accurate description of the era that came after the First World War. In this document they wrote,

All the political experiments of our day are anti-liberal. (Mussolini & Gentile 1932)

The heyday of extreme left and extreme right authoritarianism and totalitarianism in the 1920s – 1930s was evidence of the inability of liberal democratic institutions to find an adequate response to the unusually acute *la question sociale* of that era.

World War II represented an existential challenge for humanity. Its result was the experience of the victory of humanness of inhumanness. This victory led to the unprecedented cohesion established between governments and citizens in many countries of the world. However, as a result of numerous factors, such as the growing problems of the dominant Keynesian macroeconomic model—the post-war public consensus reached in the Western world on basic political and socioeconomic issues—began to collapse in the 1970s. Leftists such as Herbert Marcuse drew attention to the fact that the practices of domination in democratic countries after the war have not been overcome. Likewise, Jurgen Habermas pointed to the systemic crisis of the legitimization of political power in democratic societies. Conversely, voices from the right declared that freedom in the world had, for the second time, faced serious internal threats, and that these threats were carried by democratic procedures themselves.

In 1975, a group of scientists, consisting of Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki, prepared a report for the Trilateral Commission entitled "The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies." Its main theme was that democracy was in crisis for a variety of reasons, the most important of which was "the involvement of an increasing proportion of the population in political activity" (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki 1975: 163). The report states that it is not always necessary to rely on the fact that a democratic government will function in a self-correcting manner. The result of its actions may be the emergence of forces that undermine democracy. For example, this happens when a democratic government becomes a place of conflict of interests, rather than the formulation of common goals.

To overcome the crisis of democracy (it was the second crisis), the authors of this report actually propose to limit democracy, or rather, to limit popular participation in political decision-making.<sup>1</sup> In other words, in the dialectical confrontation between democracy and liberalism (in this confrontation Rain Mullerson sees the root of the crisis of the liberal democracy of that era), Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki proposed to focus on liberalism, or else on the detriment of democracy.

I do not agree with the claim that democracy is in crisis when there is too much of it. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki are well aware of the logic of the actions conducted by the elites after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and at the beginning of the neoliberal times, when the role of experts and non-majoritarian institutions in democratic political systems became noticeable. This is exactly what Nadia Urbinati calls this increase in the role of experts as the “epistemic disfiguration of democracy” (Urbinati 2014). In fact, it is possible to say that the approach formulated by Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, and implemented in neoliberal politics, has significantly contributed to the current (the third) crisis of democracy.

Indeed, for the third time in a century, politicians and political philosophers talk about a “crisis of democracy” yet again. We see an increase in the number of “illiberal democracies” (Fareed Zakaria) with their inherent conservatism, nationalism, and populism. Simultaneously, we also observe the establishment of regimes of “undemocratic liberalism” (Yasha Munk), which are distinguished by the rule of liberal elites or elite technocrats. In both cases, opportunities for civic participation and decision-making based on an open and equal dialogue are significantly limited—or even completely excluded.

Today, there is no consensus among researchers about how to understand the crisis of democracy, nor about its key characteristics. Researchers use various concepts to describe the state of modern democracies and political regimes.<sup>2</sup> Among the numerous works on the current crisis, authors such as Neil Ferguson, Larry Diamond, David Runciman, Tony Grayling, Yascha Mounk, Steve Levitsky, and Daniel Ziblatt stand out first. James Cairns suggested calling these writers liberal catastrophists (Cairns 2019), since they talk primarily about the collapse of democratic institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> This position corresponds to the tradition of liberal thought. For example, Mitchell Dean puts in that it is quite common for liberal theory to encourage non-liberal forms of power. He refers to the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill—in particular, to Mill's idea that the doctrine of freedom applies only to a limited circle of people, and to his idea of “good despots.” According to Dean: “It is remarkable how regularly the division is made in varieties of liberal rationality and associated human sciences between those who are capable of bearing the freedoms and responsibilities of a citizen and those who, for whatever reason, are deemed not to possess the characteristics necessary for such a task. The latter are thus liable to a range of disciplinary, sovereign and other interventions...” (Dean 2010: 159).

<sup>2</sup> For example, these are the concepts such as “electoral authoritarianism” (Andreas Schaedler), “competitive authoritarianism” (Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way), “illiberal democracies” (Fareed Zakaria), “hybrid regimes” (Terry Karl and Larry Diamond), “controlled democracy” (Peter Anyang' Nyong'o), “new authoritarianism” (Jerzy Wiatr), “delegative democracy” (Guillermo O'Donnell), “authoritarian liberalism” (Michael A. Wilkinson), “authoritarian anti-liberalism” (Patrick Deneen), “light fascism” (Charles Derber) etc. (see: Przeworski 2019: 15; Wiatr 2019: 7; Wilkinson 2022; Hogan 2018; Derber 2013).

