

## WORLDVIEW AND IDEOLOGICAL PRIORITIES OF MODERN SOCIETY: UKRAINIAN AND EURO-ATLANTIC CONTEXT

**Svitlana Storozhuk**

National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine

ORCID: 0000-0002-7947-6268

**Igor Hoyan**

Vasyl Stefanyk National Precarpathian University

ORCID: 0000-0003-2548-0488

**Oksana Fedyk**

Vasyl Stefanyk National Precarpathian University

ORCID: 0000-0002-9029-2611

**Nataliia Kryvda**

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

ORCID: 0000-0001-7429-7693

**Abstract.** *The article deals with the shifts in the worldview and ideological priorities of contemporary society as well as with the reasons behind the decrease in the significance of the priority of liberal doctrine. To focus on the above-mentioned issues, the factors defining this worldview, axiological, and ideological priorities in society should be investigated, as well as the impact of capitalism on the development of the axiological system of society needs highlighting. The reasons for this worldview and the ideological transformations of contemporary society are also focused on in the article. The investigation proves that the prolonged domination of liberal values in the North Atlantic Region has become the logical consequence not only of the development of capitalism, but also of the Cold War which united Western European countries against the image of a mutual external enemy. The destruction of this image brought the issues of civil policy into focus, since the increase in migration from countries with traditions contradicting basic European values has become a threat to their further development. The shifts in the social structure of society and the new outburst of nationalism have caused a serious threat to the existing values and actualized the necessity to preserve liberal values.*

**Key words:** *liberalism, nationalism, globalization, industrialization, capitalism, the “Other”, community.*

## **Modern worldview and ideological transformations and their assessment in modern intellectual discourse**

The period of the last few years in Western Europe is marked by a considerable shift in social consciousness. Despite the prevailing belief that liberal values will immediately expand, being the logical consequence of World War II and the globalization it caused, the nationally-oriented political forces have commenced reappearing in the political arena. This tendency has been caused by an expected development of ethnic nationalism in post-Soviet countries where national political slogans usually serve as the means of manipulating the electorate and are used by the political elite so as to achieve their political aims (Gritsay 2009: 6).

In addition, the increasing role of nationalism in political life of post-Soviet countries is caused largely by the fact that national projects are built into the politic area and do not affect the economy, leading to the development of conflict strategies. Equally important is the fact that the political elites of post-Soviet countries often continue to implement the principle of ethnic “nationality” inherent in civil politics of the USSR, which, as rightly pointed out by R. Brubaker, was a peculiar marker for categorizing the population of the Union’s republics (Brubaker 2012: 110–112), and, therefore, capable of predetermining the fragmentation of state boundaries.

It should be noted that, according to foreign researchers, the growth of the political influence of nationalism in post-Soviet countries is caused by both internal and external factors, among which the international policy of Russia does not rank last. Thus, for example, the Lithuanian scientist and politician Egidijus Vareikis emphasizes that, in the Russian socio-political consciousness, imperialism and chauvinism play an outstanding role, legitimizing the appeal of some Russian politicians to expand the existing political boundaries (Vareikis 2017: 195). It is significant that these political and territorial ambitions are accompanied by permanent territorial losses that have been observed since the military campaign in Afghanistan (Vareikis 2017: 191), which actualizes the issue of territorial revenge and causes the outbreak of nationalism in countries

Undoubtedly, the mentioned factors give an opportunity, at least in part, to understanding the reasons for the growth of the political force of nationalism in post-Soviet countries. However, their influence is territorially limited, and, thus, would not allow us to explain the emergence of a new confrontation wave between liberalism and nationalism in the Euro-Atlantic. Meanwhile, as J. Haidt rightly states, “2016 is an emotional turning point, and it can be remembered as the year when the Western world turned its back on, or at least delayed, its long march to globalization and transnational entities such as the European Union” (Haidt 2016,a). To support his statement, the well-known American scientist uses the example of Austria, where, in the second round of the presidential election of May 22, 2016, the population highly supported N. Hofer (49.7%), a candidate from the ultra-right “Austrian Freedom Party.” Despite the fact that the results of this election round were annulled due to a large number of violations,, they become a

vivid indication of the growth of political support for the right-oriented political forces and the enhancement of their role in domestic policy of the states. In the opinion of J. Haidt, the election of D. Trump to the post of US President in 2016 was no less spectacular in supporting a new wave of strengthening right-wing forces in national politics, even contrary to the fact that, during the election campaign, he repeatedly stated the need to restrict the immigration of Muslims and build a wall on the Mexican border. In the same year, as further highlighted by the American scientist, Great Britain voted for Brexit (Haidt 2016) justifying significant modifications in worldview and ideological priorities, primarily in the domestic policy of the Euro-Atlantic states, J. Haidt focuses only on the political events of 2016. Indeed, this view deserves to exist, even though changes in worldview and ideological priorities in the Euro-Atlantic world commenced in 2011. In addition, the leaders of the world's major economies (and, above all, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) claimed defeat of the policy of multiculturalism and the need to abandon it due to the threat of the destruction of basic European values.

The shift in worldview and ideological priorities that has emerged in certain parts of the Euro-Atlantic area increased investigations into ideological, socio-cultural, and economic premises for liberalism, its potential for solving the range of problems in dealing with civil and international policy and for studying the factors which, despite the expectations, caused nationalism to return to political life of society. In this regard, the works by C. Welzel (Welzel 2013), J. Haidt (Haidt 2016), B. Bonikowski (Bonikowski 2017), K. Stenner (Stenner 2005), M. Lilla (Lilla), B. Yack (Yack 2017) and some other researchers should be mentioned, since, following their predecessors, namely E. Renan (Renan 2000), B. Anderson (Anderson 2000), A. Smith (Smith 1994), in trying to find the axiological, economic and moral foundations that nourish national ideology, they claim national feelings to be an inseparable part of human nature. Thus J. Haidt and K. Stenner make a valid point, believing that strengthening of the political influence of right-wing forces was a natural consequence of the globalization process, which led to an increase in the level of migration and limitation of the sovereignty of national states. These changes, as the researchers argue, are perceived as a "regulatory threat" to the existing moral order, and, therefore, they activate the "authoritarian dynamics" of those who are prone to authoritarianism. In other words, according to J. Haidt and K. Stenner, it was the globalists who initiated a chain of events that caused right-wing nationalist reactions in many countries (Stenner 2005: 330; Haidt 2016).

