Abstract. This study aims at testing and improving the existing instruments of the urban toponyms’ analysis. This study focuses on the renaming of 2,445 streets in 22 regional centers of Ukraine, which took place during the 2010ies. Author of this study argues that there is a considerable difference between the announced and the real values of the vast majority of Ukrainians. The newly adopted street nomenclature in Ukraine’s regional centers reflects the balance between various ideological influences and powers. It imposes values that are regarded as acceptable by the decision-makers at both national and local levels, and by the majority of local political activists. This study defines the signs of the balance of values for every region of Ukraine.

Keywords: identity, ideology, values, Ukrainian regional centers, street renaming

Toponym nomenclature policies that have been carried out in Ukraine during the 2010s provide an extraordinary content-rich material for researches. Ukraine, being the most populous among post-Soviet countries (except Russia), is rich in resources. The spread between Russia and the European Union, Ukraine has undergone major changes during the 2010s, being the subject and object of geopolitical shifts.

This has only been one case in a series of numerous changes in Ukraine over the course of past five centuries. In the 16th–18th centuries, some northern parts of modern Ukraine’s territory were owned, as well as politically and culturally influenced, by the Tsardom of Muscovy, while the wide parts North of the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov were controlled by Muslim lords of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire (Plokhy 2015: 65–66, 74). Meanwhile, the other territories were the domain of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which brought about political, social and cultural change, until the great uprising of Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks in 1648–1650s (Plokhy 2015: 60). The leader of the uprising Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was victorious in several battles against Polish-Lithuanian armies but failed to maintain a stable independent state. According to his decision, the Ukrainian new military estate (the Zaporozhian Cossacks) would become vassals of the Tsardom of Muscovy (Plokhy 2015: 97–107). The lands of the Zaporozhian Cossacks (the territory of several modern regions/oblasts in the central and northeastern parts of Ukraine) would become controlled and influenced by
Moscow. Ukrainian Orthodox clergy were powerful supporters of the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. The clergy strengthened the development and expansion of this empire (Plokhy 2015: 118–146).

In the last quarter of the 18th century, the Russian Empire annexed the lands of the Crimean Khanate and some of the Ottoman Empire, which included the territory of the Crimean Peninsula, modern Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions, together with some other territories. In addition, the empire annexed the lands of modern Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Volyn regions, and some other Polish possessions in Ukraine. Likewise, the Habsburg Empire, the owner of Zakarpattia region since 1699, annexed the lands of modern Chernivtsi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv regions (the borders are approximated) in the 18th century (Plokhy 2015: 139–145). During the period between 1918–1939, the most territories populated by ethnic Ukrainians have been unified under the rule of Bolsheviks in the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). At the same time, several western regions were under the control of Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Romanian states.

As a result, over the course of almost five centuries the territory of Ukraine belonged simultaneously to very different states and civilizations featuring different religions, traditions, political cultures, and heroes. The states fought among themselves and provided hostile propaganda campaigns against each other. Furthermore, they often supported separatism inside the states of their competitors in Ukrainian lands.

During the 18th–19th centuries the extensive former possessions of the Tatar Khans near the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have been inhabited by the flows of colonists of Ukrainian, Russian, German, Bulgarian, Serbian, and many other ethnic origins (Plokhy 2015: 141–142). These lands have become considerably industrialized and Russified. Consequently, their local populations have turned less inclined towards Ukrainian ethnic nationalist ideology than the population of central and western regions of Ukraine (Plokhy 2015: 226–227, 234).

During the time between the 1990s–2010s, street renaming has become an important tool and an issue in Ukrainian politics. The scale of this process is impressive: in 2016 alone, according to the statement of the UINM (Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, the central executive body operating under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), around 51,000 streets in Ukraine have been renamed (UINP 2016). It is important to point out that many thousands were also renamed before and after 2016.

Looking back at the history of the 18th–20th centuries, one can see that the renaming of toponyms was often a satellite of the change in ideology, elite, and power. The intentions of many renamers were resolute, and the investments in the renaming great. It suggests that they have considered the toponym renaming a highly important matter.

For instance, in February 1919, the Bolsheviks initiated a discussion about renaming the streets in Kyiv, just 2 weeks after coming into power there. The list of 36 new street names has been finalized by the authorities just five weeks after this initiative
(VKKRRD 1919). By the end the USSR era, more than 100,000 toponyms in Ukraine have been “painted” in the colors of Soviet ideology.

The names of cities, towns and streets are an effective instrument of promotion of official ideology among populations. They become a part of citizens’ personal data, their biographies and lives. The street name shields work as an outdoor advertisement: they remind one about a certain brand. That is to say, a political brand or a component of ideology. It seems plausible that new toponyms express to a certain degree the mission, the vision, and the strategy of the decision-makers in the (re)naming.

