DE-OTHERING POLITICS
AND PRACTICES OF FORCED MIGRANTS IN MODERN SOCIETY

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https://doi.org/10.36169/2227-6068.2020.01.00013

Abstract. The article is focused on the rethinking of the constructive and destructive effects of the de-othering politics and practices concerning forced migrants aimed at deconstruction of the Other/Alien status. Based on theoretical analysis with some empirical applications, we propose a complex theoretical model of factors contributing to different social effects of de-othering politics and practices. Societal integration is considered as the key constructive effect of the de-othering politics, while radicalization of the migrant social milieus is the riskiest destructive effect for a society. Within the model, we make an analytical distinction between manifestations, social effects and their factors at macro-/meso- and micro-levels of societal integration in constructive and destructive dimensions of the de-othering politics and practices. This theoretical knowledge will allow researchers to better estimate and to model the aftermaths of the corresponding politics, including their benefits on strengthening of societal integration as well as risks of their socially destructive effects.

Keywords: de-othering, societal integration, radicalization, pull and push factors of integration vs. radicalization, forced migrants, Internally Displaced People (IDP)

Introduction
The intensification of migration processes is a sign of social transformation in the modern world; its significance is enhanced by mass media inputs. According to A. Appadurai, «migration and mass mediation constitute a new sense of the global as modern and the modern as global» (Appadurai 1996: 10). International and internal forced migration caused by a threat to the life or well-being of people due to natural, technogenic or political (wars and ethnic conflicts) reasons, creates multiple risks and challenges in modern society, increasing social tension and intensifying the activities of social actors.
to resolve them. One of the most significant risks that forced migrants might face is the risk of their rejection and exclusion by the host community as the Other or Alien, who have no place intended at the local community (place of work, housing, local communication network, etc.).

Politics of othering can be explicit and obvious (for example, they can be manifested in the absence of real state support for migrants or in the media/everyday discourse of hostility associated with perceiving them as a “threat” to the well-being or a “heavy burden” to the host society). It can be latent, hiding behind the official rhetoric of tolerance and understanding of the problems of forced migrants. The social theory of othering, which originates in the works of G. Spivak and E. Said, emphasizes various characteristics of explicit and latent politics of othering. Their main structural features argued in this theory are the following:

1) usage of the binary opposition of in-group/out-group (in the context of our topic — the host society/forced migrants), built on the principle of subordination and hierarchy (the in-group is located above the out-group and can control and dominate the latter) (Spivak 1988; Jensen 2011; Brons 2015: 80; Udah 2019);

2) exclusion/segregation of forced migrants as an out-group, social distancing from them (Brons 2015: 72), which entails their stigmatization, “symbolic degradation” (Jensen 2011: 65) and stereotyping as inferior members of society;

3) discursive violence against the out-group as a weak/miserable and voiceless (Spivak 1988) social actor, deprived of social status and symbols of prestige.

Politics of othering supports social inequality, which creates the desire of forced migrants to resist discriminatory practices, to overcome the subordinate format of interaction with representatives of the host community.

Within the frame of the modern post-colonialism theories a new concept of De-othering was developed which rejects the negative connotation and social effects of the Othering concept and practices. The concept of “De-othering” was initially used by Jonathan O. Chimakonam in the meaning of the practice of eliminating the differences between in-group and out-group in conversational communication:

«I employ a new concept, de-othering as a conversational strategy that might be able to address the mutually opposing negative identification and dis-identification constructions. ...De-othering for me is when A and B do away with the negative instruments of othering and re-othering due to the consciousness of mutually assured destruction such that the idea of superior-inferior identities is eliminated and actors are reduced to the same identity formation at which they face and return the same objective attention as belonging and possessing the same identity as humans. In the event of mutually opposing identity constructions between both the in-group and the out-group, it does seem that de-othering might be a viable conversational strategy to overcoming negative identity construction» (Chimakonam 2019).

B. Freter uses the concept of “De-superiorization” to refer to De-othering practices:
«De-superiorization is practical decolonization from the standpoint of the violator. The colonial violator must work on establishing a new reality in which the colonial transgression is no longer possible. The practical action ...must be the work of the desuperiorization of our thought and according action as part of the process of decolonization» (Freter 2019).

De-othering practices are associated with the process of social adaptation of forced migrants to a new context of existence and involvement in social life. S. Jensen described this style of social practices with the concept of “refusal of the status of the Other”: “another type of agency in relation to othering has been termed refusal. This strategy is based on rejecting the category of the other” (Jensen 2011: 73). So, the de-othering practices can mean migrants’ attempts to change their status, integrate into the host community, and accumulate social, cultural, symbolic and economic capital in a new place of residence.

Based on the features of the othering politics mentioned above, we can distinguish the essential characteristics of the de-othering politics:

1) the deconstruction of the binary opposition in-group/out-group; the rejection of the possibility of elevation of any group at the expense of another one; the elimination of the principles of subordination and hierarchy;

2) the inclusion/involvement of the out-group of forced migrants in the social life of the host society; the abandonment of practices of their social distancing and stigmatization;

3) the criticism of the discourse of indulgence towards forced migrants and the use of the discourse of involvement of migrants in the host society.

Meanwhile, de-othering politics and practices can produce ambiguous effects with respect to integration in a society. Their constructive effects are connected with different forms of societal integration and inclusion of migrants into the host community, but the destructive effects may also exist. Their extreme forms can be manifested in aggressive radicalization of attitudes and behaviors motivated by a revenge for the previous discrimination and stigmatization as the Other or Alien.