In the process of studying the change in worldview priorities of modern society, no less fruitful seem the works of those Ukrainian researchers who are focusing on the study of civilizational and paradigmatic transformations of European society and their reflection on the axiological and social system of transitive societies. In this context, it is worth mentioning the papers of T. Danilova (Danylova 2016). While rethinking the concept of F. Fukuyama, she emphasizes that the domination of liberal democracy in the modern political life of society is conditioned by the internal aspirations of every person to be recognized, which, to date, only liberal democracy is able to ensure. The attention of V. Kravchenko and N. Kryvda is drawn to the issues related to the formation of national and cultural identity, including under the conditions of globalization (Kravchenko 2011; Kryvda 2017). The works of I. Hoyan (Hoyan 2017) are no less fruitful in the process of

studying the historical transformations of ideological and value priorities of European society. Instead, in the works of S. Storozhuk (Storozhuk 2014) and M. Stepiko (Stepyko 2017) the main focus is placed on the study of worldview and ideological priorities of Ukrainian society and the issues of structure planning for modern Ukrainian national identity.

It should be noted that, despite significant differences in the area of scientific interests of the above-mentioned researchers, their intelligence, as well as many other Ukrainian researchers, is carried out in the context of the doctrine of ethnic (cultural) and civil nations prevailing in the modern Ukrainian nationality. Moreover, Ukrainian researchers usually do not resort to a thorough coverage of the causes, on the one hand, of the leveling of liberal values in Ukrainian society, and, on the other hand, of the domination of the fundamental values of the ideology of nationalism in the political worldview and social practices of Ukrainian society. Such a worldview paradigm of the Ukrainian scholars may be the result of the prolonged stateless periods in Ukraine, which, being inseparable parts of the collective memory, determine the priorities of the scientific research. The military operations of recent years have had an equally important impact, since they, having caused the fragmentation of Ukrainian borders, made the nationalist ideology extremely attractive, not only for the regions striving to substantiate their own ethnocultural identity and to claim their right to independent life, but also for the political establishment. The latter uses nationalist slogans so as to divert public attention from social and economic issues and to focus on the formation of national strategies, aimed at the consolidation of the ideologically split Ukrainian society.

In this context, one can mention Crimea, where the majority of the population, according to the 2001 census (note that this was the last population census), was Russian (58.3%). In Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Russians accounted for about 40% of the total population. This gave grounds to the local elites, on the basis of the idea of economic self-sufficiency and language isolation of the local population, to form the myth about Novorossia. To date, the “issue of Rusynism,” which, as Stepyko rightly points out, may be exacerbated by the influence of internal political, economic, social and cultural factors and support from neighboring countries (Stepyko 2017: 40), especially with regard to the national direction of the Hungarian government, remains sensitive. Herewith, the researcher argues reasonably that “Rusynism,” the ideological basis of the idea of the ethnocultural and geographic isolation of the local population, had long been an element of manipulation of local political elites in the struggle with the political center (Kyiv) and neighboring states (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania), by which, the political self-determination of the Rusyns, will ensure the expansion of the area of political influence.

Due to the undivided attention of the intellectual discourse to the issue of ideological transformations in contemporary society, this issue is topical not only for the Ukrainian, but also the European, socio-cultural space. This situation is determined by contemporary Europe being not just a continent, but a cultural and spiritual environment that is in the permanent process of development and is not limited by geography. Europe is the project which needs not only persistent work in every socio-cultural sphere, but a

distinct awareness of all the factors predetermining its axiological priorities and cultural identity.

Taking into account that European integration is the strategic aim of contemporary Ukrainian society, this research dwells upon the comparative analysis of contemporary European and Ukrainian worldview and ideological priorities. The influence of capitalism on the development of human values as well as the factors causing nationalist-oriented strategies to reappear in the political life will be also focused on in this research. This approach allows not only to fully comprehend the contemporary potential of Ukrainian society for European integration, but also to define distinct strategies of the development of every social sphere.

### **Worldview and ideological priorities of Ukrainian society in the context of Western European political values**

The upturn of nationalistic feelings and their respective rhetoric in Ukrainian social and political worldview have been observed since 2014. To a large extent, this circumstance is caused by the fragmentation of state borders and the emergence of a mutual enemy image, which determines not only the consolidation of the population, but determines the vector of further geopolitical development of the country as well. Actually, this fact, according to sociological surveys of the Razumkov Center experts, has long defined the ideological and worldview priorities of Ukrainian society. In particular, Ukrainians in 2017 gave indispensable priority to those political forces of Ukraine that are focused on “protecting Ukraine's national interests”. It is worth noting that, according to Yu. Yakymenko, the number of respondents who choose this answer is significantly higher than others. The closest competitors are represented by political forces focused on protecting the interests of inhabitants of the regions, protecting the interests of a particular social group or protecting ideological principles, even if they, in totality, fail to catch up with the first option (Yakymenko 2017).

Obviously, the idea of protecting national interests does not provide a full understanding of the ideological priorities of Ukrainian society. Indeed, according to the 2014 election, the forces on the right (“Svoboda” [Freedom] and “Praviy Sector” [Right Sector] received only 7 parliamentary mandates; instead, the leaders of the parliamentary race were parties that had right-wing orientations, in particular, the “Solidarnist” [Solidarity] Bloc of Petro Poroshenko. Such results, as evidenced by the results of sociological surveys carried out by experts of the Razumkov Center, fully and completely correspond to the ideological priorities of Ukrainian society. In particular, despite the fact that the ideological orientations of Ukrainian citizens vary regionally, there is every reason to say that Ukrainians have unclearly expressed right-centric views. Moreover, it must be noted that the Western region of Ukraine is characterized by more “right-oriented” political views (the average score is 6.3), the Eastern region is featured by the left-oriented views (4.7 score); ethnic Ukrainians are politically more “right-oriented” (5.4 scores) than ethnic Russians (4.7 scores) (Kulchytskyi, Mishchenko 2018: 215-216).

