

## DE-ETATIZATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FORMATION OF A GLOBAL MAIDAN

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**Abstract.** *This article is devoted to revealing the factors of de-etatization of the sovereignty of modern states. We highlight the transformational trends that occur in institutional mechanisms and organizational forms of state functioning: the splitting of traditional state functions between the private and public sectors, the increasing influence of supranational institutions on internal and external governance, depletion of the substantive component in the communication of power and society, and the erosion of established systems of political representation. Actual policymaking in network formats with the participation of nonstate stakeholders causes the state to lose its sovereign monopoly on decision-making and creates problems for legitimation.*

*This study is presented as part of a wider theoretical debate over the fate of state sovereignty and democracy. The legitimacy associated with the existence of modern structures, including representative democracy, is running out. Despite its legality, the modern state loses its legitimacy owing to loss of trust on the part of citizens. Contemporary structures of governance have proved unable to respond adequately to the pandemic crisis. The Western system of social services and medical services provision cannot cope with the challenges of the epidemiological emergency. Legitimacy now belongs to the global Maidan, which exists outside the modern state. In this situation of crisis we find not only the countries of the post-Soviet bloc but also countries that were considered the center of world democracy and world capitalism.*

**Key words:** *state sovereignty, political governance, political representation, legitimacy*

### Introduction

The turbulent and unpredictable global events of the early 21st century—from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to the global economic crisis of 2008, the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, and the many other upheavals that humanity has experienced in just two decades—have revealed the institutional weakness and vulnerability of the national and international regulatory mechanisms in the setting of ongoing globalization. In recent years, many states have faced a crisis of regime legitimacy, which is expressed in frequent changes of government, the deconstruction of representative systems, the

volatility of electoral preferences, large-scale protest movements, and the rise of radical populist political forces.

Despite the intensification of etatistic rhetoric among scholars concerning the decline of globalization and the rise of nation-states (O’Sullivan 2019), the pandemic has clearly confirmed the fact recognized by globalists: states are no longer able to effectively regulate everything that penetrates their territorial borders. A common theme in global studies is the deterritorialization of sovereignty, as globalization makes it impossible to create public policy without the involvement in transnational structures (Castells 2000; Hardt & Negri 2000; Beck 2005; Held & McGrew 2007; Pabst 2010; Crouch 2017; Slaughter 2017; Gleckman 2018).

Territorial claims still remain a meaningful factor in interstate conflicts (e.g., the escalation of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020), though the apparent trend in the exercise of state sovereignty in the 21st century is toward a changing role for the national government. This is occurring because of the multiplicity of actors participating in policymaking, the forms of interaction between them, and the move from hierarchically organized governance to its deverticalization in the interstices of the network. State power is fragmented among the many actors involved in policymaking and influencing decision-making at every level of governance: international structures and supranational entities with varying degrees of integration and institutionalization, global clubs, multinational companies and foundations, NGOs. The heterogeneity of governance is exacerbated by the increase in the number of public actors seeking recourse to international organizations and institutions to address domestic political issues. Although political governance, by definition, is run by public authorities and aims to ensure the “public good,” its implementation more often takes place through hybrid channels of private and public structures. The essence of this process is that society is no longer controlled exclusively by centralized structures.

Accordingly, the conceptual revision of the classical definition of sovereignty as “supreme power especially over a body politic (as a country)” (*Merriam-Webster* 2020) built on the fundamental issue to the modern world, the search for new organizational forms to provide sovereignty. In the scholarly literature on maintaining state sovereignty, we find the following statements:

[T]he trend in modern international law has been in the direction of enhancing the authoritative foundations of the international system and to moving State practice away from State absolutism. (Nagan & Hammer 2004: 187)

[T]he juridical concept of status sovereignty is not sustainable, and should not be encouraged. (Zick 2005: 337)

And finally,

[S]overeignty can no longer be understood in terms of the categories of untrammelled effective power. (Bhalla & Chowla 2014: 162)

Sovereignty is rather “a matter of competence” (Zick 2005: 337) in the functioning of the state as an actor in international affairs or as a provider of services to ensure the welfare of citizens. In this course of the issue recognition, Adrian Pabst points out that

“late-modern democracy is no longer predominantly defined on the basis of territoriality, nationhood, or the self-determination of people composed of persons and citizens” (Pabst 2010: 59). Thus the main purpose of modern democracy is to regulate risks and maximize individual choice and the economic opportunities of consumers as regards material goods (ibid.).