What factors contribute to production of the constructive and destructive effects of the de-othering politics and practices? What kind of institutional arrangements can become restrictive factors for growing destructive effects of such policies? Which social theories can help researchers to evaluate and model the social risks of de-othering politics and practices in the dimension of societal integration in a society? These research questions are the focus of our theoretically grounded study.

Our analysis proceeds in three logical stages. First, we examine de-othering politics at the macro-/meso-levels of social interaction between migrants and the host communities using the societal integration optics. The application of the Lockwood’s theory of societal integration, Berry’s theory of adaptation strategies of migrants, Bourhis’ and Senecal’s ‘interaction acculturative’ model allows us to outline the strong connection between adaptation strategies (that are bilaterally being directed from the host society to migrants and vice versa) and probable effects of de-othering politics with respect to
societal integration. The different bilateral social adaptation models produce different analytical expectations concerning constructive societal integration effects and social risks of its destructive aftermaths. Here for illustration of some theoretical statements we use some empirical findings received from the INTAS "InterEthno" project, conducted in five European countries including Ukraine from 2005–2007 which the authors participated in under the principal coordination of N. Genov.

Next (second), we base our analysis on the micro-level of societal interaction of migrants. Using the Schlossberg’s concept of ‘transition situation’, that describes different ways of perception and living through the situation of radical changes in personal life, we define a three-dimensional complexity of factors influencing societal integration of migrants in the host communities as the crucial constructive effect of de-othering practices. The theoretical frame of analysis is illustrated by the Ukrainian empirical data in relation to mass attitudes towards migrants (the data of the Institute of Sociology National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine — IS NASU), social adaptation of the internally displaced people (IDP) and their perception of inequality and discrimination (the data of the Institute of Economics NASU and Forecasting and the National System for Monitoring the Situation of IDP).

Lastly in the third stage, we focus our analysis on the factors contributing essentially in the probable disruption of de-othering politics and practices thereby producing the destructive effects, among which the risks of radicalization of migrant’s milieus are considered as the most dangerous for a society. Based on several empirically tested theories (Sageman’s theory of radicalization, Horgan’s theory of personal involvement in terrorist organizations, Kutsenko’s and Berlyand’s agency-cultural theoretical model of radicalization, Genov’s multi-dimensional concept of out-migration), and using the concept of cultural kinetics (by Moody and White), we distinguish four phases of strengthening radicalization in migrant social milieus, focusing on different pull and push factors of radicalization. For empirical application of this theoretical framework, we draw upon the data of several research projects (the National System for Monitoring the Situation of IDP; "The Ukraine’s Hidden Tradegy"), that, in particular, allows us to provide the general conclusions concerning the factors contributing to the successful integration of the internally displaced people in Ukraine.

De-othering Politics and Practices of Forced Migrants in the Context of Societal Integration

The societal integration of forced migrants into the host society is a crucial constructive effect of de-othering politics and practices. It is gained in the context of various national, territorial and sociocultural conditions, which can have a significant impact on choice of strategies for interaction between non-dominant communities and dominant majority. The concept of societal integration describes the process of incorporating social actors into a system of mutual relations, which is aimed at social inclusion, overcoming inequality and developing equal opportunities and rights for all interacting actors. Being socially integrated, the individual and collective actors are able to improve their life
opportunities, create or strengthen their identity, and develop conditions for more successful cooperation.

The pioneering works in the empirical study of societal integration of migrants with different ethnic backgrounds into the local communities were studied by Chicago sociologists R. Park and E. Burgess, who identified the mechanisms of acculturation (the adoption of the language, norms and values of a dominant society) and amalgamation (ethnically mixed marriages), ensuring the development of integration processes from phases of competition and conflict to phases of accommodation and assimilation (Park et al. 1924). Under the influence of these mechanisms, the third generation of migrants become fully integrated into the social structure and assimilated the norms, values, and behavioral models of a dominant society.

Subsequent studies showed the ambiguity of those conclusions through analysis of variety of interethnic interaction formats. An important contribution to the understanding of these processes is the finding of D. Lockwood on the need to distinguish between system integration which occurs between the social community and various parts of the social system (its institutions and culture), and social integration understood as the mutual penetration of norms and values of individual and collective actors (Lockwood 1964). According to D. Lockwood, social integration can exist without system integration; however, both of these processes mutually reinforce each other.

Nowadays, there are various ways and forms of societal integration and adaptation strategies in relationships between local communities and a “dominant” society. In particular, one of the most relevant for our study is the acculturation theory by J. Berry that distinguishes four macro-positions (“strategies of larger society”) which are connected with four adaptation strategies, in which the attitude of the dominant group to non-dominant actors or vice versa is manifested. They include the following:

- Societal integration, which presupposes the preservation of the original identity and culture by all interacting communities along with the creation of new intercultural forms of coexistence;
- Marginalization as a loss of original identity and culture by a community along with a lack of developed intercultural contacts;
- Assimilation associated with the loss of original identity and culture by an ethnic community along with the development of interethnic ties;
- Separation, manifested in the rejection by the community of contacts with others and the culture of the “dominant” society to preserve the original culture (Berry 2005).