The results of sociological surveys only at first glance question the growth of the political weight of nationalism in the political life of Ukrainian society. After all, according to the same sociological polls, in the social and political worldview of Ukrainians, the political right orientation correlates with qualities such as “religiosity,” “patriotism,” “love of freedom,” “national pride,” etc. (Kulchytskyi, Mishchenko 2018: 215–216). In our opinion, the liking of centrist orientations is predetermined by the fact that none of the ideologies enjoys absolute support; moreover, attention is drawn to the fact that Ukrainians usually have trouble with self-determination. In addition, it should not be overlooked that only 4% of respondents support liberal-oriented ideological-political views. Significantly, according to IOM in 2016, the number of migrants to Ukraine is insignificantly higher than 0.5% of the total population (Malynovska 2016: 22), which obviously should contribute to the growth of the political weight of liberally oriented political forces.

Of course, given Ukrainian realities, and above all the hostilities in the East of the country, the growth of patriotic and national feelings seems quite logical. Meanwhile, representatives of European intellectual discourse express deep concern over the growing political weight and social influence of nationalism. Thus, for example, G. Monbiot, emphasizing the increasing political influence of nationalism in Britain, emphasizes that, from a utilitarian point of view, nationalism is often unethical, because it requires the choice of interests of only their own community. According to the thinker, such an approach contradicts civilizational development in general and national interests, which fully and entirely witnessed the experience of the Second World War. In particular, the scientist emphasizes the fact that all participants during military confrontation, were grouped on a national basis, and, therefore, to help the other party should mean helping the enemy (Monbiot). Meanwhile, as is known, in reality the situation was different, which determined the results of this military confrontation.

Without resorting to the assessment of the conclusions of G. Monbiot who tried to substantiate the common belief of globalists in the equality of all people, we pay attention to attempts by the states of the Euro-Atlantic region to balance the dual potential of nationalism, which initially served as the engine of its success (Habermas 2002). In an attempt to avoid the formation of the social split line determined by ethnic-based factors, the principle of rational formation of super-ethnic civic values based on “constitutional patriotism,” economic well-being and peace, which provided the right to full development of each individual, that undoubtedly offset the existing ethnocultural differences that was taken as the basis of a liberally oriented civil policy. Meanwhile, the very gradual rooting of these values, as quite rightly J. Haidt remarked, transformed into a completely legitimate desire, in terms of liberal-oriented political force, to open borders, which resulted in a high level of migration demanding integration, had not foreseen the assimilation of newcomers. In addition, liberals have generally supported and are supporting transnational organizations, even in cases where they demanded a reduction of national sovereignty (Haidt (b)). Against this background, a policy of multiculturalism, popular in a number of European countries, has been built.

In other words, the effective civil policy, which is aimed at marginalizing the role of ethnocultural characteristics of culture through the provision of economic and legal guarantees for the development of each individual, has become one of the reasons for the establishment of liberal values in the Euro-Atlantic intellectual space, thereby contributing initially to national consolidation, and subsequently leading to a restriction of national sovereignty. Given the contemporary worldview and ideological priorities of Ukrainian society, such a trend can be considered a “regulatory threat” which will lead to an increase in authoritarian dynamics in Ukraine. Given the importance of patriotism and national pride, the restriction of state sovereignty can be perceived by Ukrainians as a regulatory threat.

### **The development of liberalism under the influence of capitalism**

The process of European integration, declared by Ukraine, combined with the unstable increase in the level of support for liberally oriented political movements, reinforces the significance of investigating the factors contributing to the development of liberal values in the Euro-Atlantic region.

According to the American scientist J. Haidt, the establishment of liberal values in the Western world became a logical result of the development of capitalism and its socio-cultural and ideological transformations. In particular, in his work “How Capitalism Changes Conscience,” he explores the changes which take place in the world under the influence of capitalism and globalization. In particular, J. Haidt emphasizes that the ascendant stage of the development of all societies was a traditional agrarian society whose life was complex and unpredictable—in order to survive, all people had to fulfill their duty, pray to the gods and cling to their extended families, because it was the family that ensured personal protection (Haidt 2015b).

But, the American scientist develops his thought, as the countries were industrialized, that is, people left their land and went to work at factories, welfare and values changed, which was initially actualized as secular values of survival. This process was quite logical, because factory production did not leave much time or space for religious rituals (Haidt 2015b). A. Toffler also expressed similar views on the first stage of industrialization, emphasizing, however, that industrialization led to a gradual modification of all spheres of social life—a nuclear family came to replace a large patriarchal family, which began to be regarded as a basic social cell. The emergence of a factory type school and higher education system has become equally important (Toffler 1980). All this, in the opinion of the American philosopher, led to a change in ideological and value priorities of society, thus causing the formation of political entities, i.e., nations, corresponding to the new economic conditions. Similar ideas are expressed by the English scientist E. Gellner, who emphasizes the fact that one of the main preconditions for the formation of national communities was the modernist educational system formed under the influence of industrialization, which laid the foundations for the establishment of closed communities—national states (Gellner 2002).

Despite the fruitfulness of a number of ideas expressed by A. Toffler and E. Gellner regarding the impact of industrialization on the development of nationalism, nevertheless, the researchers disregard those changes that determined the value priorities of an individual. In this context, the conclusions drawn by J. Haidt, which generally satisfy the theoretical generalization of A. Toffler in relation to the preservation of a high level of economic oppression generated by industrialization, and, at the same time, revealing entirely different content emphasis. In particular, the attention of the American researcher is drawn to the fact that, since the beginning of industrialization, people started to increasingly express materialistic values – they needed money not only for security, but also for social prestige, which could be bought in that period. Actually, according to J. Haidt, this led to a negative assessment of capitalism by intellectuals who emphasized the rigorous exploitation of the workers by the capitalists, both directly and at the expense of value proposition increases—the latter gave rise to a tireless pursuit of money and, accordingly, excessive exploitation (Haidt 2015,b).