In accounting for the need to formulate approaches that would go beyond the traditional parameters of interpretation of state sovereignty, John Jackson (2003: 801) connects it with “the pragmatic functionalism of the allocation of power as between different levels of governance entities in the world.”

In a wide range of the scientific literature, the chief recognized factors in state sovereignty transformation are globalization and the influence of supranational entities on the functioning of states. Nonetheless, we argue that the political, institutional, and social changes taking place within the states are no less significant in their impact on the de-etatization of sovereignty and the shift to new organizational forms of governance. The legitimacy of decisions and the status of political institutions that must ensure the execution of state sovereignty are more often being disputed, as indicated by the frequency of changes in parliamentary coalitions and governments and the intensification of protest activity across the globe. The rules of the political game are becoming less clear owing to the fragmentation, deterritorialization, and diffusion of political power.

The purpose of this article is to lay bare the factors that determine the de-etatization of the sovereignty of modern states. We interpret the concept of sovereignty in terms of legitimacy. As in the context of modern trends in the implementation and provision of power, it is legitimacy both in the normative aspect (including legitimacy enshrined in law) and in the perceptual sense (based on the recognition of sovereign power and consent to its implementation) that is the basis for sovereignty.

Taking into account the above, our study is based on the following assumptions. First, we assume that the trend of widespread protest activity in the world in the last decade can be attributed to the delegitimization of institutions of state power in the eyes of citizens and the simultaneous lack of alternative institutionalized channels for representing their interests. The second assumption is that the key factor in the de-etatization of the sovereignty of modern states is the actual deverticalization of policymaking processes in network multistakeholder formats, which have neither accountability mechanisms nor channels of reverse public control.

The paper consists of two parts. The first part introduces recent conceptual reflections on contemporary trends in state functioning and rising protest activism worldwide, and provides some empirical justification of the issues. The second part discusses the challenges to the legitimation of state sovereignty in the context of its de-etatization.

## The Rise of the Multitude

One of the more obvious world trends in sociopolitical development is the surge of protest activity, political dissent, and other public expressions of dissatisfaction with the actions of governments and representative systems in established democracies and countries undergoing regime transformation (see: Krastev 2014; Inglehart & Norris 2016; Mounk 2018; Müller 2018; Mudde 2019; Brannen, Haig, & Schmidt 2020). Indeed, mass antigovernment protests rose by an average of 11.5% from 2009 to 2019 in all regions of the world, with the highest concentration of activity in the Middle East (16.5%) and the fastest growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa (Brannen, Haig, & Schmidt 2020:4). Even under severe quarantine restrictions in 2020, 230 antigovernment protests occurred in various countries (Global Protest Tracker 2020).

Paradoxically, despite the variety of procedural mechanisms for public participation in policymaking, people in different countries with distinguished political modes more and more often take to the streets to declare their needs and interests. Does that mean that modern states can no longer provide the appropriate representation of public interest? The question is of interest insofar as representation is crucial for modern states. As Frank Ankersmit (2002: 115) has written, "Without representation there is no represented – and without political representation there is no nation as a truly political entity".

Political representation has always been a complex mechanism, as relations between citizens and their representatives are mediated by political parties, interest groups, and corporate organizations. In addition, the common interest is based on the social identity of the representatives and those they represent. However, modern societies are becoming increasingly diverse in economic, cultural, religious, and gender aspects. That makes it a very complex task to provide means of representation that would satisfy the variety of public interests. Simultaneously, the sphere of political representation, embodied in the activities of parties, political movements, and parliamentarism, is gradually losing its legitimacy as a mediator between government and society, as evidenced by the widespread decline in membership in political parties and confidence in political institutions.

Citizens' attitudes toward traditional party policy is reflected in the quantitative indicators of party membership. According to the World Values Survey in 48 countries only 14% of respondents are members of political parties, and of these, only 5% are active members, while 84.7% declare no party affiliation at all (Haerpfer et al. 2020: 150).

Total party membership declined from 1994 to 2014 in Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, and North America. Formal membership in Latin American parties declined from 24% to 18% in twenty years. In the countries of South Asia, party membership ranged from 13% to 15% during this period (Klaukka, Van der Staak, & Valladares 2017: 109). Despite the dominant position of the Communist Party in China, only 6.6% of citizens identified themselves as members (Statista 2020).