In particular, David Runciman, who proposed one of the most interesting theories of the modern crisis of democracy (Runciman 2018), argues that democracy can collapse even with properly functioning democratic institutions, such as an independent court, elections and a free press. In his view, the “fall of democracy” is happening today—and it happens so not because of a vivid spectacle, as it was during the coups in the second half of the twentieth century. According to Runciman, the de-democratization is a result of a series of small “coups” that no one even notices, but the result of which is a gradual expansion of the sphere of influence of the executive power and narrowing the space for democratic practices.

On the one hand, catastrophists (in the terminology of Cairns) are opposed by skeptics who doubt that the participation of citizens in politics is really capable of contributing to both their own good and the public good,<sup>1</sup> and therefore are calmly observing democratic decline. On the other hand, they are opposed by optimists of two types: (a) Those who, like Pippa Norris or Michael Ignatieff, consider the crisis of democracy nothing more than a fashionable “myth” and believe that liberal democracy will only flourish in the future, and (b) those who, like Alessandro Bonanno, consider the crisis as a great opportunity to get rid of problems, which brought neoliberalism, such as, for example, the marketization of the economy, society, and politics.

The crisis we face now is not merely a temporary destabilization of the social and political order of democratic societies. It is also not a rejection of democracy, as was the crisis of democracy in the first half of the twentieth century. I believe it is actually the tendency towards the establishment of another order: the order that, at least in most cases, preserves and develops many democratic institutions, such as competitive elections or a certain pluralism of opinions. Nevertheless, this is pluralism that outlined by clear thematic and semantic frameworks. Going beyond these frames is strictly suppressed, since in this case the political consolidation based on it is under threat. It is pluralism, which excludes disagreement or even conflict over fundamental issues (see: Kiryukhin 2022: 74-87). That is why this order cannot accurately be called truly democratic.

I do not think it is necessary to accede to the catastrophists, for I believe that liberal democracy really needs to be transformed. I believe that since the role of non-majoritarian institutions is too great in the decision-making process today, this transformation must involve expanding opportunities for civic participation in politics and public administration. Likewise, we should not rejoice alone with the optimists about what is happening.

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<sup>1</sup> Jason Brennan in his “Against Democracy” explicitly states that “ideally, politics would occupy only a small portion of the average person’s attention,” because “political participation tends to corrupt rather than improve our intellectual and moral character.” He further states that more equitable results in politics can be achieved “if we replaced democracy with some form of epistocracy,” i.e. elites with knowledge and management skills (Brennan 2017: 3, 18). Brennan is not alone in his negative attitude towards democracy. For a few liberals, such as Brian Caplan or Jeffrey Friedman, the potential (and, according to some, inevitable) conflict between liberalism and democracy should be resolved in favor of limiting democracy (Caplan 2007; Friedman 2006).

I believe what is called for is taking into account how serious the problems that modern democracies face are, and the fact that we really cannot be sure that we will be able to solve these problems.

The dream of a free democratic society was one of the key factors in socio-political transformations in post-Soviet states following their independence. Nevertheless, not all of them managed to fulfill this dream at least partially. Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes explain this by pointing out that even from the very beginning, the process of democratization in post-socialist states was an imitation of goals, not a means. As a result, corrupt authoritarian or hybrid regimes formed quite rapidly in most of these countries (Krastev & Holmes 2020). Along with Krastev and Holmes, many other researchers have wondered why the dreams of democracy in these countries have gone largely unfulfilled. As a rule, such researchers search for the reason for this mainly within these post-Soviet societies themselves. They point to factors such as details of political heritage, the peculiarities of established social practices, and the weakness of democratic institutions, which did not allow them to overcome the challenges and threats facing young democracies. When examining such countries as modern Hungary, Poland, Belarus, etc. today, we can confidently make statements about the crisis of democracy in the post-Soviet (post-communist) space. Even where the process of developing democratic practices and institutions seems to have achieved at least some success, economic problems, growing inequality, nationalism, populism, and armed conflicts have often negated these modest achievements. Ukraine, which is the main subject of interest of this study, is no exception. Moreover, the Russian armed aggression poses a serious challenge to the development of Ukrainian democratic institutions. Nevertheless, Ukraine is not isolated, for it is part of a global world. Therefore, not only a war and internal problems, but also the situation with democracy in the world should have an impact on the Ukrainian development. Let's take a closer look at the Ukrainian situation.

## **2. Ukraine on the Scales of Democracy**

The analysis of democracy in Ukraine is a very difficult task. Simply referring to the data of various democracy rankings based on empirical measurements will not allow us to fully address the complexity of the matter. These rankings allow us to see only the general dynamics of the transformations of political institutions and to make an inter-country comparison.

When discussing democracy rankings,<sup>1</sup> two factors have attracted attention. First of all, these are indicators. Secondly, the methods by which these indicators are formed. For example, we may examine the well-known Freedom House's ranking "Freedom in the World" (developed in the 1970s by Raymond Gastil). This ranking is based on cumulative assessments of the state of political rights and civil liberties and is calculated for each country based on experts' answers to questions about

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<sup>1</sup> I will analyze only those democracy rankings that are based on their own methodology. Therefore, for example, I will not consider the ranking of the Democracy Ranking Association.

the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, government activities, freedom of opinion, and association. “Freedom in the World” ranks nations on a scale from “Free” to “Not free.” However, as many critics point out, indicators of rights and freedom do not fully describe democracy.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, these indicators are formed on the basis of value judgments (Vanhanen 2003: 52), which means there is always a risk that the final picture will be distorted due to the influence of the subjective biases of the experts involved. Even so, it is still of some interest to observe where the democracy of Ukraine ranks according to Freedom House.