Since the 1990s the number of researches focused on the issues of toponym renaming has risen significantly. This is partly due to multiple waves of toponyms renaming as a result of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Additionally, it has been partly due to the development of historiography in postcolonial countries. The works of many prominent researchers of toponym naming—J. Vuolteenaho, L. Berg, R. Kearns, M. Azaryahu among them—have been included in the book “Critical Toponymies: The Contested Politics of Place Naming,” an interdisciplinary collection that emphasizes the inevitably political character of place naming, thus considering place naming a political practice and a question of power (Berg & Vuolteenaho 2009).

Hundreds of researches and thousands of journalists have covered the practices of street renaming carried in various American, African, Asian, and European cities under various circumstances. As it was shown, the process of renaming was often painful for large groups of people, resulting in not just zealous debates, but also in vandalism, riots, and sometimes in international conflicts (Kadmon 2004; Street 2017).

Countries that share similarities are the most preferable objects in comparing street renaming practices. Neighboring countries seem to be good candidates. Poland is more homogenous than Ukraine in terms of ethnicity and religion. Though the dominant religion of Poland differs from that of Ukraine, around half of Ukraine’s territory has for several centuries fallen under the rule of the Polish state. In the 20th century, both countries were in the same camp of the so-called socialist states under the rule of Moscow.

For this reason, the languages and many traditions of these 2 countries were closely related. In this regard, the paper by Bartłomiej Różycki (2017) is highly noteworthy. He focuses on street renaming through the process of decommunization in the cities of Warsaw, Kraków, and Wroclaw. The patrons (commemorated themes, categories of objects) replacing communist names are categorized as follows:

1. Independence struggle and interwar period.
2. World War II.
3. Anti-communist opposition.
4. Local activists.
5. Restored traditional names.
6. Patrons unrelated to the city.

7. New patrons related to the communism.

8. Neutral, non-symbolic names.

The study describes distinctions among the cities in the majority of the categories. It also shows possible causes for this being the differences in the history of these cities. Examples of that include the influence of German culture on the history of Wroclaw, the rich Polish heritage in Kraków, and Warsaw's status as the capital of modern Poland. One of the most interesting results shows that local memory is often incompatible with the dominant narrative of commemoration. In such a case, new street names can be either the symbols from the dominant narrative or non-symbolic, neutral names. The number of neutral new names is higher in Wroclaw than in Warsaw and Kraków, mainly because Wroclaw's local memory is mostly incompatible with the dominant (Polish) narrative (Różycki 2017).

Perhaps the paper of Różycki would be more informative if it had touched upon a wider range of Polish cities. Wroclaw was only the fourth largest Polish city by population, while Warsaw, Kraków, and Łódź stood at the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd positions, respectively.

In 2011, a group of 11 researchers has published the result of their analysis of the toponyms of eight Central European cities (Stiperski et. al. 2011). The researchers have distinguished a number of groups and subgroups divided by several criteria. Ultimately, they have come to a conclusion that the cities' identity, culture, history, and political processes were reflected in the names of the streets.

A study conducted by eight Slovak authors (Bucher et. al. 2013) provides methods and findings applicable to the research of Ukrainian toponyms. In spite of differences in populations size and levels of European integration, both countries possess many similarities. In the 16th and 17th centuries, parts of both Ukraine and Slovakia have been battlefields in wars between Christian and Ottoman armies. Both of these neighboring Slavic countries were a part of empires throughout the 19th century. Some regions of Ukraine and Slovakia were parts of the Habsburg Empire. Both countries have had a short period of independence in the first half of the 20th century, they have been controlled by Moscow for around four decades after World War II, and both gained independence in early 1990ies. Finally, Ukraine and Slovakia have lower per capita income than their Western neighbors, developed industry, and large ethnic and religious minorities in 21st century.

Following the interdisciplinary approach based on the methodology suggested by Stiperski et al. (2011), the Slovak researchers have analyzed the names of 520 toponyms (mostly streets, but also the names of squares and parks situated in the historical centers of the cities) from eight regional cities (centers of autonomous regions) of Slovakia (Bucher et. al., 2013). The analyzed toponyms were divided into the groups of Personalities (with 5 subgroups by the fields, branches of personality’s activities), Geography (with 3 subgroups), Historic Events & Institutions, Crafts & Trade, and Other. Additionally, they were categorized according to a space scale: local, regional, national, and an international scale. As an example, the names of international scale are those that
have to do with people, events or concepts outside of Slovakia (Wilson Embankment, John Paul II Square, and the like). The toponyms on international scale constated 13% of all toponyms in all eight cities. However, the capital city Bratislava appeared to be the leader in the use of international toponyms: they constituted 20% of all toponyms of the Slovak capital.

The main conclusion of the Slovak researchers is that the nomenclature of streets, squares, parks, and other public spaces depends on the collective identity of the city’s population. Cultural and historical development of certain urban population can be defined through their toponymic nomenclature. Thus urban toponyms are indicators of ideological perceptions of the political, social, and historical events in the context of the Central European region (Bucher et. al. 2013).