The parties of the UK, France, and Italy have lost up to 1.5 million registered members in the last three decades, corresponding to a total loss of about one-third to

two-thirds of their original electoral base. The share of the population that is a member of political parties in the UK in 2019 was 1.7% (Audickas, Dempsey, & Loft 2019).

Although the results of individual surveys may differ from the quantitative accounts of party membership provided by parties (citizens may hide their party affiliation, or parties may inflate numbers to enhance the importance of their brand), they nonetheless indicate skepticism about parties as representatives of voters' interests in policymaking. Thus the World Values Survey records that between 2000 and 2020, 61.6% to 67.6% of population surveyed expressed distrust in parties (Inglehart et al. 2018: 166; Haerpfer et al. 2020: 113).

Additional evidence of delegitimization tendencies in established systems of representation comes from the decline in confidence in national parliaments. In particular, among all public authorities in the EU, citizens have the least trust in national parliaments. Overall, only 36.4% of citizens in the world trust national parliaments (Haerpfer et al. 2020: 114), and the proportion of those who do not trust parliaments increased from 49.2% in 2000 to 60% in 2020 (Inglehart et al. 2018: 167; Haerpfer et al. 2020: 114). Along with falling confidence in governments—more than half of citizens, 51.3%, do not trust national governments (ibid., 112)—such figures highlight the inability of state policies and guidelines to satisfy social needs and public demands.

The de-affiliation from political parties is associated not only with a decline in trust in them and in parliaments but also with a change in the substantive component of representation, namely, the transformation of the social structure and a shift in the “traditional” electorate from left and center parties to the extremes of the ideological spectrum.

Structural transformations in modern societies occur mostly under labor market changes and migration flows. The IT sector and robotics, online systems, and multinational production have significantly changed the nature of professional employment over the last quarter of a century. The increasing use of robots in manufacturing and the introduction of electronic services have displaced blue-collar workers from the labor market. According to a report by the analytical group Oxford Economics, technological changes in production and services will lead to the loss of more than 20 million jobs by 2030 (Cone & Lambert 2019).

Another important trend is connected with the intensive dynamics of labor migration flows, which, along with the migration crisis in Europe, has become acutely social. This trend casts into sharp relief the problem of marginalization of large professional groups related to the manufacturing sector and certain industries. At the same time, the ranks of such marginalized groups are replenished by graduates of higher education institutions who cannot find employment but have to make payments on loans for their education and by young people who cannot afford higher education at all. These groups—workers who are unskilled for the labor market, young educated people who cannot find jobs, migrants and refugees from conflict zones—form a new large social stratum that is neither tied to certain labor groups nor has a clear political identification. This stratum is what Hardt and Negri (2005) define as a “multitude” and Guy Standing (2011) conceptualized as a precariat.

Precariat growth has been driven by the global economic turmoil of the last decade, including large waves of migrant laborers and refugees, which has led to an increase in the number of temporary jobs. Trying to determine the generational characteristics of the precariat, Alex Foti (2017) argues that precariousness affects generations X, Y, and Z, who entered the labor market after the baby boomers—that is, people aged 18 to 45. Precariousness also affects middle-aged people who have been fired (Foti 2017: 10).

The attitude of the precariat to production is defined as partial participation in the labor process in combination with the so-called “work for job,” a term that refers to the constantly rising amount of unpaid activities workers must carry out in order not to lose a job. The precariat is often deprived of certain civil rights that other members of society have. However, the precariat is not yet a class *for itself*; so far it is a class *in itself*, but it is dangerous in terms of conflict because of the features that Standing identified and summed up as the “4As.” Precariousness is characterized by constant *anxiety* due to uncertainty; by *alienation*, in the sense that workers do not do what they want and do a lot of things they do not want to do; by *anomie*, a despair caused by a lack of way out of a situation; and by *anger* as a result of the previous three points (Standing 2011: 9–24).

Unlike the proletariat, the industrial working class, whose existence formed the basis of the social democratic policy of the 20th century, the precariat does not have a definite political platform owing to its eclectic composition. Without seeing the “old” political parties and programs as reflecting its interests, the precariat becomes an object of manipulation by radical political forces. Radical populist parties have the greatest electoral influence in matters of domestic policy, upholding the principle of “national preferences” for employment and social security. By mobilizing the electorate against labor immigration, they are in favor of restricting the supply of labor in the labor market. Another reason for alienation is the weakening of traditional loyalty to political forces that previously acted as representatives of the interests of the working class. Increased support for radical parties can be seen as an expression of protest and frustration in centrist parties. Citizens show their dissatisfaction with the political elite by choosing parties that were outsiders to the political arena for decades.