According to Berry’s theory, the integration strategy is correlated with multiculturalism, the main features which include: cultural diversity, low level of ethnocentrism, racism or discrimination, protection of the rights and freedom of all ethnocultural groups living in the territory of a particular country; the assimilation strategy is correlated with the “melting pot” model in which diverse ethnic and cultural groups mix, losing their originality and cultural uniqueness; the separation strategy is linked with
segregation of non-dominant groups from the dominant majority as hostile and alien. Finally, the marginalization strategy is correlated with the exclusion of a particular group from the context of the dominant culture (Berry et al. 2002: 354). D. Berry concludes that the most effective strategies are the integration and multiculturalism; the least effective are the marginalization and exclusion of the group from the area of dominant culture. Assimilation and separation strategies are in the middle of the social efficiency scale. D. Berry explains this by saying that «integration involves two positive orientations, marginalization involves two negative ones, while assimilation and separation involve one positive and one negative relationship. ... those who pursue and accomplish integration appear to be better adapted, while those who are marginalized are least well adapted. And again, the assimilation and separation strategies are associated with intermediate adaptation outcomes» (Berry et al. 2002: 368–370).

The various dynamic contexts of (mis)match between macro-/micro-indicators of social adaptation of migrants are examined by R. Bourhis, L. Moise, S. Perreault and S. Senecal in their Interactive Acculturation Model (Bourhis et al. 1997). The contexts of match have been called consensus ones (these include situations in which the host society and migrant groups use compatible de-othering strategies; for example, the dominant community supports the ideology of multiculturalism, and the migrant group, in turn, practices an integration strategy). If the host society and migrants use opposite strategies, such situations are termed problematic (for example, migrants incline to integrate into the host community, while the latter tends to assimilate them). If the strategies of de-othering are in conflict, then this can give rise to conflicts or disruption of interaction (for example, the host society tries to assimilate migrants, but they tend to separate). The worst scenario is the use of exclusion strategies by the host community, while migrants tend towards marginalization, which excludes the possibility of their interaction. In this case, the politics of othering of migrants are obvious, which ultimately can lead to their deportation. J. Powell and S. Menendian believe that politics of othering are closely related to strategies of marginalization, segregation/secession and assimilation of migrants into the host society (Powell and Menendian 2016), since in each of these cases, migrants are treated as interior out-group:

«Segregation is not simply physical separation; it is an attempt to deny and prevent association with another group. ...Like segregation, secessionism may reduce intergroup violence, but it does not resolve the problem of the “other”. ... Perhaps more benevolent response to the problem of the “other” is assimilation. Assimilation is an attempt to erase the differences that define group boundaries, such as teaching the dominant language to a subordinate group or converting the out-group into the dominant religion. ... Group-based identities and differences cannot be entirely erased. In an assimilationist paradigm, they are submerged or repressed. In this way, assimilation is inherently hierarchical” (Powell and Menendian 2016: 27–32).

Social integration as a result of human intentions and actions is not free from the structural and cultural conditions of the social system. Social integration (as well as other close concepts are used in modern theory, such as belongingness, inclusion or membership (Powell and Menendian 2016: 32; Rodin 2017)) manifests itself at the
individual, community and institutional levels of social interactions, which can be regarded as relatively independent and, at the same time, mutually reinforcing each other. Understanding the problems that accompany the processes of societal integration at different levels is impossible without taking into account their historical and cultural contexts, as well as the characteristics of social relations dealing with satisfaction of important social needs. Following E. Allardt (Allardt 1993), it can be assumed that (non)satisfaction of the most important individual and community needs, such as needs of having (i.e., possessing resources that provide standards of living, as well as the possibility of achieving them, such as work and income), needs of loving (i.e., the presence of social networks and emotional support including family, children, friends, etc.) and needs of being (i.e., general recognition and social participation) — significantly affects the societal integration. There is significant relationship between the impact of societal integration of forced migrants and the system of economic, civil and political living conditions in a particular society. This includes the level of well-being of the population, political (in)stability, effectiveness of the government, the level of civil liberties and political rights of various groups, the level of corruption in the country, etc. (Kutsenko 2008b: 149).

Developing D. Lockwood’s ideas, we assume that in the case of a low level of institutional efficiency and system integration in a particular society, the process of forced migrants’ societal integration develops through strengthening of the inter-group cohesion as a reaction to weak social integration and inefficiency of the system. However, the interaction of institutions, individual and group interests in determining the nature of processes of societal integration does not relate to causal relations. People remain relatively free in their personal choices within the framework of certain structural and cultural constraints and opportunities. If the institutional system cannot satisfy the important needs of a migrant community, the latter is able to cultivate its own life forms that “fill” the failures of the social system, and create conditions for the duplication of institutional structures of society. The duplication of institutional forms lead to development of a “parallel society” with its own regulatory and supporting mechanisms.

At the same time, possible scenarios for further development of society in the case of the emergence of a “parallel society” within it remain unclear. In the areas of how stable and consequently how long does such a state continue? Is this condition just a way of latent absorption of a “host” society by “migrant minority” life styles? History, including the history of interaction of the Roman Empire and the “barbarians,” provides numerous examples confirming the possibility of the latest version.