Ukrainian toponymy is being studied well these days. However, these studies are mainly focused only on one to several regions of Ukraine (Homanyuk 2017; Takhtaulova 2015; Shtejnle 2018), while others (though covering all the country thematically) do not contain an analysis of diverse aspects (especially, quantitative aspects) of street renaming (Shevel 2016; Törnquist-Plewa & Yurchuk 2017; Kravchenko 2018; Majorov et. al. 2017).

Some methodological approaches of the abovementioned Slovak research were applied in the studies of Ukrainian researcher Oleksiy Gnatiuk (2018). Gnatiuk has analyzed the (re)namings of the toponyms in 36 Ukrainian cities with a population of more than 100,000 people, for the period from February 2014 to the middle of 2017. Only the cities situated in the territory controlled by Ukrainian government were the object of the research. Within the cities selected for research, new names of all streets (streets, lanes, squares, passages, avenues, embankments, and other similar elements of city’s infrastructure are included to the category of Streets in his article) have been analyzed—and not only limited to the historical centers.

Overall there were 2,897 (re)named objects in the selected cities. Gnatiuk has distinguished 2 main categories of these toponyms:

1. Restored historical names.

2. Non-historical names (the object has never borne such a name before).

Furthermore, researcher divided the non-historical names into 3 groups: Topographic, Commemorative, and Poetic (or Figurative) names. In addition, commemorative names were further classified by several criteria: political and military names with the division into subgroups, “according to the respective historical context: Kievan Rus; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Cossack State; Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires; Ukrainian Struggle for Independence in 1917–1922; Soviet Union; Ukrainian Insurgent Army and related liberation movements; Independent Ukraine,” and other names. Equally important, all commemorative names were divided into 3 groups, according to the relation of their local, regional, and national context (Gnatiuk 2018).
There are many interesting particular findings in regard to different regions and aspects in the Gnatiuk’s article. However, some aspects of the renaming of the Ukrainian urban streets still need to be clarified.

1. The period between 2014–2017 needs to be added by its pre-history and post-history, its wider context, in order to understand the process in the whole decade dynamics.

2. Some thematic aspects of new names of streets should be considered for better understanding of the connections between the decision makers’ (national and local government, as well as the majority of politically active local population) convictions, values, strategies, as well as their reflection in the street names.

During the decade of the 2010s, the peak of renaming activities was reached between 2015–2016. This was caused directly by the adoption of the Laws of Ukraine “On Condemning the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting the Propagation of their Symbols” and “On the Legal Status and Honoring of the Memory of the Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century” in the spring of 2015. The first law obliged authorities of all Ukrainian cities, towns, and villages to delete the names of Communist officials (except the positions lower than the secretary of the district committee of the party, but including all the servicemen of Soviet state security services), as well as names connected to the Communist ideology and Soviet state symbols from Ukrainian toponyms. The implementation of those directives had to be adopted as official decisions on the local levels by local self-government bodies until October 9, 2015. If the local council would not fulfill the law, the renaming obligation was put on mayors. If the latter would not follow the law, the renaming should have been enacted by the head of the regional state administration (the official appointed by the president and the government of Ukraine) until April 9th 2016. So these directives preconditioned the fact that the majority of the renaming acts had been accomplished during 2015–2016. Nevertheless, many changes of street names and other toponyms were conducted between 2010–2013. In Kharkiv, for instance, the number of 2010–2013 the streets’ renamings constitute around 1/3 of the total number of name changes in 2010–2019. In some Ukrainian cities many renaming act were done between 2017–2019.

Based on the findings of the aforementioned researches, as well as on a pilot study of Ukrainian political, ideological, and urbanistic processes of the 2010s, I hereby can define four hypotheses:

The first hypothesis is based on the population statistics of the regional centers of Ukraine¹ and on the assumption that a regional center has a greater influence on public opinion than any other city with a similar population in that region (see the Methods section below). The analysis of regional centers is less time-consuming than a comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian regional centers, supplemented by many other cities (with a population 100,000 or more) of those regions. However, the analysis limited to

¹ Regional centers are the capitals of 24 regions of Ukraine, while regions are the main Ukrainian administrative and territorial units.
the regional centers presumably gives reliable results similar to those of complex analysis which includes every major city.

The second hypothesis suggests that the newly adopted street nomenclature in Ukrainian regional centers reflects the balance of ideological influences, and accordingly, the balance of powers in that region. In other words, it reflects a system of values regarded as acceptable by the decision-makers of both national and the local levels, and by the majority of politically active local people. A political and social establishment needs to take prevailing values of local activists into account to avoid disloyal voting or an armed resistance. The majority of politically active citizens would rather choose to accept street names they don’t like than face bullying, bankruptcy, imprisonment, and armed violence against themselves in the case of rejection.

The third hypothesis assumes that the analysis of the newly adopted streets nomenclature would be very fruitful and informative if renaming dynamics would be traced not over several years but at least a decade. Such an approach could help researchers to define the origins and directions of the expansion of political values, opinions, and ideologies among national and local decision-makers and the majority of politically active local residents.