The above-mentioned tendentious assessment of capitalism and the social consequences of industrialization, in the opinion of J. Haidt, was quite objective. In addition, the researcher focuses on the fact that, in the process of capitalism's development, the social environment gradually and significantly changed:

“Societies transition to more service-based jobs, which require (and foster) very different skills and values compared to factory jobs. Also, as societies get wealthier, life generally gets safer, not just due to reductions in disease, starvation, and vulnerability to natural disasters, but also due to reductions in political brutalization. People get rights”(Haidt 2015b).

The stated intentions in public consciousness also attracted the attention of A. Toffler, who emphasized the fact that, in the process of the third wave of civilizational changes, society has an increasing demand for workers with a lower level of set and unchanging skills for a specific type of activity, since now there is an ever increasing need for those who can adapt easily to changes and are able to make independent decisions. Moreover, the attention of the researcher is attracted to the fact that the new civilizational changes lead to the emergence of new social and personal values; people, as observed by the researcher, are increasingly striving for more responsible and proactive work that will meet their aspirations and qualifications (Toffler 1980). The above-mentioned changes, according to A. Toffler, became a logical consequence of the share of mental labor in the general system of production. In particular, the researcher emphasizes the fact that, today, industrial forms of production are significantly way below symbolic ones, and eventually the proletariat as the main driving force of industrial production rapidly gives way to the role of “cognizant,” that is, people engaged in intellectual labor (Toffler 2003: 103).

Taking into account the above, we have every reason to agree with the findings of J. Haidt that the gradual decline of existential pressure caused by economic inequality and social challenges leads to the transformation of life priorities—freedom comes to replace security, autonomy—to replace subordination to power, the development of creative assets—to replace discipline. In other words, according to the scientist's

conviction, under the influence of industrialization, the entire value system of society changed—people begin to take care of women's rights, animal rights, gay rights, environmental degradation, and so on. Let us note that at a time when women receive education and career prospects, they become less interested in family and the birth of children, which results in the fact that, in developed industrialized countries, the population begins to decline significantly (Welzel 2013: 278). This tendency may seem extremely negative; however, it can become one of the means of avoiding ecological collapse.

The above observations give all the grounds for J. Haidt to consider capitalism and, especially, worldview changes under its influence, as quite positive, since they contribute not only to the growth of the material well-being of humanity and tolerance but are able to overcome major global problems. Despite the fruitfulness of the researcher's insights regarding the dynamics of value priorities of society, yet, in our opinion, he uncritically identifies the notion of capitalism and industrialization, which greatly complicates the understanding of the true foundations of those philosophical and value priorities, which are usually common to the representatives of the “cognizant.”

Despite some disagreements occurring in the process of substantiation of the relationship of capitalism to the development of liberal values, yet, in our opinion, they have a high explanatory potential for explaining philosophical and value priorities of Ukrainian society. In particular, the high level of pressure of existence due to the low standard of living of the majority of society and a huge social gap between the rich and the poor, which is noted not only by The Economist (Our Crony-Capitalism Index 2014), but also by experts of the Razumkov Center, lead to the social withdrawal of Ukrainians in security issues, directing them to ensure their own material well-being first, thereby causing a low level of sensitivity to the problems of others. This, in turn, leads to support of those political forces that have a distinct social orientation, i.e., higher taxes for the rich, price regulation and protection of employees by expanding the public sector. Instead, the interests of the middle class are considered by the majority of Ukrainians to be secondary and not requiring additional attention (Yakymenko 2017). In other words, the lack of opportunities for the exercise of personal freedom does not make it possible to understand the priorities of a liberal oriented Western world.

### **Society without nationalism: ideal or myth?**

The low standard of living of most of Ukrainian society and the high level of pressure of existence caused by it results in the permanent designing of external and internal enemies that are on the path of social and economic transformation, which undoubtedly makes nationalist ideologies and political programs to a large extent attractive to Ukrainians. Instead, the relatively high standard of living in European society, subject to the absolute legitimacy of the above findings by J. Haidt, should contribute to the establishment of cosmopolitan liberal values on its basis. In our opinion, this intention was quite clearly manifested in the second half of the twentieth century. As is known, at that time, the principle of a “melting pot” for the modern civil policy began to yield to the policy of multiculturalism as a strategy aimed at the acceptance and recognition of the

cultural features of various ethnic groups that manifested themselves in religious, ethnic, educational, professional, gender, etc., identity of the population of each state (Smorgunova 2013: 202). It is obvious that the stated political intentions fully and completely corresponded to the ideological foundations of postmodernism, which substantially devalued the narratives and social ideals of educational humanism, laying the foundations for the recognition of the rights for various life styles (Lektorskiy 2001: 8).

The practical insolvency of the multiculturalism policy was first manifested on September 11, 2001. The tragic events of this day revealed the need to explain the content of Western European values, thus revealing the need for the revival of educational fundamentalism. Thus, for example, according to J. Haidt, it is an awareness of the threat of destruction to the value system of Western European society as a result of the sharp increase in the number of immigrants stipulated promoting nationalism as an ideology that stands in defense of the interests of its own, historically formed group and its inherent values (Haidt 2016b).

J. Haidt makes a valid point, since people have always fought for values that united them into the community, forming religious, ethnocultural or national communities. With this in mind, they can accept immigrants who are assimilated to the existing culture, but they will be fearful of those who they feel are incompatible with existing traditions, breaking into a new social structure. Thus, the growth of public attachment to nationalism is due to its inherent orientation to counteract the destruction of the established axiological system, which, according to J. Haidt, is manifested only in that part of the population that has an individual psychological propensity to authoritarianism (Haidt 2016b). According to the scientist, from the middle and until the end of the twentieth century, this predilection existed unprofessed; however, in the beginning of the twenty-first century, it manifested itself in full, including through the ever existing unbridgeable divides between urban and country living, whose representatives became carriers of radically different interests and values. In particular, the scientist emphasizes the fact that the village has always been more patriotic, more religious and more family oriented (Haidt 2015a). Instead, the values of the urban population, especially in economically developed countries, are cosmopolitan, the population is more open, and, therefore, much more tolerant of dissent, and, therefore, the growth of immigration and the policy of multiculturalism do not always lead to an increase in authoritarian intentions among the urban population.