The process of societal integration is inevitably accompanied by various conflicts between local communities of forced migrants and the host society at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. According to G. Zimmel and L. Coser (Coser 1956), a conflict can have not only destructive, but also positive consequences for social stabilization and crystallization of previously poorly structured social groups. In communities that are disintegrated, a particular intra-group conflict can restore the integration basis, and promote social cohesion through a series of alliances with other groups participating in the interaction. Conflicts within the group can make the positions of competing
participants more transparent and understandable. However, as in the case of correlation between system and social integration (according to D. Lockwood), it cannot be said that there is a direct connection between social conflict and social integration (as a possible consequence of the conflict). In this context, the form of a conflict (violent or non-violent), its frequency (high–low), the desire of opponents to come to an agreement, and so on are important. If some social conflicts can stimulate the process of reaching agreements between the community of forced migrants and representatives of a host society, then violent conflicts are capable of splitting a society in accordance with dichotomous interests and preserving the format of "parallel societies". For example, the international study "Comparing Societal Integration of Turkish and Related Minorities: institutional strategies in INTAS and NIS countries" conducted by N. Genov team in 2005–2007, has revealed a high conflict potential in interethnic interactions involving the Turkish-speaking ethnic community in Germany, where about 38% of cases were assessed as conflicting (which occurred to be one of the indicators of weak societal integration of this local community into German society). On the contrary, the relationship between ethnic Turks and the titular ethnic group in Bulgaria since the mid-1990s had a non-conflict character, which can be regarded as evidence that the main adaptation strategy of ethnic Turks was assimilation, accompanied by the adoption of the norms and values of a "dominant" society (Kutsenko 2008a: 323–330; Kutsenko 2008b: 155).

The model of societal integration of forced migrants implies the need to assess the risks of interaction between forced migrants and the host society at the local, national and international levels, to determine the localization of risk in specific areas of social interactions. We will use the definition of risk proposed by N. Genov as "the probability of dysfunctional effects of processes occurring in social systems" (Genov 1999). One should use a set of indicators of risky events, such as the scale and scope of the manifestation of risks, prospects for their limitation (Kutsenko 2008b: 159). Prevention or resolution of conflicts between local and dominant communities, ensuring civil and political rights and liberties, implementation of national and regional projects to optimize the financial, housing, labor, socio-cultural status of forced migrants can help relieve the risk tensions in this context.

**Constructive De-othering Practices by Forced Migrants: Transition Theory Application**

Constructive de-othering politics and practices of forced migrants are associated with their refusal to occupy subordinate social positions with active attempts to gain full membership in the host society. De-othering politics and practices by forced migrants can be carried out at different levels and in different contexts, for the description of which it is convenient to use the theory of transition by N. Schlossberg. She defines transition as any event or nonevent that leads to a change in the behavior, relationships and roles of a particular social actor. N. Schlossberg identifies several types of transition: anticipated transition, which happens predictably (for example, graduation from school/university); unanticipated transition (such as dismissal from employment as a result of reduction of personnel) and nonevent transition, which was expected but did not occur (for example, a person did not pass the exam and did not obtain a driver’s license, although was
preparing for it). Any form of transition is associated with serious changes in a person’s life that will become more profound than the significant difference between the pre-transition and post-transition conditions of his/her life (and conversely, if they are insignificant, adaptation to transition will be faster and more effective) (Schlossberg 1981).

Similar conclusions were presented by B. Mancini in the sociological concept of marginality, which uses the concept of “cultural conflict” between the host and feeder communities. Cultural conflict, manifested in a high degree of discrepancy/contradiction between the original and recipient forms of culture — in the linguistic, religious, cultural, historical, political, social incompatibility of the two reference groups — will significantly slow down the process of social adaptation of forced migrants (Mancini 1988). Conversely, the relevance of the sociocultural systems of the feeder and recipient societies, manifested in the similarity of the contexts of the migrant’s life before and after resettlement, which contribute to a more successful social adaptation.

Forced migration, which by definition is involuntary and occurs as a result of adverse events that threaten the life/well-being of people (war, ethnic conflicts, industrial or natural disasters), should be classified as unanticipated transition. The unanticipated transition of forced migrants from one sociocultural environment to another is accompanied by multiple crises that complicate the process of social adaptation — professional (the need to change jobs/professions/specialties due to a change in residence), communicative (loss/weakening of the original networks of contacts and the need to establish new social ones), financial (complete or partial loss of property, forced search for new housing and livelihoods), psychological (trauma from catastrophic events that interrupted the biographical chronology) crises. N. Schlossberg has identified four factors that affect a person’s ability to adapt to a transition event, which we will call the factors of forced migrants’ de-othering. They are situation, self, support, and strategies factors (4S scheme).

The first factor of de-othering is a personal attitude towards the transition situation. The migrant’s ability to adapt to the situation of unanticipated transition is determined by the presence/absence of the possibility to control the process of changing life prospects, using internal life resources (internality versus externality of the migrant’s life attitudes). If in a transition situation, an actor retains the ability to control and plan his/her life, it will be much easier for him/her to adapt to the circumstances than for a person who is completely dependent on the decisions of external social actors. The adaptive abilities of an actor also depend on other factors such as:

a) the duration/completeness of the transition (the longer the transition process lasts, the higher the likelihood of depletion of life resources and weakening of the adaptive capabilities of the person; on the contrary, if a person knows that unpleasant life changes are temporary and soon it will be possible to return to the usual way of life, he/she can easily endure the difficulties of transition);

b) the presence of positive/negative changes in the actor’s social roles as a result of transition (if some/many social roles are lost as a result of forced migration, for example, the roles of a successful professional or family man/woman due to job
loss or severance of relations with the family, and new roles are not acquired instead of old ones in the new residence, it will be more difficult for the actor to cope with the negative effects of the transition situation;

c) the experience of successfully overcoming difficulties of social/personal transitions in the past, which can contribute to successful adaptation in a new social context (Schlossberg 1981).