The fourth hypothesis states that analysis of the newly adopted street nomenclature can reveal the differences between political statements and real intentions of the majority of politically active local influential people.

Methods

The study of the street renaming covers 22 Ukrainian cities that are the regional centers, i.e. the capitals of Ukraine’s 24 oblasts. Out of 24 oblasts mentioned in constitution, the central cities of two (Donets’k and Luhans’k) are outside of control by the government of Ukraine after the spring of 2014 and until the time this article is written. Since these two regional centers were de facto outside of Ukrainian official policies and ideological processes, they were not included in my analysis.

According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, as of January 1st 2014, the population of Ukraine stood at approximately 45,426,000 (rounded to the thousands). This included around 8,551,000 in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Ukrstat 2014). The last Ukrainian census was carried out in 2001. The majority of Ukrainian experts considered the official figures of the total Ukrainian population as a gross overestimation, while the population of the largest Ukrainian cities as an underestimation. An example to support this shows that in 2016 the population of Kyiv was officially around 2.9 million people, according to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (Ukrstat 2017). The Deputy Head of Kyiv City State Administration said that 4 million people were living in Kyiv and 0.3 million people visited daily for work purposes (Kievvlast 2016).

As of January 1st, 2014, the population total of the foregoing 22 cities officially stood around 12,194,000 (rounded to the thousands). This figure was about ⅓ of
36,875,000, the official estimation of the 22 oblasts’ population (Ukrstat 2014). During the 2010s, the population of the regional centers could reach ½ of the population of these 22 oblasts, taking into account all-Ukrainian trends of urbanization (World Bank 2016).

Population is not the only advantage of regional centers, they are also important as trendsetters for other cities and towns. There are many cities in Ukraine that are not the capitals of oblasts, but their population is larger than the population of some regional centers. However, as a rule the influence of regional centers on the region’s public opinion is larger than the influence of the region’s other cities, even if the population of that other city is larger than the population of the regional center. The reason for this is that such cities are the headquarters of political, economic, and cultural activity of the region. They are perceived as the centers of power and prestige by the majority population of the region. With this in mind, the character of the street renaming in the regional center has a significant impact on the renaming in the subordinated cities. In reality, there is a high probability of copying the practice of the leading city in the practice of less important (and perhaps, even more populated) cities of the oblast.

The term Streets in this study is used in the meaning that includes all the streets, lanes, avenues, squares, passages, and embankments in the city, and not only those that are situated in the city center. Parks are not included to the category of Streets here. It should be noted, that the number of parks renamed in the 2010s in the 22 regional centers are at least 60 times less than the total number of the renamed objects included to the term Streets.

Predominantly, the websites of city councils were used as the sources of the information about the street renamings. In some cases, the publications in local and central mass media were used as well. A total of around 200 such sources were used to fill in data Tables 2 and 3.

The Streets were divided into 12 groups (Themes) in this study in Table 1. Themes of new names as follows.

**Table 1. Themes of new names**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of the Theme</th>
<th>Themes of new names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chieftains and princes of Ukrainian lands in the 10th–to the first half of the 16th century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Symbols, famous personalities of Ukrainian Cossacks, insurgent movements in the second half of the 16th century and until the end of the 18th century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Symbols, activists of the Central Council of Ukraine (Central Rada, Tsentralna rada), the Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukrainian National Republic, UNR), the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukrainian: Zakhidnoukrayins’ka Narodna Respublika, ZUNR), Pavlo Skoropadskyi’s Ukrainian State (Hetmanate), and anti-Bolshevik rebellions between 1917–1922.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Activists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainian: Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, UPA) between the 1930s – 1950s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Ukrainian prominent figures in culture, science, economy, sports, as well as civic activists. Those whom the Russian Empire and/or the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarded as dangerous enemies*.

7. Ukrainian or born in Ukraine, prominent figures in culture, science, economy, sports, as well as civic activists. Those whom the Russian Empire and/or the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union didn’t regard as dangerous enemies*.

8. Soviet armed groups and their activists.

9. Apolitical names, not in honor of a prominent historical figure.

10. Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs, and religious propagandists.

11. Non-Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs, and religious propagandists.

12. Other.

*As for the 6th and 7th items of this list, the expression “to regard as dangerous enemies” means that a person was regarded as an enemy combatant, or he (she), for his (her) political disloyalty (real or false), was jailed for a month at least, or repressed by means of the exile to another region, or killed.

Such groupings of new toponyms is appropriate for several reasons:

1. At least some of the Themes must coincide with some other themes in the subgroups presented by Gnatiuk. This is in accordance with the respective historical context: “Cossack State (approximately); Ukrainian Struggle for Independence between 1917–1922; Ukrainian Insurgent Army and related liberation movements,” to get comparable data for the testing the first hypothesis.

2. Several gaps of the previous studies needed to be filled: Theme 5 and Theme 7 (not just a wider subgroup ‘Independent Ukraine’ of Gnatiuk), to specify the uniting and separating potential of the commemoration of the personalities and symbols.