Despite the polarity in the ideological spectrum, the programs of far-right and far-left parties have a number of common denominators: antielitism and antiglobalism (the ideological platforms of populist political forces, right and left, are based on criticism of the low efficacy of international organizations, global clubs, and international financial institutions); endogenous political rhetoric (many populist parties began to form their electoral base from certain regions of the state, which is reflected in their names), and politicization of the migration issue. Thus the success of such parties is based on the mobilization of a reserve of popular discontent among alienated voters who express deep disappointment in modern politics. The rise of political populism is due to economic globalization, which has changed the social basis of the centrist party electorate, and to sociocultural resistance to global migration flows.

Modern systems of political representation also face the pressure of participatory practices that utilize online technologies, through which citizens can independently

represent their interests in policymaking. Citizens are less interested in unilateral participation in traditional political activities, such as maintaining formal party membership. As political organizations are unable effectively to represent the existing diversity of interests and values, online activities take over and complement the activities of public organizations and social movements. But are such technology-based activities able to fill the functional gaps in representation left by party activities?

Nowadays, the phenomenon that highlights the above-mentioned tendencies in public representation and the decline of trust in governmental bodies is the fulminant rise of social movements worldwide, from small, local protests to protests of national or even global scale. The most vivid examples of such movements in recent decades include Occupy Wall Street, the "Arab Spring" uprisings, the Indignados, Fridays for Future (a youth climate movement), the Umbrella Movement, the Yellow Vests, and Black Lives Matter. Together, they form something that could be called a global Maidan.<sup>1</sup> These social uprisings can be considered separate from the institutional pillars of state functioning, particularly in the state's mission of moderating plurality of public interests.

The diversity and multiplicity of non-governmental-sector organizations are growing exponentially, in particular in the scale of activity and influence on policymaking processes at all levels of government, from local to global. Surveys show that social movements and NGOs generally enjoy more trust among citizens than parties do. According to the Edelman Barometer, the level of trust in NGOs in 28 countries in the decade from 2010 to 2020 remained constant and even increased slightly, from 57% to 58% of respondents, respectively (Edelman Trust Barometer 2010:6; Edelman Trust Barometer 2020: 38).

The effectiveness of the representation of interests by social movements and public organizations depends on the influence they can exert on the institutions responsible for the implementation of laws. However, against the background of the transformation in the systems of political representation and the delegitimization of mass traditional parties, social movements and NGOs still have not supplanted them as representatives of social interests in the political arena. Social movements and NGOs draw attention to unanswered demands from government agencies and relay them through nonelectoral public channels. At the same time, such organizations are less interested in mediating between competing requirements for consistent policy development. Their campaigns are sporadic and fragmentary. Social movements do not fully compensate for the consequences of party withdrawal, as they perform only partially the functions that help ensure stable representation.

Among other challenges of political representation, it is necessary to point out the problem of the substantive aspect, the attributive characteristics of representatives, because the socioeconomic and value gap between those who delegate their right to represent interests and those who have to convert them into decisions is obvious. The problem of the lack of mechanisms for aggregating the existing multiplicity of interests

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<sup>1</sup> Here "Maidan" refers to mass protest movements in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014).

with a simultaneous demand for their articulation in the political plane has become increasingly acute. After all, the spectrum of political representation, in our opinion, can no longer be reduced exclusively to a right-left dichotomy. A concomitant factor contributing to social anomie and declining public confidence in public institutions is the structural and organizational transformation of policymaking processes, namely, the fragmentation of state power between private and public actors at the subnational, national, and transnational levels. Through a domino effect, these several manifestations of the dysfunction of political representation systems form a global trend of de-etatization. The assertion of the universalist role of nation-states in representing the common interest rather than the collective interests of the inhabitants of a given territory, in relation to actions that take place within national borders, is in dispute (see: Crouch 2017: 63).