According to J. Haidt, the unbridgeable divides formed between the value systems of country and urban living led to the fact that political forces guided by different social strata and administrative regions, expressing different interests and important values, were reluctant and incapable of negotiating, which resulted in the fact that, in the middle of society, antagonistic value systems beginning to form; they can, and in some cases, do, lead to territorial fragmentation. This is also facilitated by the radical transformation of the communication system, and, in particular, by mass media. Nowadays, most people receive information not from a few national channels that serve as tools for forming a

value system of society, but from a large number of alternative sources of information, in which the population usually seeks confirmation of their own convictions (Haidt 2015a).

Obviously, the outlined trend is fully manifested in Ukrainian society. The high level of social inequality (Kutsenko 2017: 12) is obviously the main prerequisite for the formation of distinctive value orientations of Ukrainian society. The high level of “existential pressure” predetermines a high level of conservatism in Ukrainian society, which is evidenced by the large number of traditional, religiously oriented ritual practices preserved to this day and still defining “insiders” (relatives, friends, colleagues, etc.) and “outsiders.” Within the limits of the dominance of such a bipolar outlook, the concept of a “world citizen” substantiated by I. Kant becomes unacceptable, and cosmopolitan values are hostile. It is obvious that these convictions and the general worldview of Ukrainian society are largely determined by folk-memory or rather by mental features and the most influential television channels that determine the public consciousness of the older generations of the Ukrainian population.

The image of the enemy is an invariably no less important factor in the formation of the value system of not only Ukrainian, but also European, society. For instance, J. Haidt emphasizes the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the important foundations for the radical socio-political transformations of the modern Euro-Atlantic region, which eventually resulted in the fact that the entire Western world was deprived of its “mutual” enemy. In the opinion of the American scientist, the “Cold War” was an extremely powerful factor, on the one hand, for the creation of the image of the “Other,” and, on the other hand, for consolidation and, eventually, globalization as well. In addition, the existence of something mutual for the whole liberal-oriented world, similar to that observed in modern Ukraine, provided possibilities to prioritize external, not internal, policies. Meanwhile, at the moment of change in the political situation that arose as a result of the destruction of a large totalitarian state, the “Other,” that is, the mutual enemy was gone, which forced society to focus on internal problems, forming the image of the “Other” inside the nation, and not outside of the public as a whole (Haidt 2015). This was also facilitated by the fact that modern Western society is a generation of baby-boomers, that is, people whose values were formed not on the values of patriotism, as in the middle of the twentieth century, but in competing with each other in relation to worldview, values and social orientations. As a result, competition and struggle have become a kind of mental basis of the socio-political culture of the modern Western world, and, hence, the hidden or open confrontation with established values appears to be quite a logical fact of political activity.

Undoubtedly, J. Haidt's conclusions and comments about the socio-cultural factors of the revitalization of nationalism deserve attention and have a high explanatory potential. Meanwhile, they do not make it possible to understand the reasons why, despite tireless industrialization, the worldview of the urban population is radically changing, while representatives of rural regions remain more conservative and cannot accept cosmopolitan ideas, especially in developed countries of the world. In other words, his conclusions do not make it possible to understand the foundations that nourish group identity, and nationalism with it. To a large extent, the said gap is largely conditioned by

the fact that nationalism, which was viewed as an outdated ideology, was overlooked within intellectual discourse, which eventually resulted in a shortage of fundamental scientific research. Instead, the attention of intelligent thinkers repeatedly raised the question of whether individualists and liberals can live outside the community, “ignoring the national question—the elephant in the room” (Yack 2012: 6). To understand the potential of nationalism, according to B. Yack, is possible only when we understand whom we are considering the object of our care and duty. In view of this, the thinker proposes to refute the prevailing approaches in the modern intellectual discourse to understanding the nation as a community of solidarity or group identity, interpreting it as a community of loyalty and mutual engagement inherent in social friendship.

The modern revival of nationalism is a challenge that prompts intellectual discourse to look in a new way at the peculiarities of association and the specifics of their functioning. According to B. Yack, the conceptual basis of this approach is the constructivist conceptions of nationalism, in particular the concept of the imaginary community developed by B. Anderson. It helps us to understand how, at the individual level, we experience a sense of unity with members of the community, whom we never cross in real life. Meanwhile, it lacks the explanatory potential in the cases when it comes to the peculiarities of the formation of such an imaginary community, that is, it is not able to answer the question of why some people have a sense of loyalty to us, and not to others.

The classical interpretation of nation in contemporary intellectual discourse is usually based on one of two models—ethnic or civil, which, by offering different ways of forming nations, position two distinct views on national unity. In particular, the representatives of the ethnic model of the nation assumed the idea of J.-J. Rousseau, on the “general will” that subjugates the will of separate individuals, instead, the representatives of the civil model of the nation insist that the nation emerges as a result of the community’s loyalty to political institutions and, in particular, the guiding principles of their activities. In view of this, political institutions are subject to and function according to citizenship requests. According to B. Yack, none of these approaches makes it possible to understand the essence of national unity, since community is formed not so much as a result of subordination to the group, but as a result of social friendship. In the opinion of the researcher, it is formed in cases where what we share with others is somewhat in common.

“These feelings of mutual concern and loyalty, unlike the submergence of individuals in the group, are a common feature of everyday life, though they vary in depth and intensity from one form of community to another. For the members of some communities, we are disposed to sacrifice a minute of our time; for the members of others, our lives.” (Yack 2012: 14).

In other words, B. Yack is considering the national community as a kind of the others more and less expressed in the real life of communities whose members share some common values. In this regard, the scientist argues that the nation is an “an intergenerational community whose members are connected by feelings of mutual

concern and loyalty for people with whom they share a heritage of cultural symbols and stories” (Yack 2012: 14).

Considering the nation as a community united by the feelings of care, B. Yack proves that the growth of the political influence of nationalism does not mark the return of a suppressed desire to subdue themselves to a group. On the contrary, it reinforces our desire to exercise special care and loyalty to those with whom we share something in common. At the same time, the scientist, trying to avoid the extremes of instrumentalism and primordialism, does not renounce their fundamental principles, but emphasizes the fact that our identity is determined, on the one hand, by the fact of our birth, and on the other – by our own choice, which, however, is carried out in some certain space of freedom. In fact, in this case it is said that in the process of forming communities, people are able to reject or reconcile with some of the differences of others.

Proceeding from the aforementioned theoretical and methodological foundations, B. Yack pays special attention to the refutation of the liberal concept of a civilian nation. Within this theory, as the scientist rightly states, the idea is asserted that people independently choose when and with whom they want to unite in the community (Yack 2012: 11–17). Meanwhile, in reality, such an approach leads to social fragmentation on which D. Hume focused his attention. So, in the essay “Of Parties in General,” the thinker notes that the peculiar feature of the human mind is that “he always strives to conquer every mind that comes close to him, and to the same extent, in which it greatly strengthens unity in thoughts, impresses and annoys any contradiction. Hence is the glow that most people have in disputes; hence their intolerance to objections, even in the most abstract and unbiased issues” (Hume 1996).

Along with the above, the thinker emphasizes the fact that all national communities historically were forming against the background of small cultural communities, which refutes the liberal-instrumental explanation of the peculiarities of the formation of national communities. In view of this, B. Yack agrees with E. Renan that the formation of a national community occurs against the background of subjectively confirmed consent and rich cultural heritage of common memories and practices. According to B. Yack, without consent, the legacy of shared memory and identity would not be a set of background restrictions on people’s activities, but their destiny. But without such an inheritance, there would have been no agreement at all because people would have no reason to seek an agreement with this, and not with any other group of individuals (Yack 2012: 93).

Undoubtedly, B. Yack’s conclusions provide an opportunity to understand the origins of the national community and to show that nationalism in the modern world does not revive, does not gain new strength, but manifests itself as a reaction to a change in the value system of society. Meanwhile, such an approach is quite legitimate when nationalism becomes the spiritual instruction of some historically formed community, like the modern United Kingdom, which, in an attempt to preserve its own cultural identity, opposes the values of its own community, cosmopolitan values that lead to the destruction of its identity. The same tendency was observed in Ukraine during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, taking into account the prevailing intention in

the modern world to fragment national boundaries, the findings of the researcher may seem more problematic given that the common historical heritage should become a significant factor in preserving national borders. Despite this, since the 1970s, K. Volf quite rightly observes, there has been an outbreak of ethno-nationalism (or ethno-regionalism) among the Welsh, Bretons, Basques, Flemish, Walloons, Catalans, etc. (Volf 2000: 24). A similar tendency towards separatism is observed in modern Ukraine.

Taking into account that almost all of the ethno-cultural communities mentioned above share a common historical heritage and experience from the past, there is every reason to believe that the outbreak of the ethno-national movement was predetermined by transformations of worldview which was evident in the late 1990's under the influence of digital technology development, as A. Kirby notices (Kirby 2006). At this time, on the one hand, the Internet begins to determine the entire life of society, and on the other hand, there is a modernization of the old, including social and political forms. A. Kirby reveals the peculiarity of these changes as an example of a whole series of cultural phenomena that are rapidly losing their focus on making a certain "impression" on their consumers. In contrast, the central place in the modern world is given to proactive human activities. In other words, the central role in the modern social and cultural life of society is taken by those who hold information. As a result, the author in his traditional sense "is downgraded to the status of someone who simply sets the parameters used by the viewers, or becomes quite insignificant, driven outside of the process", while the text at the same time begins to be characterized by a high level of instability. That is, the development of information technology leads to the fact that the text begins to be determined by the viewer, ultimately making cultural products extremely trivial (Kirby 2006).

Worldview and social and cultural transformations, impacted by the development of information technologies, radically changed not only social and cultural norms, but also the political aspect of life of the whole society. On the one hand, a more peculiar nostalgia for fundamental values is more clearly observed today, which lays the foundations for the resuscitation of social and political ideologies of modernity, including nationalism. Meanwhile, in our opinion, the revival of this ideology is no longer occurring in its pure form, as emphasized by J. Haidt, but it is sporadic. So, for example, in Denmark and Norway the foreign policy is right-centered, while the internal policy is left-oriented. Similar trends are observed in the work of Angela Merkel, who, in her foreign policy, supports the course of a single political and economic European area, while domestic policy often focuses on public support and trends. In general, the outlined changes in social and political life are fully consistent with the conceptual ideas outlined in the Manifesto of Metamodernism (Turner 2011) which states that the oscillation between the two opposing truths (or ideologies) can be the most effective way of solving a number of social issues. On the other hand, changes in political life are accompanied by the growth of populism, which results in the growth of distrust of rational classical political strategies. To a large extent, this situation is predetermined by those social transformations, which are emphasized by J. Haidt, namely: modern society is becoming more diverse and variable as a result of the growth of social polarization. The latter generates not only social tensions, but also the growth of the influence of "marginal"

strata in the political area. Their political aspirations are implemented due to the ambitious role of Internet technologies which open up new opportunities not only for manipulating public consciousness, but also open new levers of influence on political institutions.

In general, we think the modern degeneration of curiosity and political influence of nationalism is conditioned by those ideological and social and cultural transformations that are constantly modifying the social and cultural life of a person. Under the influence of globalization, migration and even the development of postmodernism, human life has become extremely unstable, as a result, the current spiritual, and also political, situation is characterized by nostalgia for the concept of “bright future,” “eternal values,” which people usually find in various forms of group identity, the manifestation of which nationalism used to be. Surely, today there is every reason to say that the revival of national feelings and attention to collective identity is based on the social and cultural foundations different from those of the nineteenth century, thus reflecting the unchanging social essence of a person, which was defined by Aristotle during his time. Moreover, we would like to note that when uniting in a community, people express their loyalty to those who profess the same values, laying them into the foundation for a new or existing collective unity. It is significant that the formation of a new ethno-national community takes place in unity with the opposition to the “Other,” which are regarded as those who destroy the value basis of intra-group unity.

Proceeding from the above, we have every reason to refute, substantiated by I. Kant, the concept of a “world citizen” as a thinking being who admits, besides himself, the existence and freedom of other people (Kant), considering their equal and self-valued beings. Formation of communities, including national ones, takes place against the background of subjective will, which arises owing to loyalty to the shared experience in the past and by contrasting oneself with the “Other.” At the same time, the opposition to the “Other” is one of the most powerful ways of forming group loyalty. Focusing on the qualities that distinguish the “Other” from “We,” people tend to ignore or not to take into account the qualities that distinguish us from each other within our group. In view of this, we can assume that the liberal ideal of a “world citizen,” transforming all humanity into a united community, can only be realized in cases where everybody faces a shared threat. In opposite cases, they will be united in larger, or smaller, historic variables of community, the dynamics and peculiarities of which will be determined by the political situation and the civilizational transformations that will take place in the world.

## Conclusions

The domination of liberal values in the socio-political outlook of the Euro-Atlantic region in the twentieth century became quite a logical result not only of industrialization, which required radical change in the social and cultural life of society, but also the international political situation in the world. In particular, despite the tendentious assessment of capitalism and the social consequences of industrialization, it was their long-term development that was considered as the main socio-cultural preconditions for the establishment of cosmopolitan values among the urban population, as a result of

liberation from existential pressure that took place due to changes in the value priorities of society. Instead, more conservative in its basis, rural population remained more patriotic and religious, maintaining the internal potential of activating the national movement.

The long-lasting unity of the axiological system of national and international communities was maintained at the expense of the existence of a mutual enemy, which made it possible to dampen the ideological and value differences within the communities that emerged as soon as the shared threat disappeared and led to the formation of new social communities in the midst of large national entities, laying the foundations of a new wave of ethno-nationalism and fragmentation of borders. In other words, a cosmopolitan worldview became one of the factors in the modern outbreak of nationalism. Liberating a person from the influence of the traditional ethnocultural community, it opened the possibility for the emergence of new social entities that arose on the basis of not only subjective, but also objective, factors, among which the basic role was played by such key liberal values as rights and freedoms of the individual. In light of this, nationalist sentiment would intensify at the time of the appearance of an external enemy, giving rise to an outbreak of nationalism. In addition, the actual increase of the political influence of nationalism as an ideology is largely conditioned by the worldview and social and cultural transformations of the present, caused by the development of digital technologies, opened new opportunities for “marginal” segments of the population to determine the direction of political life of society, thereby causing the growth of political populism, which was also manifested through the appeal of political leaders to nationalist rhetoric.

The contemporary intellectual discourse that considers nationalism an “outdated” authoritarian ideology that does not have sufficient foundations for life in the modern world have been refuted, and it has been shown that nationalism is a way of building and functioning social communities, and therefore it should be regarded as a phenomenon accompanying humankind at all stages of its development. Nationalism has always been a peculiar psychological reaction to the development and change of social values. In this regard, in the process of social management, the social interests and mental characteristics of the community must be taken into account. Ignoring these demands leads to the activation of defense mechanisms in a community, which are revealed through intolerance to changes and non-conformism. The authoritarian inclinations of community may be decreased not only by means of permanent construction of social and political ideals, but also by means of the rise of every person’s prosperity and freedom of self-realization due to the increase in the role of mental work in social industry.

### **Bibliography:**

- Anderson, Benedict. (2000). *Ujavena spilnota* [The Nation as Imagined Community]. In *Natsionalizm: antolohiia*. Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 333–342.
- Bonikowski, Bart. (2017). Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment. *The British Journal of Sociology* 68: 181–213.

- Brubaker, Rogers. (2012). *Etnichnost bez grupp [Ethnicity Without Groups]*. Moskva: Izd. dom Vyisshey shkola ekonomiki.
- Danylova, Tatyana, Komisarenko, Sergey. (2018). Scientific Investigations of the Nobel Prize Winner Emil Fischer as a Launching Pad for the Development of Biochemistry: A Brief Overview. *Ukrainian Biochemical Journal* 90: 135–142.
- Danylova, Tatyana. (2016). The Desire for recognition in the Context of Francis Fukuyama's Universal History. *Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research* 10: 69–77.
- Economist (2014). Our crony-capitalism index, *The Economist*, 15 March 2014, <https://www.economist.com/news/international/21599041-countries-where-politically-connected-businessmen-are-most-likely-prosper-planet> (accessed 13 November 2019).
- European Charter (1992). European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Strasbourg, November 5, 1992, *Zakon Ukrainy*, [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994\\_014](http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_014) (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Gellner, Ernest . (2002). Prishestvie natsionalizma. Mifyi natsii i klasa [Coming of nationalism. Myths of the nation and class]. In *Natsii i natsionalizm*. Moscow: Praksis, 146–200.
- Gritsay, Elena. (2009). *Nikolko Milana. Ukraina: natsionalnaya identichnost v zerkale Drugogo [Ukraine: national identity in the mirror of the Other]*. Vilnyus: EGU.
- Habermas, Jürgen. (2002). Evropeyskoe natsionalnoe gosudarstvo: ego dostizheniya i predelyi. O proshlom i buduschem suvereniteta i grazhdanstva [European national state: its achievements and limits. On the past and future of sovereignty and citizenship]. In *Natsii i natsionalizm*. Moskva: Praksis, 364–380.
- Haidt, Jonathan (2015b). How Capitalism Changes Conscience, *Humans and Nature*, 2015, <https://www.humansandnature.org/culture-how-capitalism-changes-conscience> (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Haidt, Jonathan. (2015a). Abrams, Sam The top 10 reasons American politics are so broken, *The Washington Post*, January 7, 2015, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/07/the-top-10-reasons-american-politics-are-worse-than-ever/?utm\\_term=.1726c3c50170](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/07/the-top-10-reasons-american-politics-are-worse-than-ever/?utm_term=.1726c3c50170) URL (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Haidt, Jonathan. (2016a). The Ethics of Globalism, Nationalism, and Patriotism. *Minding Nature* 9(3): 18–24.
- Haidt, Jonathan. (2016b). When and Why Nationalism Beats Globalism, *The American Interest*, 10 July 2016, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beats-globalism/> (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Hume, David. (1996). O partiayah voobsche [Of parties in general], *Ekonomicheskaya biblioteka*, [http://econlibrary.ru/books/104/108/hume16\\_of\\_parties\\_in\\_general.html](http://econlibrary.ru/books/104/108/hume16_of_parties_in_general.html) (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Kant, Immanui. (1966). Antropologiya s pragmaticheskoy tochki zreniya [Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view], *Istoricheskaya biblioteka*, <http://filosof.historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000507/> (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Kirby, Alan. (2006). The Death of Postmodernism And Beyond, *Philosophy now*, 2006, [https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The\\_Death\\_of\\_Postmodernism\\_And\\_Beyond](https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Death_of_Postmodernism_And_Beyond) (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Kravchenko, Volodymyr. (2011). Ponevolennia istoriiei: radianska Ukraina v suchasniy istoriohrafii [Conviction of History: Soviet Ukraine in Modern Historiography]. In *Ukraine, Empire, Russia*. Kyiv: Chasopys "Krytyka", 455–528.
- Kryvda, Natalia. (2017). Ukrainska identychnist yak svitohliadniy konstrukt [Ukrainian identity as a worldview construction]. *Scientific Bulletin of NUBiP of Ukraine. Series: Humanities Studies* 274: 109–124.

- Kulchytskyi, Stanislav. Mishchenko, Mykhailo. (2018). *Ukraina na porozi obiednanoi Yevropy [Ukraine is on the verge of a united Europe]*. Kyiv, Tsentrazumkova.
- Kutsenko, Olha. (2017). Suspilstvo nerivnykh: superechnosti ta vyklyky kompleksnykh sotsialnykh nerivnosti [Society of narrative: Supervisions and challenges of complex social inhereents]. In *New influence – new conflicts: Ways of future*. Kharkiv, 11–12.
- Lektorskiy, Vladislav. (2001). Hristianskie tsennosti, liberalizm, totalitarizm, postmodernizm [Christian values, liberalism, totalitarianism, postmodernism]. *Voprosy filosofii* 6: 6–9.
- Lilla, Mark. (2016) The End of Identity Liberalism, *New York Times*, 20 November 2016, [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html?emc=eta1&\\_r=1#story-continues-1](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html?emc=eta1&_r=1#story-continues-1) (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Malynovska, Olena. (2016). *Mihratsiia v Ukraini: fakty i tsyfry [Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures]*. Kyiv: Mizhnarodna orhanizatsiia z mihratsii.
- Monbiot, George. (2018). The New Chauvinism, *Monbiot official website*, 8 September 2005, , <http://www.monbiot.com/2005/08/09/the-new-chauvinism/> (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Poll (2016). *Ukraine-2016: Achievements and Problems on the Way to Transformation Forecasts-2017 Public Opinion on the Results of 2016*, KIIS. Kyiv: UKMA.
- Renan, Ernest. (2000). Shcho take natsiia [Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation]. In *Natsionalizm: antolohiia*. Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 253–263.
- Smith, Anthony. (1994). *Natsionalna identychnist [National Identity]*. Kyiv: Osnovy.
- Smorgunova, Valenitina. (2013). Sravnitel'no-politicheskii analiz multikulturalizma kak politicheskoy tehnologii i faktora ustoychivogo razvitiya obschestva [Comparative and political analysis of multiculturalism as a political technology and the factor of sustainable development of society]. *Vestnik Omskogo universiteta* 1: 200–205.
- Stenner, Karen. (2005). *The authoritarian dynamic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stepyko, Mykhailo. (2017). Suchasne rusynstvo: etnopolitychnyi proektchy kryza ukrainskoi natsionalnoi identychnosti [Contemporary Rusynism: an ethnopolitical project or a crisis of Ukrainian national identity]. *Stratehichni priorityty. Serii: Polityka* 1: 39–46.
- Storozhuk, Svitlana. (2014). Natsionalizm: problema vyznachennia ta interpretatsii [Nationalism: the problem of definition and interpretation]. *Visnyk Cherkaskoho universytetu. Serii Filosofii* 31(324): 28–33.
- Toffler, Alvin. (1980). *Tretya volna [The Third Wave]*. Moskva., Bantam Books.
- Toffler, Alvin. (2003). *Metamorfozyi vlasti [Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century]*. Moscow: "Izdatelstvo ACT".
- Turner, Luke. (2011). Metamodernism, Manifesto, 2011, <http://www.metamodernism.org/> (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Vareikis, Egidijus. (2017). *Global football. Emotional and political civilizations relations in the postmodern context of globalization*. Kaunas: Vitae Litera.
- Volf, Ken. (2000). Etnichni natsionalizm: analiz i zakhyst [Ethnic Nationalism: An Analysis and a Defense]. In *Natsionalizm: antolohiia*. Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 244–252
- Welzel, Christian. (2013). *Freedom Rising: human empowerment and the quest for emancipation*. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Yack, Bernard. (2012). *Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Yakymenko, Yurii. (2017). Naikrashcha partiia: shcho vplyvaie na rozvytok ukrainskykh politsyl [The best party: what influences the development of Ukrainian political forces], *Razumkov Centre official website*, 2017, <http://razumkov.org.ua/komentari/naikrashcha-partiia-shcho-vplyvaie-na-rozvytok-ukrainskykh-politsyl> (accessed 13 November 2019).
- Hoyan, Igor, Storozhuk, Svitlana. (2017). Gender equality as a modern phenomenon. *Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research* 11: 71–83.