3. The Themes must reflect certain classic narratives, systems of heroes, symbols that have been disseminated in certain Ukrainian regions for a longer or shorter period than in other regions. For example, Theme 8 (shorter in western regions) is purposeful to test the second hypothesis.

A comparative analysis is applied to prove all the hypotheses of this study. The regional centers are compared with each other by new names of the streets. Those new names are compared to the history of the region. Some results of this study are compared to Gnatiuk’s (Gnatiuk, 2018) and some other publications, mainly about the names of the streets in the European Union. An absolute number of the newly adopted nomenclature of streets is calculated for each of the 22 cities, for the period between 2010–2019, as well as the number per 10,000 inhabitants. The cities are compared among themselves according to these criteria.

Results and discussion

The main calculations are presented in Table 2 Percentage of the total number of the streets renamed in a given city below. The Themes in the second row of Table 2 are indicated by the numbers that correspond to the sequence number of the Theme in Table 1. Themes of new names. As an example, number 8 as a title of a column means Theme 8: “Soviet
armed groups and their activists.” The figures 10–19 in the left column mean the period between 2010–2019 years. Respectively, the figures 14–19 mean the period between 2014–2019. The figures 14–17 mean the period from the beginning of 2014 to September of 2017. Furthermore, the figures 17–19 mean the period from October 2017 to the end of 2019. The absence of figures in the cell of the left column, excluding the highest figure, refers to the period between 2010–2019.

Table 2. Percentage of the total number of the streets renamed in a given city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City &amp; period</th>
<th>Percentage of the total number of the renamed streets in a given city, %. The themes marked by their serial numbers from Table 1 (e.g. “8” means “Soviet armed groups and their activists”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv 10-19</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv 14-17</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv 17-19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv 10-19</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv 14-19</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa 10-19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa 14-19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro 10-19</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro 14-19</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherkasy</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnitskyi</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kropyvnytskyi</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutsk 10-19</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutsk 14-19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzhhorod</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These data show that the total quantity of the streets renamed in 22 regional centers in 2010–2019 is 2445. Arithmetic mean is calculated for every Theme of renamings for the period between 2010–2019, for 20 cities (excluding Ternopil and Lviv, due to an extremely small quantity of the renamings in these 2 cities). In Kharkiv, where only \( \frac{2}{3} \) of the newly adopted street nomenclature occurred since 2014, the difference between the periods 2010–2013 and 2014–2019 doesn’t seem significant. An exception to this can be seen in Theme 8 (“Soviet armed groups and their activists,” a decrease during 2014–2019) and Theme 10 (“Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs and religious propagandists,” an increase during 2014–2019).

Equally important, a very specific situation took place in Odessa: Mikheil Saakashvili, the Head of the Odessa Oblast State Administration, signed the order to rename 51 streets of the city. However, this decision was later canceled (as with most of the items in the list) by the Odessa City Council. In this study, the names of the streets are described as for the end of December, 2019. Those names were fixed in Odessa according to the city council’s version of the nomenclature of streets, not Saakashvili’s version. Consequently, the quantity of the streets renamed in Odessa during 2014–2019 was actually around \( \frac{2}{3} \) of the renamings that occurred during 2010–2019. The difference between these periods was rather significant for Theme 2 (increase during 2014–2019) and Theme 7 (decrease during 2014–2019).

Only about 5% of the street renamings occurred since 2014 in Dnipro. Therefore, the difference between the periods 2010–2013 and 2014–2019 is mainly insignificant. Although this may be true, two Themes should still be noted: Theme 2 (decrease), Theme 3 (increase), and Theme 6 (increase) during 2014–2019.

As for Lutsk, a drastic change is detected: the share of Theme 5 increased significantly while Theme 7 and Theme 9 dropped down. It should be noted that only 37 streets were renamed there during 2010–2019, including 10 streets between 2014–2019.

Finally, Kyiv with its 212 streets renamed during 2010–2019, only a few of them before 2014, and around 45 of the streets renamed since October 2017. From the evidence, one can see during the period between 2014–2017 (compared with the period 2017–2019) a significant decrease in Theme 3, Theme 6, and Theme 9. In contrast, a significant increase is shown in Theme 4 and Theme 5.

Theme 9, ‘Apolitical names’, (i.e. named not in honor of a prominent historical figure), in this analysis is approximately identical to the composition of non-commemorative groups proposed by Gnatiuk (2018): restored historical names, topographic names, and poetic (or figurative) names. The results of this analysis and Gnatiuk’s analysis are similar. Gnatiuk states that the total share of non-commemorative toponyms increases from the west to the south-east (Gnatiuk 2018: 7). This study proves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total *</th>
<th>1.7</th>
<th>6.0</th>
<th>6.4</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>7.2</th>
<th>7.7</th>
<th>23.3</th>
<th>1.7</th>
<th>28.3</th>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>3.4</th>
<th>8.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010–2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ternopil and Lviv are excluded.
the same (See Theme 9 in the Table 2). The causes of this phenomena seem to be described precisely by Gnatiuk (2018).