### **The Legitimacy of Sovereignty: The State versus the Multitude**

Legitimacy as one of the main factors guaranteeing the full realization of sovereignty is at the heart of the matter. In the context of deterritorialization of the concept of state sovereignty and the transformation of political governance, the legitimation of sources of power and decisions becomes key to understanding the growing social frustrations in different countries as a global trend in the last twenty years. Since the sovereignty of the state is based on the exercise of power and decision-making, with results that are binding on all members of society, according to rules (normative aspect) that determine who can make political decisions, when, and in what order, and also depends on the commitment of those affected (perceptual aspect), the top-down rules and bottom-up social commitment together are important for legitimating sovereignty, as they serve to guarantee the stability of the political system.

Despite numerous studies of political legitimacy, its conceptual rationale is still not clear enough, owing to problems of operationalization and measurement. Various evaluation indicators can be adduced in support of legitimacy, such as the level of political activity of citizens or compliance with norms and rules. In a generalized sense, legitimacy can be represented as the perception of the population of political power that is acquired and exercised in accordance with certain social norms and criteria. Legitimacy is formed both in accordance with the legal framework and through trust-building between stakeholders. The two forms of legitimacy, normative and perceptual, are complementary.

Legitimacy presupposes the voluntary acceptance by society of power and the decisions the power-holder makes as meeting the requirements and challenges of today. Since trust is the basis of the legitimacy of policy-making, and legitimate requests from society are manifested primarily in the expectations of public authorities, to clarify the state of their perceptive legitimacy, one should examine what is important for citizens in terms of priority issues of state functioning. Cross-national monitoring studies show that the concerns of citizens are primarily related to the socioeconomic aspects of life. Ensuring stable economic growth is a priority for the state, according to 48.1% of respondents (Haerpfer et al. 2020: 204), while only 18.6% of respondents saw increasing

the involvement of citizens in the discussion of government as a priority (ibid). An important finding was that at the individual level, among the priority goals, the majority of respondents (40.9%) indicated the maintenance of order in the country. The fight against rising prices was identified by 23.6% of respondents, but giving more power to citizens in making important government decisions as a priority was selected by only 22.4% of respondents (ibid., 206).

Thus there is a public demand for solutions to economic problems amid low levels of trust in government. For their part, governments, caught between the need to keep their promises to citizens and their obligations to international institutions, must seek solutions that can satisfy both parties. The only factor that seems capable of yielding a compromise in such a contradictory situation by maintaining stability in society and the status quo for the pro-government forces is the successful functioning of the economy.

The interpretation of Caleb Miller's sovereignty (2020) fits into this context. He argues that it is Hobbes's interpretation of sovereignty as a form of domination through the dichotomy of "subject" and "servant" models that reflects modern trends in governance. While the Hobbesian subject has a conscious attitude toward sovereignty as shared and mediated by the community and guaranteed by the agreement, the servant perceives sovereignty as an accidental phenomenon, unmediated and guaranteed by violence. Miller (2020) notes that in contrast to the ideal of citizens in a democracy, namely, that political practices meet or at least approach democratic criteria, citizens today recognize the impossibility of popular sovereignty and political equality. It is self-perception through the service format (the servant model) of building relations with institutions of power that makes the political involvement of citizens more productive and reduces the stressful consequences for providing state sovereignty.

If socioeconomic indicators are determinants of the legitimacy of political governance, then fluctuations in economic growth can have a significant impact on the maintenance of the political system because increasing the welfare of citizens increases the legitimacy of political decisions, while economic deprivation reduces the legitimacy of governance strategies and can cause frustrations in society. It is symptomatic that the "Yellow Vest" protests in France have nothing to do with the migration crisis or terrorism, problems that are quite acute in that country. The government's decision to raise the fuel tax as an economic tool to cover the budget deficit provoked the formation of a social movement across the country whose members opposed the neoliberal reforms of President Emmanuel Macron and again put forward purely economic demands to restore the solidarity tax on wealth and increase the minimum wage. Problems of concern to citizens prove that the basis for recognizing or not recognizing modern policymaking processes is performative legitimacy, which is achieved by demonstrating the effectiveness of governance, mostly through the receipt of benefits. In this context, the results of a cross-national study of political participation practices conducted in 2018 (Wike & Castilio 2018) are indicative.

In our opinion, the reason for the growth of public discontent and the frequency of political crises is the economization of political legitimacy against the background of privatization of government processes. De-etatization is embodied in the spread of

network formats for policymaking with the involvement of stakeholders from the public and private (international, private, public) sectors. The influence of supranational institutions and commercial institutions on political and managerial processes raises the question of the legitimacy of decisions made in multistakeholder formats of governance.

In the context of modern sociopolitical trends, the two-dimensional format of the government–citizens seems insufficient to fully understand the features of legitimization of policymaking. After all, the effectiveness of governance depends not only on the ability of public institutions to provide public goods in general but also on the ability to effectively implement the program objectives of international entities. The study of international organizations such as the UN, the IMF, the World Trade Organization, and supranational entities such as the EU also highlights the importance of citizens' perceptions of problem-solving as a major factor in their legitimacy. States and their citizens support power through the collective benefits they receive (see: Tallberg & Zürn 2019: 595–596).

The transformation of state sovereignty under the influence of globalization has led to a change in the formats and principles of interaction between political actors, as many of the issues related to the domestic policy of the state are mediated by decisions made outside the state. As a result of the institutionalization of powers to set the agenda and make, implement, and enforce decisions, powers transferred from states to international organizations, the latter have expanded the scope of regulation beyond the original functional powers and have gained more imperative influence.

The most powerful stakeholders choose legitimization strategies that allow them to maintain control over the process. They implement dependency mechanisms that are difficult to change. This is especially evident in governance formats with the participation of international institutions. For instance, the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization are powerful sources of direct influence on both the economies and policies of member states. Adherence to the rules and recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank not only affects the possibility of obtaining a loan or grant, it is also a key aspect of a recipient country's international reputation, which is of interest to other international institutions and governments. Delegated authority can be restored only by terminating membership in a particular international organization. However, the consequences of such independence can be seen not only in reputational but also in real economic losses for the private and civil sectors of the state.

An example is the situation around Brexit. The UK's leaving the EU, according to a draft agreement approved by the EU Council in November 2018 and rejected by the British Parliament, would cost around £38 billion in “economic and fiscal outlook 2019.” When the Brexit issue was finally settled in the autumn of 2019, the payments amounted to £32.8 billion (€36.3 billion), with £5.0 billion to be paid as part of the UK's normal membership fees in the EU (OBR 2019: 166). However, the biggest challenge facing the UK is the prospect of its place in world markets. Brexit affects multinational companies and enterprises operating in the UK, and therefore their employees.

The fragmentation of state powers between a multitude of public and private stakeholders at the subnational and supranational levels of governance changes the

structural modularity of legitimizing policymaking. First, in multistakeholder governance, the sources of legitimacy are fragmented, as each participant in a network partnership—a public institution, private or public organization, or international entity—may be seen as differently legitimate from the perspective of other actors and society as a whole. Legitimacy requirements vary depending on the audience. They are formed by the interaction of the legitimizing efforts of stakeholders and the reactions of target or other groups to such efforts. Even if there is trust and agreement among the members of a certain political and managerial network, they may have a low level of trust on the part of the general public. Citizens are not asked to consent to the participation of specific nonstate actors in decision-making, and public trust is mostly assessed through attitudes toward government and government agencies.

Second, participants in multistakeholder formats of political decision-making may have their own unique strategies to legitimize political decisions, especially in the normative aspect.

Third, multistakeholder political and managerial processes lack mechanisms for legitimizing decisions that could simultaneously meet the legitimizing demands of all stakeholders and their legitimizing audiences.

Traditional formal accountability mechanisms are not suitable for assessing the legitimacy of decisions made in multistakeholder governance formats. To whom and on what grounds should each participant in the multistakeholder decision-making network be accountable?

International organizations (actually, their governing bodies) are accountable to member states; NGOs are accountable to donors and sponsors. The accountability of commercial organizations involved in decision-making and ultimately the provision of services applies only to shareholders and is not relevant to the accountability of public institutions to citizens. Even if multistakeholder governance is associated with multilateral decision-making goals to be implemented on behalf of governments, this format is not required to report on its activities or to follow the instructions of the intergovernmental community. Multistakeholder governance with an emphasis on organizational efficiency and managerial autonomy is not relevant to traditional models of political control and accountability.