It can be assumed that the previous experience of cultural and spatial mobility of an actor for the purpose of cultural, recreational or professional development can also contribute to de-othering practices of forced migrants, the result of which is the development of the ability to establish social relations with people, create and maintain networks of acquaintances (Urry 2007). It can be also supposed that those forced migrants who had previously experience of cultural spatial mobility (at the local, national or international levels) will better adapt to their new place of residence than those migrants who had no such experience (Bataeva et al. 2017).

The second factor deals with the personality dimensions. Within the Transition theory, the corresponding analytical aspect combines the study both of a) the social characteristics of individuals as social actors, such as their socio-economic status, gender, age, health status and ethnicity, and b) the socio-psychological and cultural characteristics, including a personal development level, ideological and basic life values. The recent sociological findings (Mastikova 2016: 104) shows that a middle-young age contributes to faster social adaptation; more educated persons (having vocational technical training or university degree) makes it easier to find work in a new residence settlement and, as a result, to integrate into the host community. Men adapt faster, while women experience affection to previous living conditions longer, which prevents them from attuning to the need to adapt to a new residence (Zheng et al. 2012). The results of a survey conducted in Ukraine in the fall of 2015 among IDP women aged 18-59 (Vymusheni pereselentsi 2016) showed negative trends of women's integration into the labor market. The disadvantage of their integration is noticeable when considering the age structure of the respondents, most of whom are women under 40. Similar results were received among local and IDP women in five biggest IDP’s destinations (Genasimenko 2016, 189): 50% of women were employed before their forced migration and only 27,1% of them found a job after their displacement in a big cities.

In addition to social characteristics, basic life values have a great influence on de-othering practices of forced migrants. Following M. Thurnher, they can be divided into seven categories:

1) instrumental-material values (economic and professional achievements, social status, etc.);

2) interpersonal expressive values (love, friendship, social ties);

3) philosophical-religious values (the search for the meaning of life, loyalty to ethical principles);

4) the values of social service (helping others, serving the community);
5) values of comfort, safety and relaxation;
6) hedonistic values (sexual pleasure, enjoyment of life);
7) values of personal growth and self-actualization (Thurnher 1975: 184).

Depending on what values are relevant for an individual, one can talk about their (un)favorable impact on the process of de-othering of forced migrants. For example, if material values are a priority for a person, then in the case of loss of financial well-being as a result of forced migration and the difficulty of reconstructing a similar socio-economic status in new conditions, a breakdown or slowdown of the process of integration may occur. In another situation, when the philosophical and religious values (or the values of social service to people/society) are important for an actor, then even the adverse circumstances of forced migration can be reevaluated by him/her and perceived as a condition for further spiritual growth (or to help those people whose life circumstances are more complicated). In this case, the process of de-othering forced migrants can be quite successful. In addition to the basic values, the de-othering of forced migrants can be influenced by behavioral motives (such as the motives for achievement, affiliation, avoidance of failure, power, self-realization, etc. (Bataeva 2018)). For example, one can expect that the formed motives for achievement and self-realization can positively affect the dynamics of de-othering of forced migrants, while the motives for avoidance of failure and refusal of affiliation might be connected with preserving the position of the Other.

The third factor of the de-othering as well as the third aspect of the transition analysis is a content of the interpersonal (from family, friends) and institutional support of the migrants from the civil, religious, professional and other communities and organizations (Schlossberg 1981), or social inclusion of them into different social ties and capacities. Such aspects of social support as the positive tone of mass media discourse and the generalized favorable attitude towards migrants from the host society are important for forced migrants. In the sociological study by N. Mastikova, certain patterns related to the attitude of the host society towards migrants were identified:

1) the lower the level of welfare in the society (the lower the GDP), the more intolerant the society towards migrants (who are perceived as competitors claiming for public goods and jobs that may be in short supply);
2) the female population of the host society is more hostile towards migrants (according to N. Mastikova, this is due to the “increasing feminization of migration flows” and, as a result, the increase in feminine competition in employment (Mastikova 2016: 104)).

In addition to the factor of economic and political stability, the general level of trust in the country is important: the more trustful a society is, the more favorable it is towards migrants (Mastikova 2016: 107; Mukomel 2014). Since Ukraine is a society with a low level of public welfare and institutional trust, it has an average level of generalized trust and a high level of particularized one (Ukrayins’ke suspil’stvo 2015), then the level of public trust in migrants cannot be high. According to the monitoring of the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, “for the year from 2017 to
2018, the percentage of respondents who agree to allow migrants from Donbass to vote in the elections of the President of Ukraine, the Parliament or local authorities decreased from 41.5% to 31.4%. During this period, the percentage of respondents who are ready to admit migrants from the Donbass as recipients of tax, credit and other privileges has also decreased from 24.3% to 15.2%. In 2017, 15%, and in 2018, 11.3% of respondents had witnessed a conflict between displaced persons and local ones” (Vnutrishno peremisheni osobi 2019: 182–183).

Current sociologists differ between the emotional (hostility, hatred) and actual (discrimination) levels of the negative attitude of a dominant group to non-dominant social groups (Mukomel 2007: 153). If hostile attitudes of representatives of the host society transform into discrimination in the labor market, in everyday life, in the sphere of consumption, rental of housing or social services, this could lead to a breakdown in practices of de-othering of forced migrants (Zheng et al. 2012: 382; Mukomel 2007: 154). In Ukrainian society, the level of discriminatory practices against forced migrants is not reported as widespread: according to the results of national monitoring of situations with internally displaced persons in 2018, 12% of forced migrants experienced discrimination against them as IDPs. On the other hand, when IDP’s answer the specified questions about practical issues, they speak about it much more often:

“The feelings of discrimination or unfair treatment were predominantly related to housing (34%), employment (32%), health care (29%), engagement with the local population (24%) and administrative services (16%)” (Zvit 2018: 1).

A significant role in othering of forced migrants could be played by mass-media. Media discourse programs the audience for positive or negative perceptions of forced migration via the use of specific terminology with positive or negative connotations. However, a relatively low level of negative rhetoric in relation to forced migrants was revealed in Ukrainian mass media. According to the results of media monitoring conducted in 2015 by the public organization “Crimea SOS”, ”most publications have a neutral (54-86.1%) and/or positive (10-35%) context concerning IDPs. Most IDP materials are statistical and neutral, but some of them contain negative information. In particular, IDPs are sometimes described as passive recipients of assistance; the influx of IDPs is seen as a reason for rising prices, unemployment and lack of social services” (Vymusheni pereselentsi 2016).

The fourth aspect of transition analysis — an analysis of actor’s behavior strategies — involves exploring ways to solve the transition problems that he/she uses. L. Pearlin and C. Schooler (Pearlin et al. 1978) identified the following behavioral strategies in critical situations: strategies aimed at changing the situation, rethinking the situation or reducing stress. Migrants who flexibly use a variety of behavioral strategies depending on the requirements of a particular social environment are more effective in de-othering their social position.

A successful outcome of the constructive de-othering politics and practices by forced migrants can be integration into the host community, which, according to H. Esser, includes four aspects: acculturation, placement, interaction and identification (Esser 2006). Acculturation (or cultural integration) is the process by which an actor acquires the
knowledge, cultural standards and language competencies necessary for successful functioning in the host society. Placement (or structural integration) means the acquisition of a relevant status position by an actor in the host society and enjoying the rights in the educational, economic, professional and civil spheres. Interaction (or interactive integration) involves the establishment of social, friendly, romantic or marriage relationships with other people, gaining membership in social groups and networks in the host community. Finally, identification (or identificational integration) is associated with forming feelings of belongingness in the host society or some of its groups. Identificational integration can be implemented at the macro-/meso-levels (for example, identification with the Ukrainian society or with a particular region) as well as at the micro-level of interaction between individual actors and social groups (for example, forced migrants can identify themselves with the local religious or neighborhood community, maintaining a distance in relation to other institutions and groups of the host society, and even this will contribute to her/his successful social adaptation). The constructive de-othering politics and practices with respect to forced migrants result in the formation of changeable multiple identity of the actors as personal adaptation to the external life challenges. This multiple identity can manifest in various aspects of life such as of the national, civil, religious, political, communicative, cultural, linguistic, among others. Self-belonging makes societal integration successful.

**Destructive Modus of De-Othering Politics and Practices: the Radicalization of Forced Migrant’s Sociocultural Milieus**

The societal integration of forced migrants is an open-ended process. It is accompanied by risks of its different destructive effects, among which the risks of radicalization and violent behavior are the most dangerous for a society. What factors contribute in probable disruption of the de-othering politics and practices thereby producing destructive effects and strengthening the risks of radicalization of migrant’s milieus? We define ‘radicalization’ as a non-linear social process of self-organization in social milieus, which occurs as a result of a critical change towards intolerance in personal beliefs and attitudes. It manifests in socially intolerant and even violent protest behavior, and leads to the formation of radical social networks. The agency-cultural model of the radicalization of socio-cultural milieus (Kutsenko et al. 2013) considers risk situations that disrupt the process of forced migrants’ societal integration. This theoretical model describes a way of escalation of tension between forced migrants and representatives of a host community. The escalation under the impact of many factors (religious, financial, political, cultural) can be resulted in supporting for politically motivated violence, using destructive politics and practices of de-othering.

We justify our interpretation of the radicalization of forced migrant behavior with the recent research findings by M. Sageman (Sageman 2004; Sageman 2008), J. Horgan (Horgan 2008; Horgan 2009), C. McCauley (McCauley et al. 2008), M. D. Silber and A. Bhatt (Silber et al. 2007), M. Slootman (Slootman et al. 2006), which identify four phases of critical changes in individual beliefs, attitudes and behaviors: from the moral outrage as an initial trigger spreading in a social milieu (the phenomenon of the ‘morality play’) up
to fusing between the global and the local, and, finally, joining a violent/terrorist cell, which becomes a ‘surrogate family’. Using the agency-cultural model, one of the indicators of the radicalization of forced migrants’ behavior is the prevalence of ideas of support/approval for violent ways of changing the existing political and social system in a society (at the local, national, regional or global levels) based on the cultural (political, ideological, religious, moral) rationale. Two factors play a key role in the process of radicalization of attitudes/behavior of forced migrants: a social milieu and information/cultural transmissions (from a moral authority, via mass media and Internet). One of the basic concepts in this explanatory model is ‘cultural kinetics’ (Moody et al. 2003; White 2011), which describes the process of transferring cultural patterns and models of learned behavior (for example, of forced migrants) via interpersonal interactions within a large-scale community (or social network), which can be carried out contrary to control actions of social institutions of the host society. It is a mistake to perceive cultural patterns as fixed and static structures that tend to maintain and reproduce a certain form. Rather, these structures “vibrate” and oscillate in the movable field of sociocultural transformations, demonstrating the unique properties of self-organization and the maintenance of homeostasis. The main analytical dimensions of the ‘cultural kinetics’ are the horizontal interaction of social agency with the environment and vertical monitoring of interior contents by an individual agency. The time interval required to convert internal intentions into explicit behavior of agency significantly exceeds the time required for the agency to influence each other or the environment.

Social milieus, characterized by a high level of support and approval of political violence, with a well-developed network of interpersonal trust, can contribute to the emergence of a large number of agency that realize violent actions. The push and pull factors of migration concept (Lee 1966) that explains origin and destination challenges for the migrants works here the best. Such push factors as economic and civic frustration, social and cultural distance and status deprivation, disadvantaged personal dignity, conflict of personal identities, social isolationism could intensify of the radicalization process in the sociocultural milieus of forced migrants and lead to a decrease in the level of their socio-political tolerance. The ideological values (cultural, political, religious, moral), justification of the political violence, extensive social ties within a milieu, intolerant and aggressive attitudes towards other social groups, authoritarian leadership (as an ‘agency of radicalization’), cultural/information influence can play a role of the pull factors and stimulate the appearance of coherent patterns of radical attitudes and beliefs of agency (of forced migrants in particular).

To better understand the pull factors of radicalization we apply the multidimensional concept of out-migration developed by N. Genov (Genov 2016). This empirically based theory is grounded on the synergetic and probabilistic approach, and proposes conditionally dividing the “pull factors” into two groups depending on what personality needs they are associated with basic or advanced (according to the theory of A. Maslow). A person with more advanced life needs can make a decision about migration to achieve a “good future for the children; broad space for professionalism; ethnic/religious tolerance; good quality of education; political stability”, while an agency with unsatisfied basic needs (needs for material, physiological comfort and security) is
aimed at migration to another country/region in order to achieve “economic stability; good quality of health care; developed infrastructure; good incomes; environmental safety” (Genov 2016: 59). Using this concept in our study, it can be assumed that the radicalization of the attitudes and behavior of forced migrants can be facilitated by the nonfulfillment of those needs in the host society for the sake of which they left their country/region (due to conditions of difficulty which make it impossible for them to such as continued political or economic instability in the society of origin). Radical attitudes will be further strengthened if the entire complex of basic and advanced needs of migrants is not satisfied; as a result their status in the host society can become even lower and more unsteady than in the society of origin.

In view of the current situation in the Ukrainian society in the sixth year of the hybrid war and forced migration, one would expect that the internally displaced people (IDPs) from non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk region of Ukraine are in a situation of social and economic deprivation, and this can be a basis for radicalizing their attitudes. For example, according to the research presented in June 2018 in the report of the National System for Monitoring the Situation of Internally Displaced People (IDP) conducted by the International Organization for Migration (Zvit 2018: 48), the income of forced migrants from Donbass is difficult to consider sufficient for a comfortable life. In different regions of Ukraine, the average income of internally displaced persons differs, the highest income was recorded in Kiev (about $140 per month), the lowest – in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions (about $70 per month) (Zvit 2018: 20). In 2018, forced migrants’ incomes in Ukraine did not increase, accounting for 57% of the average income of Ukrainians as a whole. At the same time, more than half of the respondents said that they had to resort to a survival strategy because of the lack of money for buying food. The problem of forced migrants’ employment in Ukraine in June 2018 has also worsened compared to previous years. Only 42% of forced migrants have jobs, of which only 70% have a steady job. Salary is the main source of income for 54% of forced migrants’ households (Zvit 2018: 22).

However, despite the economically unstable life conditions of Ukrainian forced migrants, it is not reasonable to predict the likelihood of a radicalization of their attitudes, since, as noted above, in addition to objective circumstances, situational factors greatly influence this process, namely, dominant attitudes in their sociocultural milieus, the presence of aggressively-minded leaders and mass support for the value of a violent solution to life/social problems (which is not spread among Ukrainian forced migrants). The degree and form of radicalization of behavior of forced migrants can also significantly depend on the religious beliefs of agency (for example, Islam in the modern world is more correlated with terrorism and violent public actions than Christianity, Krishnaism, Buddhism, Judaism, etc.), the level of their political culture (predisposition for a (un)democratic solution of personal or social problems), education, and/or success in adaptation to new life conditions. However, the factor of religiosity is not so obvious in Ukrainian case. For example, the religion of Crimean Tatars (forced migrants from the Crimea) is Islam, but this has not resulted in the corresponding aggressive activities and radical movements. Meanwhile, the religious conflicts have taken place between different
branches of Ukrainian Orthodox Church leading to certain tension between host local communities and forced migrants.

According to the findings of the research “Ukraine’s hidden tragedy” (Kuznetsova et al. 2018), the significant factors that do not contribute to the radicalization of the IDP attitudes or to the creation of a “parallel” society are a sufficiently high level of dispersion of the forced migrants across the territory of Ukraine, and relative adaptation and stabilization of their life situation (in the spheres of employment, education of children and access to medical care services) achieved by them in a recent years. Forced migrants more often divide themselves to “those who have adapted, found new opportunities for self-realization, and become successful in a new situation and a new place of residence; and those who have not been able to find themselves, recover from war trauma and forced migration” (Mikheieva 2015: 7–8). For example, one of the key differences in the social integration of Crimean Tatars, who have become forced migrants from annexed Crimea, is the high level of their intra-group social integration, the use of mutual assistance practices, the ethnic entrepreneurship, and the support networks created in times of their repatriation to the Crimea in the 1990s and early 2000s (Babenko 2007).

Meanwhile, the social adaptation of internally displaced people from Crimea of Ukrainian and Russian ethnic origin, as well as IDPs from non-government-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions occurs more often through individual strategies and supports from local population. According to National Monitoring of IDP in 2019 (Zvit 2019: 40), 50% of IDPs believe that they have integrated into new residences and another 36% have “partially integrated”. 34% of IDPs do not intend to return, which is an indirect indicator of their successful societal integration. Among the key factors of successful IDP integration are housing, steady income, and employment. IDPs are saying they are rather integrated to their new places of residence in major cities (Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv), and the least integrated as well as intend to stay at their new places of residence in the areas near the Donetsk and Luhansk military activities. This is explained by differences of general situation (such as infrastructure and quality of life in the regions) rather than individual or group IDP characteristics. The other explanation could be the closer distance and more contacts with the places of origin and people’s relatives left at “DNR\LNR” and hence higher expectations about return. This demonstrates that IDPs in Ukraine are not in a homogeneous socio-cultural milieu and the risks of their total radicalization as a group are insignificant, whereas some subgroups or individuals who did not succeed in integration could be involved in radical movements.

The general conclusions concerning the factors contributing to the successful integration of IDP in Ukraine are the following. First, there are no significant differences between IDPs and local communities in terms of religious, ethnic, linguistic, socio-cultural, value, socio-class dimensions. Second, there is the predominance of individual strategies for overcoming the crisis situation through the realization of resources from local communities, charity organizations, and the state as mechanisms of societal integration. Support from multiple actors of the host local community limits the internal group integration and separation of the IDP milieu. Third, the ownership of status resources (education, networking, business skills, etc.) and the readiness of IDPs to
actively change their lives in the new environment are important for their societal integration.

Conclusions and Points for Discussion

1. In the model of societal integration of forced migrants, the correlation between the effectiveness of their de-othering politics and practices and the system of objective economic, civil and political living conditions in a particular society (such as the level of welfare of the population, the political (non)stability, the effectiveness of government, the level of civil liberties and political rights of various population groups, the level of corruption in a country), as well as the level and nature of the conflict between the migrant community and the host society is revealed. If the institutional system is not able to satisfy the important needs of the migrant community, the latter can create conditions for the duplication of institutional forms of social life through the development of a “parallel society” with its own regulatory and supporting mechanisms.

2. Constructive de-othering politics and practices of forced migrants are associated with their refusal to occupy subordinate social positions and active attempts to gain full membership in the host society. Favorable outcomes of the de-othering of forced migrants process are influenced by several factors such as a personal attitude to the transition situation; personal, demographic and socio-psychological characteristics of the social actor (the level of personal development, ideological positions of the individual, life values); the presence of interpersonal and/or institutional support; the tone of mass media discourse and a generalized favorable attitude towards migrants from the host society; strategies of resolution of transition problems.

3. Under the influence of many factors (religious, financial, political, cultural), forced migrants can choose destructive ways of de-othering politics and practices and prefer a way to escalate tensions in relations with representatives of a dominant society. In the agency-cultural model, an indicator of the prevalence of ideas of support/approval of violent ways to change the existing political and social system in a society is used as an indicator of the radicalization of the behavior of forced migrants. An important heuristic component of the model is the distinction between push and pull factors, which stimulate the appearance of coherent patterns of radical attitudes and beliefs among forced migrants. Push factors are economic and civic frustration, social and cultural distance and status deprivation, pinched personal dignity, conflict of personal identities, social isolationism; that form a favorable environment that encourages the radicalization of migrants’ attitudes and value orientations. Pull factors — the ideological values; justification of the political violence; extensive social ties within a milieu; intolerant and aggressive attitudes towards outer social groups; authoritarian leadership; cultural/information influence — ensure the transition of a tendency to radicalism into the practical sphere of radical attitudes and actions.

The de-othering politics and practices of forced migrants reviewed are a promising research prism for further in-depth advanced study of the processes of adaptation and integration of forced migrants, as well as their social effects. In particular, it is necessary
to empirically evaluate which model of de-othering politics — the model of integration, assimilation, marginalization or separation (or a combination of them) — has become dominant in the situation of forced migration from the non-government-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk region as well as from the Crimea. Accordingly, what projects need to be developed and implemented to optimize the status of forced migrants in Ukrainian society? It is expedient to monitor the level of attitudes radicalization in the socio-cultural milieu of forced migrants in Ukrainian society in order to identify the main push/pull factors of this process and predict possible scenarios of destructive de-othering practices. In addition, a comprehensive analysis of constructive de-othering politics and practices of Ukrainian forced migrants using the 4S concept of N. Schlossberg is necessary in order to monitor the success of forming cultural, social, communicative and identity solidarities in the host society.

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