Similar results in the theme of Ukrainian Cossacks of the 16th–18th centuries are demonstrated both in this study and in Gnatiuk’s one. Gnatiuk is right stating that the newly adopted street names in honor of Ukrainian Cossacks are presented in the vast majority of cities (with a population more than 100,000) in the test regions. These names make up a significantly large share in the south-eastern part of Ukraine, especially in the cities along the Dnieper River (Gnatiuk 2018). However, this study shows the results that are not similar to Gnatiuk’s results with regards to Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Uzhhorod. In foregoing cities, this study detects modest level of Cossacks-related names in Mykolaiv. On the other hand, Gnatiuk detects a very high level in Mykolaiv. This is with the absence of Cossack-related renamings in Rivne and Uzhhorod, while Gnatiuk detects a rather high level of this theme.

Based on Table 2 of this study, one should agree with the opinion of Gnatiuk that the streets named after the figures, organizations, and events related to Ukrainian Cossack formations, are detected (as for the renamings during 2010s) in the territory where the Cossacks operated, in the locations of their settlements and states.

However, Gnatiuk has created a problem that baffled him: ‘How to explain the high proportion of names related to the Cossack epoch in the western cities […] Uzhhorod and Rivne, where the role of Cossacks in local history was minimal?’ (2018). He also notices the very issue, though to a lesser extent, in Mykolaiv and Kherson ‘as these cities were founded and intensely developed during the Russian Empire occupation without the direct participation of Cossacks’ (Gnatiuk, 2018).

Some remarks need to be added with regards to the citation. Firstly, Cossack states are not reflected in Uzhhorod street renaming in 2010s, according to Table 2 and therefore, this problem does not exist. Secondly, according to Table 2, as well as to the history of Ukraine, the share of the Cossack theme in the street renaming in Mykolaiv and Kherson seems rather pertinent and proportional to the share of Ukrainian Cossacks in local history. This remains in the collective memory of the inhabitants of Ukrainian Black Sea Coast, since this is the area of the operations of the army called Black Sea Cossacks (Chornomorskoe kozatstvo). Members of this army and, partly, descendants of these Cossacks took active part in the colonization of Mykolaiv and Kherson regions.

As for Uzhhorod, some discrepancies in the results of 2 studies are also noted with regards to Theme 4 (the commemoration of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). However, the whole picture of the distribution of this theme on the map of Ukraine is rather similar in the article by Gnatiuk (2018) and in Table 2. In both studies, Kmelnytskyi is the leading city, Lutsk trailing behind it, while Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mykolaiv ignore the commemoration of this theme. There also many other coincidences with regards to the theme, they are detected in the majority of regions.

A huge number of streets named after the prominent figures in culture, science, economy, and sports are noteworthy. By the same token, what is especially interesting
are the proportions of those who were regarded and those who were not regarded as
dangerous enemies by the authorities of the Russian Empire and/or the Bolsheviks,
afterwards Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

As can be seen in Table 2, the share of non-repressed persons is only a little higher
than the share of repressed persons reflected in the names of the streets of Kyiv: 20% vs.
17%. There is a similar proportion in Zhytomyr: (15.0% vs. 11.7%), and Ivano-Frankivsk:
(15.8% vs. 15.8%). Unlike the proportion in Dnipro 24.7% vs. 10.1%, and in Zaporizhia —
21.8% vs. 3.6%. Kharkiv shows — 28.1% vs. 4.3%, Odessa — 24.1% vs. 0%, and Poltava —
39.8% vs. 7.4%.

A large difference in the case of Uzhhorod (34.5% vs.3.5%) could be explained by
the history of this region, which was controlled by the Soviet Union in the years that
started after the majority of the main repressive waves had already been passed in
Ukrainian parts of the Russian Empire (against Ukrainian Cossack autonomy in the 18th
century, against disloyal activists, propagandists, rebels, since the middle of the 19th
century) and the USSR (the repressions of 1918–1921 and 1929–1941). The same
explanation looks believable with regards to Chernivtsi (21.1% vs. 5.6%). This point could
partly explain the proportions for Lutsk and Rivne: their regions spent the period 1921–
1939 as the parts of Polish state. Khmelnytskyi (28.6% vs. 8.9%) and Kherson (15.8% vs.
9.2%) are atypical for the total Ukrainian distribution of proportions, thus making it
difficult to explain. Generally speaking, the difference between the quantities of non-
repressed and repressed persons in the couples increases from the west to the south, and
the east.

The leading cities in the commemoration of Soviet military formations and
individuals (Theme 8) are: Odessa (9.3% of the renamed streets there), Kropyvnytskyi
(6.0%), and Zaporizhia (5.5%).