In traditional democratic theory, the core unit is the individual citizen, who can vote and provide their opinion on any given policy or action . . . A stakeholder-based system is not structured to give appropriate centrality to individuals affected by its governance. (Gleckman 2018: 6)

The provision of services is influenced by the authorities and can be adapted to their particular interests. Principles of democratic governance, such as procedural transparency, distributive justice, and the civil status of individuals, can be undermined. These problems are particularly acute in countries with a low efficacy of democratic institutions and an underdeveloped civil society. The informal nature of multistakeholder governance here is to the result of the close merging of the interests of public officials and large financial and industrial groups. The latter, together with the privatization of entire sectors of the public service sector, gain significant advantage over policymaking

processes in the state while remaining out of the control of citizens, further strengthening their positions in decision-making networks.

The normative aspect of the legitimacy of such multistakeholder governance is questionable because of procedural opacity and the lack of advisory mechanisms and compensation systems: those affected by the decisions made in such a format are excluded from the decision-making process and do not have adequate political and legal mechanisms to bring the decision-makers to justice. The lack of developed control mechanisms leads to problems of public legitimacy of decisions and causes social anomie and a sense of alienation from citizens owing to their inability to influence policy-making processes. Thus state power bodies, in particular governments, as socially accountable stakeholders (at least in developed democracies), find themselves at the epicenter of public discontent. The relationship between efficacy and legitimacy takes the form of a vicious circle where increasing the efficacy of the state increases its legitimacy and where increased legitimacy increases the efficacy of the state. The issue of ensuring democracy in this context recedes into the background.

## **Conclusion**

A review of current globalization trends reveals the contextual factors that determine the de-etatization of modern states' sovereignty. Changes in the economic and social spheres in the context of the spread of digital technologies exacerbate the globalization challenges that states have to deal with.

The deverticalization of governance, which occurs because of the fragmentation of state power between public and private sector actors and a shift of decision-making authority to nonstate actors, leads to the alienation of citizens from policymaking and, as a consequence, public delegitimation of the status of governmental institutions and political representation.

Displacement to the periphery of the labor market demand of professional groups that traditionally formed the basis of the middle class, even as the labor market was saturated with foreign labor through increased migration flows, led to the formation of a stratum of society, the precariat, without a stable status in society, social security guarantees, or clear future prospects. Financial instability, social insecurity, and alienation from traditional channels through which to make one's interests known, such as political parties or trade unions, make the precariat a source of social frustration, the radicalization of political sentiment, and protest activity.

Although political parties continue to play an influential role in elections and institutions, they can no longer claim mass participation, and the extremely low level of public confidence in them calls into question the prevailing notion of political parties as the main relational mechanism between the broad social strata and the authorities in the representation of a multiplicity of public interests. Radical political forces, building their programs on populist rhetoric, seek to occupy the gaps created by the decline of centrist parties.

Social movements that provide a mediating function between citizens and political authorities with the help of the latest technologies are, however, poorly representative owing to their own underrepresentation in the political sphere and to the lack of aggregation of various interests into common political programs.

The legitimacy of state sovereignty as a form of domination is ensured primarily through the ability of state institutions to provide socioeconomic benefits, though the transfer of public functions to wholly or partially controlled public service companies and joint forms of governance, such as networked public-private partnerships, displaces political control and weakens the link between public preferences and policymaking. In multistakeholder formats of policymaking, the sources of legitimacy are fragmented, as each participant in a network partnership may differ in the legitimization demands of external audiences and in its own legitimization strategies. The most powerful stakeholders, such as international organizations or financial industry groups, use strategies to legitimize decisions that make governments dependent on regulatory requirements or government claims. The lack of developed institutional mechanisms of accountability and control in multistakeholder formats of government leads to problems of public legitimacy and causes citizens to feel alienated from the processes of policymaking. Institutions of state power, in particular governments, as socially accountable stakeholders are the focus of public discontent. The de-etatization of state sovereignty leads to the delegitimization of state institutions and a downgrading of the status of states in general. In the long view, the counterthrust to the negative development of revealed trends lies in designing appropriate institutional means of providing representation of the public interest at a transnational scale. Obviously, the difficult issue of the structural reformation of international organizations that were founded in the twentieth century should be put on the global agenda. Particularly, in our opinion, the European agencies (e.g., the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), European Defence Agency (EDA), European Police Office (Europol), European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) etc.) could serve as a prototype for governmental models relevant to the current deverticalized policymaking process. However, these decentralized bodies still do not wield power directly; their structural and functional features correspond much more to the governmental tools required in a globalized world. That situation does not presuppose the elimination of state power in the near term. Yet it could mitigate some of the effects of the de-etatization of state sovereignty.

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