Ukraine first appeared in the “Freedom in the World” ranking in 1992 as a “Partially Free” country (it received a score of 3<sup>2</sup> for its levels of political rights and civil liberties). For almost fourteen years, the situation remained unchanged. For example, in 2004 Ukraine was designated as a “Partially Free” state, when it received a score of 4 for its levels of political rights and civil liberties. Likewise, in 2005, Ukraine received a score of 4 for its level of political rights and a score of 3 for its level of civil liberties. It was only in the 2006 Freedom House report that Ukraine was designated as a “Free State” for the first time. It then received a score of 3 for its level of political rights and a score of 2 for its level of civil liberties. This assessment continued until 2011, when, according to Freedom House, Ukraine was once more designated as being only “Partially Free,” when it received a score of 3 for its levels of political rights and civil liberties. In 2012, the score for political rights in Ukraine was lowered to 4. This situation persisted until 2015, when the political rights score was lowered again to 3. In 2019, the civil liberties score decreased to 4. In 2020, the civil liberties score was equal to 3. Thus, for the 28 years that Ukraine has been in the freedom ranking, the situation with political rights and civil liberties remains virtually unchanged, with the exception of some fluctuations in the rights and liberties indices and several years—from 2006 to 2011—when it was recognized as a “Free state.”

Since 1995, Freedom House has been compiling the rating of democratic development of post-communist states, which is entitled “Nations in Transit.”<sup>3</sup> Based on the average value of aggregated indicators (such as national and local government, electoral process, civil society, media independence, judicial independence, and corruption), the value of which is determined during an expert survey, the authors of the rating formulate an assessment of democracy in which 1 represents the lowest and 7 represents the highest level of democracy).

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Adam Przeworski and his co-authors talk about this. In their opinion, not only are rights and freedoms important for the analysis of democracy, but also a contestation, which is not presented in the Freedom House ranking. Regarding this ranking, they note that assessing freedom “without determining the conditions that enable its exercise can easily lead to ideologically motivated labels that measure only similarities to the United States, rather than the actual exercise of political rights” (Przeworski, Ivarz, Cheibub & Limongi 2000: 34).


<sup>2</sup> The higher the index of political rights and civil liberties, the less free a country is (where 1 is absolutely free, and 7 is absolutely not free country).

<sup>3</sup> Since 2004, the rating methodology has been significantly changed. For example, it has appeared the division of the studied countries into groups. Accordingly, in this case this study will rely on data on Ukraine since 2005.

The states are classified according to five types of political regimes: “consolidated democracy” (the lowest index for this type of regime is the index 5.01, and the highest is 7.00), “semi-consolidated democracy” (4.01-5.00), “transitional or hybrid regimes” (3.01-4.00), “semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes” (2.01-3.00) and, finally, “consolidated authoritarian regimes” (1.00-2.00).

According to “Nations in Transit,” Ukraine invariably remains a “transitional or hybrid regime,” that is, a state that is an electoral democracy, but democratic institutions in it are fragile, and rights and freedoms are not sufficiently protected. Freedom House demonstrates that in the years before the war, the situation in Ukraine had been improving somewhat, but it then deteriorated. For example, the score of Ukraine was 3.79 in 2006, which indicated that it had almost approached the status of a “semi-consolidated democracy.” In contrast, in 2014, because its score had fallen to 3.07, Ukraine had almost dropped into the category of being a “semi-consolidated authoritarian regime.” As can be seen in Chart 1, according to Freedom House, in recent years before the war, Ukraine had been stabilized in the development of democratic institutions and the protection of rights and freedoms within the country.

**Chart 1. The ranking of democracy according to Freedom House (“Nations in Transit”)**




Source: Freedom House (See: Nations in Transit 2005-2020; Nations in Transit 2021)

The authors of “The Economist Democracy Index” (the ranking of democracy by *The Economist*) use a methodology generally similar to Freedom House’s methodology. They conduct qualitative research, during which experts answer groups of questions. They also take into account the numerous criticisms to which the Freedom House ranking has been subjected. The methodology of “The Democracy Index” is based upon the fact that personal freedom, although an important component of democracy (Campbell 2008: 14), is not synonymous with democracy. That is why the authors of this ranking system expanded the number of indicators by adding, for example, an important indicator of the political culture of each society measured.

To evaluate democracy, the authors of “The Democracy Index” invite experts to answer questions grouped into five categories: (1) the electoral process and pluralism, (2) civil liberties, (3) functioning of government, (4) political participation, and (5) political culture. The states are ranked according to types, such as full (liberal) democracies, flawed (illiberal) democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. As can be seen, the main difference between this ranking and the democracy ranking discussed earlier, is that while in the Freedom House ranking we see a simple opposition between democracy and non-democracy, but in this case, differentiation also occurs within democracy, which are divided into liberal and illiberal.

According to “The Democracy Index,” Ukraine was considered as a “flawed democracy,”<sup>1</sup> with an index of 6.94 in 2006 and 6.30 in 2010<sup>2</sup> (see Chart 2). The situation changed in 2011, when Ukraine ranked as having become a “hybrid regime.”<sup>3</sup> At the time when the Russian aggression began, Ukraine continued to be this type of country.

**Chart 2: The ranking of democracy according to The Economist Intelligence Unit**



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index 2022; see also: Democracy Index 2015)

<sup>1</sup> Flawed democracy countries “also have free and fair elections and, even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation” (Democracy Index 2015: 45).

<sup>2</sup> The higher the score (from 1 to 10), the more democratic the country is.

<sup>3</sup> In a hybrid regime, “Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies—in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent” (Ibid.: 45-46).



The Polity IV Project democracy ranking is one of the most authoritative longitudinal studies in the academic field. Its theoretical foundations were laid by Harry Eckstein and Robert T. Gurr in the 1970s. Eckstein and Gurr developed a theoretical model that allows classifying political regimes and ranking the level of development of political institutions by offering an understanding of politics based on the idea of congruence of political activity. This understanding differed from the functional interpretation of politics that dominated throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As noted by Eckstein and Gurr (1975) in their *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry*:

High performance by any political system requires that the authority patterns of governmental institutions closely resemble those of less inclusive social units, notably those that socialize citizens and recruit and train political cadres and elites. (Eckstein & Gurr 1975: ix)

In other words, in order to be effective, the patterns of political power at the highest levels must be congruent with how power is organized in the rest of the society, such as in the family, public organizations, the schools, and so on. According to Eckstein and Gurr, the very same authority pattern “is a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit” (Eckstein 1973: 1153).<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, the Polity IV Project focuses on the formal characteristics of political regimes (for example, openness, competitiveness, restrictions, and so on). These formal characteristics are measured simultaneously on two scales: the democracy indicator (DEMOC) and the authoritarianism indicator (AUTOC). Both of these measurements are assessed using a ten-point scale based on the same criteria (such as, for example, the openness of executive recruitment). The total indicator (POLITY) is calculated by subtracting the autocracy indicator from the democracy indicator. (For authoritarian regimes, this value will have a negative sign). Thus, the authors of the Polity project use a methodology that is more sensitive to internal changes in political regimes than the methodological approaches previously discussed above, and they minimize the influence of subjective assessments on the formation of ranking.

The indicator POLITY for Ukraine shows that since 1991 it has usually been on the lower border of democracy<sup>2</sup>—with the notable exception of 1993. This situation changed only in 2014, when, for the first time, the authoritarianism indicator (AUTOC) became equal to 1, and the democracy indicator (DEMOC) decreased to 5 (see: Chart 3).


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<sup>1</sup> Thus, the object of political research is all hierarchical social formations, such as the family, the church, a political party, a corporation, a school, and so on, and not just government institutions and political parties.

<sup>2</sup> The authors of the Project define three basic interdependent elements of democracy: “One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation,” whereas, for example, freedom of the press or the rule of law, which are so important in other rankings, are considered here as a manifestation of these three basic elements and therefore are not encoded (see: POLITY5). Correspondingly, “there is no ‘necessary condition’ for characterizing a political system as democratic, rather democracy is treated as a variable” (Ibid.: 15).

Accordingly, the Ukrainian political regime, according to the classification system used by the Polity IV Project, had been transformed from democracy into anocracy, that is, a regime combining elements of authoritarianism and democracy. The situation remained that way until 2018 (the last year for which data are displayed on the Polity IV Project website).

**Chart 3. The ranking of Ukraine’s democratic development (by the variable POLITY) according to the Polity IV Project**




Source: Polity IV Project (Polity IV Annual Time-Series; see also: Fedoryshyna 2020)

Despite differences in methodological approaches, the indices of Freedom House, The Economist, and the Polity IV Project are correlative, as pointed out by researchers.<sup>1</sup> Additional evidence of this correlation are the graphs of the dynamics of the rule of law indices (Freedom House data), the institutionalization of autocracy (data from the Polity V project), the (political) exclusion of political groups and one of its indicators – the political groups equality in respect of civil liberties for 2003 – 2020.<sup>2</sup> As can be seen in the chart (see Chart 4), in recent years before the Russian armed aggression, not only was there a noticeable increase in undemocratic tendencies and a decrease in the rule of law in Ukraine, but the situations regarding the equality of political groups and respect for civil liberties were deteriorating.

<sup>1</sup> On that see: Yakovlyev & Gumenyuk 2012; Fedoryshyna 2020.

<sup>2</sup> The integral calculations regarding political groups were made by “The Diversity of Democracy” (V-Dem) project.

**Chart 4. Dynamics of the rankings of the rule of law (Freedom House), institutionalization of autocracy (Polity V), (political) exclusion of political groups and equality of political groups in respect to civil liberties (V-Dem) in Ukraine for 2003 – 2020**



Highcharts.com | V-Dem data version 11.0

All the above rankings demonstrate the following general trend in the transformation of democracy in Ukraine over the past twenty years: During the period of 2005-2010, indicators of democracy were fairly high relative to the 1990s. This is what essentially distinguishes Ukraine from many post-Soviet states. However, following this period, there was a significant deterioration of democracy, for several years. The situation was improved somewhat after 2014. Nevertheless, Ukraine never reached the democratic level of 2005-2010. Moreover, according to the Polity IV Project, the political regime demonstrated substantial authoritarian tendencies. Back in 2003, Tatu Vanhanen wrote that in the case of Ukraine, due to the large imbalance between the distribution of resources and the level of democratization, “it is reasonable to expect some decline in the level of democratization” (Vanhanen 2003: 173). Although, as can be seen from the materials of the longitudinal studies discussed above, Vanhanen’s forecast did not come true in the short term, he seems to have correctly captured the general trend.

### 3. The problem of political participation

Why did the level of democracy in Ukraine not return in the years just before Russian aggression to the higher indicators as recorded in 2005-2010 by the Freedom House, The Economist, and the Polity IV Project ranking?

The answer to this question requires an analysis of mass participation in the political process, because, as is convincingly shown in the works of Robert Dahl, Carol Pateman, Gabriel Almond, Larry Diamond, Tatu Vanhanen, and Peter Mayr, the level of citizen participation in politics<sup>1</sup> is directly related to the level of democracy of the political regime.

For some time, democratic theorists considered the level of mass participation in the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century to be the most crucial factor for understanding the politics of such systems. As Hannah Arendt shows, totalitarianism violates one of the basic political rights: The right not to participate (Arendt 2003). In the case of a totalitarian regime, non-participation itself is often considered to be suspicious, and can be understood as disloyalty—a means of refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the political regime. However, the waves of civil protests that swept through democratic countries in the 1960s and the early 1970s (in the United States, these waves of dissent were anti-war protests and the civil rights movement), as well as the development of the theory of democracy, contributed to the revision of the significance of participation. Nevertheless, even today, probably not without the strong influence of the Schumpeterian approach in the interpretation of democracy, as well as the Hayekian belief in the need to delegate power to political structures that are maximally protected from the influence of the electoral process, a number of philosophical works have highlighted the inconsistency of the political behavior of the masses, their impracticality, and their potentially undemocratic nature.<sup>2</sup> However, Sidney Verba's statement that "participation is at the heart of democracy"<sup>3</sup> is unlikely to be refuted by anyone today. Even those who advocate the transfer of decision-making on public policy issues to non-majoritarian institutions, in which it will be developed and adopted by experts, generally do not reject the positive correlation between democracy and political participation.

The reduction of political participation of citizens, as well as the restriction of the possibility of such participation due to the increasing role of non-majoritarian institutions in political decision-making, should be considered as one of the manifestations of the crisis or decline of democracy as a whole. In other words, such shifts and patterns are evidence of the growth of undemocratic tendencies in society.

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<sup>1</sup> Vanhanen rightly emphasizes that this participation correlates with the distribution of intellectual, economic, and other resources in society. One of the important ideas expressed by Vanhanen is that politics is based on the distribution of resources. He claims that "pluralism of the party system depends on the distribution of human, economic, and other resources that can be used as sources of power" (Vanhanen 2003: 53). Accordingly, the more widely resources are distributed, the less one political group (party) can control and suppress competitors, and the more democratic the society is. The correlation between the growth of economic inequality and the growth of anti-democratic tendencies becomes clear—democracy in conditions of increasing inequality is actually a system of government of elites who control resources and formulate public opinion, rather than following it. Hence the populists speculation on the negative sentiments towards elites that are widespread on both sides of the Atlantic.


<sup>2</sup> It is worth mentioning that Robert Dahl, in his *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956), when reflecting on the experience of political mobilization of the working class by totalitarian regimes, pointed out that active political participation of the lower classes could lead to anti-democratic consequences.

<sup>3</sup> Quot. by: Tiemann-Kollipost 2020: 26.

In this regard, the question of whether it is possible to discuss the deterioration of the mass participation component of democracy in Ukraine is interesting. To answer this question, we should refer to voter turnout data in parliamentary and presidential elections.

The turnout in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections shows negative dynamics: It was 75.6% in 1994, 69.64% in 1998, 65.22% in 2002 58.97% in 2006, 57.94% in the extraordinary parliamentary elections in 2007; 57.98 in 2012, 52.42% in the extraordinary parliamentary elections in 2014, and 49.84% in 2019 (see Chart 5).

**Chart 5. The turnout in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine**




Source: The Central Election Commission of Ukraine and Dzhulay 2019

The turnout for presidential elections is traditionally higher since these elections mobilize voters to a greater extent than parliamentary and local council elections. Nevertheless, these elections demonstrate a similar trend of declining political participation, although somewhat less pronounced. Thus, in the 1994 presidential election in Ukraine, the turnout was 71.63%.

The President election of 1999 had relatively high turnout – namely, 73.8%. In the face of massive protests and political crisis in 2004, turnout was 77.32%. However, in 2009 there was a decrease in voter turnout – down to 69.15%. For the early presidential elections in 2014, the turnout was 59.48%, and, finally, in the elections of 2019, it was 61.37% (see Chart 6).

**Chart 6. The turnout in the presidential elections of Ukraine**



Source: The Central Election Commission of Ukraine and Shchebetun 2020

These data demonstrate that Ukrainian citizens are increasingly avoiding participation in elections. This problem of absenteeism has attracted the attention of both researchers and politicians in Ukraine for quite some time. However, most of the studies devoted to this problem are characterized by a number of significant drawbacks—the presence of which allows us to conclude that the trend in absenteeism is misinterpreted by most researchers. There are several distinct factors to consider. First, such studies generally study the Ukrainian situation outside the context of European (and world) political processes, without taking into account the problems faced by democracy in the global market environment, the influence of transnational corporations and international economic institutions on the behavior of voters and national governments. Second, absenteeism itself is considered a feature of citizens, rather than a problem of institutions. This is because the authors of these works look for its causes, including the peculiarities of the Ukrainian national mentality (Shchebetun 2020), thereby implicitly excluding the possibility of developing democracy in Ukraine. Third, they usually pay attention only to the dynamics of turnout in elections, while simultaneously ignoring other important indicators of the political behavior of citizens. Fourth, the recommendations that are proposed to overcome the problem are primarily aimed at changing the behavior of the voter, which, according to the authors, should be facilitated by measures such as restricting the rights of citizens to non-participation or active educational work among the population, rather than re-democratizing the system of political decision-making and strengthening the political influence of majoritarian institutions.

An important indicator of the democratic nature of the regime is not only voter turnout but also the persistence of ideological and party identity, that is, volatility. As the Peter Mair points out, “as popular involvement fades, however, and as indifference grows, we can expect that even these citizens who do continue to participate will prove more volatile, more uncertain and more random in their expressions of preference.” This happens because “if politics no longer counts for so much, then not only should the willingness to vote begin to falter; so also should the sense of commitment among those who continue to take part” (Mair 2013: 29). The Pedersen index (Pedersen 1979; Pedersen 1983) is an imperfect indicator but is nevertheless one of the few available tools for measuring voter volatility. This index is determined by calculating the percentage of voters who changed their political preferences during two electoral cycles. In the case of Ukraine, calculating the Pedersen index is not a simple task. The electoral blocs of party mergers, splits, or gets reformed from one electoral cycle to another, political parties disintegrate or re-form permanently. Large-scale painstaking work is required to perform the corresponding calculations. Recently, such a study has been conducted.

The Pedersen index for the parliamentary elections of 1998 – 2019 was calculated by Oksana Balashova (Balashova 2020). She based her calculations on the results of the parties that received at least 1% of the vote in the elections. She calculated the proportion of each political party in the electoral bloc, taking into account the partisanship of candidates who won in single-mandate districts. As for the problem of new parliamentary parties, Balashova justifiably corrects the “classical” methodology in relation to the Ukrainian situation and equates their indicator to zero in previous elections. Thus, she obtained the following indicators of the volatility index (taking into account new parliament parties):

**Table 1. The electoral volatility in Ukraine (1998-2019)**

| 1998 | 2002 | 2006 | 2007 | 2012 | 2014 | 2019 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 5.1  | 15.6 | 37.8 | 5.5  | 22.7 | 58.4 | 46.4 |


As one can see from these figures (for the visualization of this data in the form of a graph, see Chart 6) volatility increases with increasing indifference among citizens in the political process. At the same time, it significantly exceeds the level of volatility in EU countries, on the basis of which Mair concludes about the growth of political detachment in the EU.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the dynamics of volatility<sup>2</sup> generally correlate with the dynamics of

<sup>1</sup> Mair designated volatility as high, which exceeds 10%. According to his calculations, one of several European volatility maxima was reached in the 1990s in Italy: 22.9%. The European situation caused Mair to be extremely pessimistic about the future of democracy in the EU. In Ukraine, as Balashova shows, the volatility indicators in 2010s were several times higher than European highs (Mair 2013: 31–32).

<sup>2</sup> The volatility indicator for 2007 is somewhat in conflict with most other data, but this is not surprising. The time difference between the regular (2006) and extraordinary (2007) elections was so insignificant that another ranking indicator would have caused doubts about the correctness of the calculations. The rather high electoral volatility in 2006 was probably due to a significant change in

the level of democratic development, as it is recorded in the indices of Freedom House, *The Economist*, and the Polity IV project. This consistency of various data and indices seems to provide additional evidence that they describe the dominant trend in Ukraine before the war, associated with the growth of crisis trends in the field of democracy.

**Chart 6. Electoral volatility in Ukraine (1998-2019)**



Source: Balashova 2020

Finally, another important aspect of the Ukrainian situation has also attracted attention. According to the data from sociological research conducted by the Institute of Sociology NAS of Ukraine, the level of trust in the parliament in Ukraine is consistently low, on average, with such trust being expressed by less than 10% of respondents. As a rule, this level increases somewhat during election years. For example, 15.2% of respondents reported that they mostly trusted or fully trusted the parliament in 2006, and 16.7% of them said they trusted it in 2019. However, the level of trust in parliament decreased very rapidly to 5-8% during the first year of its convocation. Only when the highest democracy rankings in Ukraine were recorded, during the period 2006 – 2010, had any increase in trust in the parliament been detectable (Ukrayins’ke suspil’stvo... 2020: 472). Alexander Vishnyak says this about this phenomenon:

[T]he low level of trust to the Verkhovna Rada in 1994 – 2005 (...) is partly explained by the fact that in 1995 (...) its powers were significantly reduced... After 2006, the powers of the Verkhovna Rada were expanded, but not quite consistently... After 2010, the level of confidence in the Verkhovna Rada became very low again. (Višnák 2014: 151–152)

the political landscape of the country after the 2004 presidential elections, which were accompanied by mass street protests.



In other words, trust had grown at a time when many people in Ukraine had formed perceptions of parliament as a platform for civic participation in politics. However, the dominance of non-public and depoliticized state decision-making practices had not been overcome. The result was a return of the level of trust in parliament to its previous low level. Furthermore, this low level of trust also contributed to greater alienation of Ukrainian citizens from institutionalized mass politics (hence, probably, the willingness of a significant portion of them to support non-institutionalized forms of politics). This situation provides additional evidence of the fallacy of the idea that refusal to participate in politics is a consequence of the peculiarities of national mentality.

In one of my previous works (Kiryukhin 2022), I pointed out that from the 1990s it is the deliberative model that is justifiably defined as the actual model of democratic political structure. I agree with the most general definition of democracy given by Amartya Sen (Sen 2009), namely, that democracy is decision-making through deliberation. In this context, elections are an important expression of public deliberation (Stout 2004: 4). The decline in electoral activity should be understood as a weakening of the importance of this deliberation in favor of non-majoritarian institutions and, therefore, as a movement towards a crisis of democracy. That is, based on the previously given data, it is possible to say about the growing anti-democratic tendencies in Ukraine before the start of the war.<sup>1</sup> Additional evidence of this is the fact that after 2014 Ukraine was not able to return to the rankings of democracy that were recorded earlier (since the role of majority institutions in political life remains quite limited, it would be difficult to expect a different result<sup>2</sup>). In turn, high volatility, which is connected to

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<sup>1</sup> The idea that the decline in political participation and political apathy should be seen as a manifestation of the crisis of democracy is being criticized by some researchers today. For example, critics argue that democracy should not be considered exclusively in the context of citizens' participation in elections, since this is a very narrow approach to understanding politics that does not take into account the development of alternative forms of political participation, such as Internet activism or transnational social movements (McCaffrie and Akram 2014). However, this criticism seems groundless in this case. First, it is based on the ideas that prevailed in the first half of the 2010s about the rapid reduction of the state and the blurring of national borders, and accordingly, the revision of ideas about citizenship. However, we are witnessing the revival of the topic of the relevance of national borders, the so-called "right turn," the development of authoritarianism and nationalism, against the background of growing political apathy in democratic countries and the spread of non-political decision-making practices in the second half of the 2010s. This shows that "traditional" participation is extremely important for democracy and cannot be adequately replaced by alternative forms. The search for such alternative forms is often a manifestation of crisis. (For criticism of the idea that alternative forms of electoral political participation can be effective in solving political issues, see, for example, in: Crouch 2004). Second, within the framework of the approach of this study, political participation is considered only as one of the dimensions of public discussion, which seems to absolve him of the accusation of too narrow an interpretation of the political.

<sup>2</sup> It cannot be ruled out that in this case we are witnessing a situation that Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way wrote about. They note that after the end of the Cold War, democratic procedures, such as multiparty elections, spread to many countries, including those where there were no favorable conditions for democracy. They include Ukraine among such countries. Levitsky and Way write that these countries "according to nearly all existing social science research, "should" have been authoritarian, but external pressure compelled their elites to permit a degree of pluralism and electoral competition. Thus, regimes that would very likely have been outright dictatorships in another historical context became hybrids during

the exclusion of citizens from politics and a decrease in party and ideological identification,<sup>1</sup> contributed to the growth of populist strategies aimed at the emotional involvement of citizens in the political process. This leads to the ultimate derationalization of political processes.

#### 4. Conclusion

We live in an era which provides little cause for optimism, and the emerging threats against democracy present one of the best examples of this. Since liberal democracies have lost their opponents (communism and socialism), there would seem to be no serious obstacles to expanding the sphere of democracy in the world. For instance, in the mid-1970s there were approximately 40 democracies in the world, but by the end of the 1990s there were already more than 60. This observation allowed Huntington to talk about the so-called “third wave of democratization”. However, it soon became clear that the main threats to contemporary democracy are not its direct opponents. These threats are embedded in the model of democracy itself that was formed in the second half of the 1970s under the influence of neoliberal politics, skepticism about the expansion of democratic participation, and, accordingly, limitation of the system of embedded liberalism. That is, the current crisis of democracy—the third in the last hundred years - is a systemic crisis caused by internal factors that have forced many citizens of democratic countries to express support for non- and anti-systemic right-wing populist political movements and leaders. Its peculiarity is that democratic institutions themselves, and democracy itself as a source of legitimization of political power, are usually not questioned. However, at the same time, the political process is distinguished by alienation, of a significant part of citizens from political decision-making. This is the so-called crisis of representation, which, to a large extent, is a result of increasing inequality. This is also a result of restrictions imposed on pluralism of opinions—a problem that has worsened with the growth of public support for populist movements. The combined influence of all these factors has a negative impact on the possibility of political decision-making by broad civic participation and deliberation.

Longitudinal studies of the development of political institutions in Ukraine show that after a short period of significant improvement in the situation which seemed to be ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens to participate in political decisions, there was an increase in anti-democratic tendencies even before the beginning of Russian armed aggression. However, this situation is not surprising. Having only joined global political and economic processes 30 years ago, Ukraine was also vulnerable to negative anti-democratic influences. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Ukraine is a transforming society with relatively new, underdeveloped, and unstable democratic traditions, and, as a result, the country is very susceptible to

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the post-Cold War era” (Levitsky and Way 2020: 52). The extent to which this description is applicable to the explanation of the situation that has developed with democracy in Ukraine requires special analysis.

<sup>1</sup> Mair specifically points out these consequences of the volatility.

practices which violate the principles of political equality due to socio-economic inequalities (the phenomenon of oligarchy).

The main existential threat Ukraine now faces is the war. In 1918, when voicing opposition to Woodrow Wilson's statement about war and democracy, Charles Ellwood said that war cannot make the world safe for democracy. This was because:

[W]ar throughout all the ages has been one of the greatest enemies of democracy. Not only has militancy tended towards the rule of force and towards despotism in general, but even a defensive warfare ... has more than once resulted in the subversion of democracy both in government and in society at large. (Ellwood 1918: 511)

Is there a place for democracy or discussion about it during war? The belief that national security often requires the sacrifice of freedom, and that democracy is ineffective militarily, has been quite common in America since the Founding Fathers' time. In the twentieth century, this has been reflected in the works of Hans Morgenthau and Samuel Huntington. Is this point of view justified? Does the willingness to restrict, or even abolish, political freedoms in the situation of war pose an extremely great threat to society?

The Age of Enlightenment gave rise to the idea of the close connection between the type of political regime and domestic and international conflicts. This idea is expressed in Kant's notion that democracies are never at war with each other, which means that the spread of democracy leads to the establishment of lasting peace in international relations. This view of the relationship between democracy and war was especially popular in the 1990s, after the collapse of the socialist system and an increase in the number of democracies in the world. However, empirical research and experiments have allowed researchers to propose a number of valid counter arguments against this position. As it seems to have turned out, there may actually be no direct connection between democracy and peace. Democracies do sometimes wage wars. This only became clear after the number of democracies in the world increased. Moreover, it has often been democracies—and not authoritarian regimes—who initiated war, and, interestingly, quite often it has been the democracies which have won these wars.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, in recent decades, the relevant question has become not about whether democracy and war are compatible, but about why democracies seem to be so successful at winning wars.

Various answers have been suggested, such as, for example, that democratic leaders are more likely than authoritarian leaders to suffer politically if they lose, which makes them put more effort into achieving victory (Andrew W. Bausch and Sarah Croco).<sup>2</sup> An alternative theory has been proposed by Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long. Biddle and Long agree that democratic regimes win wars more often, but suggest this is not due to the fact that these regimes are democracies,

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example: Weede 1984; Lake, David 1992; Hegre 2014; Bausch 2017; Reiter and Stam 2002.

<sup>2</sup> This is evidenced by the experiments of Andrew W. Bausch, which, among other things, became an additional justification for the conclusions of the study of the responsibility of democratic leaders conducted by Sarah Croco (See: Bausch 2017; Croco 2011).

but to the fact that it is democratic states, who “more often than not...enjoy stronger human capital, better civil-military relations, or cultural traits that conduce to superior war fighting” (Biddle and Long 2004: 541). Indeed, it is doubtful that democratic procedures can directly affect the effectiveness of the army during the course of hostility. However, there is no doubt that the political culture of a democratic society, which promotes greater involvement of citizens in decision-making procedures, cohesion between the army and citizens and greater responsibility of leaders, creates prerequisites for military victory, as evidenced by the fact that democracies win wars more often. This means that talking about democracy and its problems during the war is not only appropriate but also extremely necessary.

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