Theme 5 is one of the most interesting aspects of the street renaming in Ukraine:
the commemoration of the Maidan 2013–2014 (Revolution of Dignity, Euromaidan
Revolution, just Euromaidan) and the armed conflict in the Donbas region (started in
2014). The leading cities in this theme are: Uzhhorod (31.0% of the renamed streets
there), Cherkasy (19.8%), Kropyvnytskyi (19.3%). The cities that show a minimal activity
in this theme are: Lutsk (0%), Kharkiv (0.5%), and Mykolaiv (1.7%). Another point to outline
is the average for 20 regional centers stands at 7.2%. It is the 4th in the ranking of the 11
Themes (the 12th is ‘Other’) by popularity.

According to the calculations of the Ukrainian volunteers web project (Zahybli,
2019) (as for the middle of 2019), Uzhhorod region had one of the smallest absolute and
relative numbers of Ukrainian servicemen and volunteers who were killed in action in
Donbas, since the beginning of the war. This was among the numbers of other Ukrainian
regions. Cherkasy was approximately in the middle of the losses ranking, in absolute and
relative numbers. Kropyvnytskyi’s region (Kirovohrad Oblast) was higher than the middle,
but not at the top of the ranking. Likewise, Lutsk’s region (Volyn Oblast) had a position
similar to Kropyvnytskyi’s (near the top). In contrast, Kharkiv region had one of the
smallest absolute and relative numbers. However, Mykolaiv was approximately in the
middle of the ranking.
As a result, any significant correlations between the share of the victims of the Donbas war in the street names and the share or absolute figure of local people died in Donbas, are absent.

Theme 10 and Theme 11 (both about religion) have a relatively low popularity. The average for 20 regional centers: 3.1% and 3.4%, respectively, in the ranking of the 11 Themes. Only Theme 1 and Theme 8 are in a lower position. Moreover, a significant number of the renamings in Theme 10 (Orthodox) were just the restoring of old names, from the Russian Empire era. There are streets named in honor of local Orthodox temples, more than a century ago.

According to the Pew Research Center’s surveys conducted between 2015–2017, Ukraine was positioned 11th in the rank of 34 European countries, by religious commitment. In Ukraine, 35% said they attend worship services at least monthly (How do European, 2018).

Theme 11 ‘Non-Orthodox holidays, saints, hierarchs, and religious propagandists’ is only popular in a few regions. This is mainly due to the streets named after the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Such renamings were done in Kyiv, Lutsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, and some other cities. Almost all of them are in the regions with a significant presence of the believers of the foregoing religious organization.

Several Roman Catholic figures are also mentioned: mainly, in the regions with a high concentration of Polish minority population in Ukraine. The figure of Pope John Paul II is commemorated not only in such regions, but also in several other regions. Protestantism is absent in the names of the renamed streets in the regional centers during 2010–2019. Meanwhile, the percentage of Roman Catholics stands between 0.6–1.8%, and the number of Protestants is around 0.6–2.2% of the population of Ukraine during 2018–2019 (Osoblyvosti, 2018; Konfesijna, 2019).

It could be thought that Protestants had smaller presence in the groups of ideological decision makers than Roman Catholics. As far as their religious identity was not presented proportionally in the newly adopted toponyms of the regional centers.

What is more interesting are the signs of an international identity: of the interest for the objects that are not related directly to Ukraine. Soviet Russian scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov and cinema artist Nikolay Rybnikov, Soviet Azerbaijanim singer Muslim Magomayev, as well as Scouts are all commemorated in the renamed streets of Dnipro.

More than a dozen regional centers named their streets after Pope John Paul II. A street named in honor of Ludwik Zamenhof (the inventor of the international language Esperanto) appeared in Kherson. Furthermore, Polish-Jewish educator and writer Janusz Korczak, Polish writer and the promoter of Polish-Ukrainian alliance Jerzy Giedroyc, Czech statesman and writer Vaclav Havel, and American anti-Russian and pro-Maidan senator John McCain were all commemorated in Kyiv. The president of Poland Lech Kaczyński was commemorated in the names of streets in Zhytomyr and Khmelnytskyi (the areas of the mostly dense settlement of Poles in Ukraine). The foregoing names are almost in all
such cases among the renamings (among 2445 streets) that commemorated people, which were not related to Ukraine by settlement or ancestry.

A few streets were named after the so-called Vasyl Vyshyvani, Archduke Wilhelm Franz of Austria, later Wilhelm Franz von Habsburg-Lothringen, also known as Basil the Embroidered. He took active part in Ukrainian political life. Furthermore, a street in Uzhhorod was named after a Czechoslovak politician, statesman, sociologist, and philosopher Thomas Masaryk, who had been the figure of the all-European scale, but it is no wonder Uzhhorod was a part of Czechoslovakia between 1920–1939.

In Chernivtsi 2 streets were named after 2 Austrian regions, but Chernivtsi was a part of the Habsburg monarchy for more than a century. In addition, some streets were named after American singer Kvitka Cisyk whose parents were Ukrainian nationals. Not to mention, few streets received the name 'European street' (in Poltava and Zaporizhia).

This concludes the reflection of international identity in the renamed streets of the 22 Ukrainian regional centers. A key point to mention is that in Kyiv are less than 3% non-related ethnically or by years of living in Ukraine persons’ and symbols’ commemorations of the total number of the renamed streets (between 2010–2019). In actual fact, there are less than 1% of such streets in the half of other regional cities and 0% or almost 0% in the other half.

Let’s compare this approach with the first renamings that were done by the Bolsheviks in Kyiv in 1919: approximately 14% of the renamed streets were the commemoration of the persons who were not Ukrainians and did not originate from Ukraine nor did they live in Ukraine (Prykaz, 1919).

The share of the streets named after non-Ukrainian, non-Russian, and non-Soviet figures were more than 5% in the last years of the USSR, in Ukrainian regional centers.

Furthermore, when comparing these facts with Slovakia: in the beginning of the 2010s, a total of 13% of the toponyms of international importance was fixed in the historical centers of all 8 Slovakian regional cities (Bucher et. al., 2013).

A further point is there are streets named after American President Franklin Roosevelt (rather positive figure in Soviet and Ukrainian historiography and collective memory) in Cannes, Lyon, Paris, Toulouse, Brussels, in many Polish cities, and in other European countries. However, his name is absent in the new names of the streets in Ukrainian regional centers. The same situation further relates to many other prominent figures of the 20th century.

A final point, the Street Renaming Coefficient (SRC) is calculated for every test city. The method proceeds as follows: the number of the streets renamed in a certain city during 2010–2019, is calculated per 10,000 citizens of the city. As a result, the scale of the changes in the local balance of ideology, identity, as well as the directions of these changes could be measured, both in geographical and semantic aspects.

As one can see in Table 3 Street Renaming Coefficient (SRC), there are no significant correlations between the size of the population and the value of the SRC (for this place and country). However, 2 types of cities could be distinguished:
1. Cities with insignificant changes of toponyms.

2. Cities with significant changes of toponyms.

The majority of the first type of cities are grouped densely (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil) in Western Ukraine. Moreover, Kyiv and Odessa belong to this type.

Table 3. Street Renaming Coefficient (SRC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population, thousands*</th>
<th>Street Renaming Coefficient (SRC) (the number of the streets renamed between 2010–2019, per 10,000 citizens)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv 2010–2013</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv 2014–2019</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherkasy</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnytskyi</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kropyvnytskyi</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutsk</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzhhorod</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As for January 1st, 2014, according to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine

Conclusion

This research proves that the newly adopted nomenclature of streets in the regional Ukrainian centers contains information that is very similar to the findings of the study that is based on more time-consuming methods: the analysis of all the cities with a
population more than 100,000 people. Limiting the object of a study to the regional centers, i.e. excluding other cities, is so effective due to the fact that policies of administrative centers are often mirrored by the subordinate cities and towns.

This specific feature supposedly works more powerfully in the regions with a long history of authoritarian centralized power and not in the traditionally decentralized regions.

During the 2010s Ukraine has been facing strong local opposition, specified for every region in this research. That is despite the efforts of dominant political groups to monopolize the information space by removing and/or reducing the alternative historical and political narratives. The pressure coming from the UINM, Ukrainian government, parliament, and the majority of the Ukrainian mass media, not to mention expert communities was not able to overcome completely the pressure coming from below, namely from local carriers of pro-Russian, pro-Soviet, and simply pro-local narratives, values, identities, and interests. The research demonstrates a set of influences on Ukrainian street nomenclature, greatly proving the following thesis: local groups of decision-makers (politically active local influential people) and their active supporters persistently and successfully ignored the significant part of those ideological narratives that were promoted by the top of Ukrainian political and ideological power. Despite all the political changes between 2014-2015, local communities resisted this promotion greatly and won numerous cases.

A connecting key point to emphasize is the loyalty of the majority of the population, mainly in the southern and eastern regions of the country, to the President, the Government of Ukraine, as well as the dominant ideology of the state during the 2010s. It looked rather fragile and superficial according to the analysis of the street renaming in the regional centers of Ukraine. The renaming dynamics analysis significantly helps to study the attitudes of citizens towards the state ideology and rulers. The study of the street names in the regional centers reveals some gaps between the officially announced values, on the one hand, and those that are considered as worth the effort, expense, and relate to the point of view of the vast majority of the Ukrainian population, on the other hand. Such a gap is detected in regard to the Eurointegration aspirations of Ukraine, which has been the crux of Ukrainian official rhetoric, both inside and outside of the country for the most part of the period between 2010–2019. The same phenomenon is defined in regard to religious aspirations.

The whole method, with particular attention to the SRC created in the process of the research, could help to find the origins, to trace directions for the leaders of the ideological changes, and to accurately measure these processes. In the case of Ukraine during the 2010s, the greatest ideological changes reflected in the street names took place in Vinnytsia and Kropyvnytskyi. On the other hand, there were no changes made in Lviv and Ternopil. Their street names have seemingly become a standard for the rest of the country.
Bibliography:


