

КОНСТРУИРУЯ ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ ГОЛОС: ДИСКУРСИВНЫЕ ПОЗИЦИИ В МОЛДАВСКОМ ЖУРНАЛЕ ФИЛОСОФИИ И...

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Аннотация. В данной статье автор рассматривает то, как конструировался философский дискурс в постсоветской Молдове, анализируя дискурсивную позицию, представленную в главном философском журнале страны – «Журнале философии и права» (как он назывался в 1992 – 2006 гг.) и «Журнале философии, социальных наук и политологии» (как он называется с 2006 г.). В статье представлен сравнительный обзор двух ключевых периодов: 1992 года, первого года самостоятельного издания журнала, и 2007 года, когда журнал сменил название и обрел свою нынешнюю форму.

В статье автор анализирует и излагает идеи 25 опубликованных статей, комментируя построение в них философского голоса. Основная позиция философа, прочно утвердившаяся в 1992 году и продолжающаяся до настоящего времени, похожа, заключается в «возвращении наследия», которым пренебрегали или считали табуированным в советский период, в основном пересказывая и разоблачая работы «великих философов прошлого», которые так или иначе могут быть заявлены как принадлежащие «нам», как правило, этнически сконструированным. Другая позиция, очевидная в большинстве работ 2007 года, – это позиция «защитника ценностей» перед лицом постмодернистской «неуверенности» и релятивизма. Тон обычно задает «эксперт» – человек, претендующий на особые способности или специальные знания и способный сформулировать «рекомендации» о том, «что нужно сделать». Лишь постепенно, и первоначально в работах аспирантов, появляется позиция философа как рефлексирующего читателя.

Ключевые слова: философский дискурс, дискурсивная позиция, философия Молдовы, постсоветская философия, наследие, ценности

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**CONSTRUCTING A PHILOSOPHICAL VOICE:
DISCURSIVE POSITIONS IN THE MOLDOVAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND...**

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Abstract. *In the present paper, author examines the way philosophical discourse constituted itself in post-Soviet Moldova, analyzing the discursive position present in the Journal of Philosophy and Law (as it was called in 1992 – 2006) and Journal of Philosophy, Social Science and Political Science (as it is called since 2006), the main philosophical journal of the country. The paper presents synchronic surveys of two key years: 1992, the first year of its independent publication, and 2007, the year in which it changed its title and became its current incarnation.*

In the article, author provides analyzes and presents the ideas from the total of 25 published papers, commenting on the construction of the philosophical voice in them. The main position of a philosopher, firmly established in 1992 and continuing up to present times, seems to be one of “reclaiming the heritage” that was neglected or considered taboo during the Soviet period, mainly paraphrasing and exposing the work of the “great philosophers of the past” that can be claimed, one way or another, as belonging to an “us”, usually ethnically constructed. Another position, obvious in most 2007 papers, is one of “defender of values” in the face of postmodern “insecurities” and relativism. The tone is usually that of an “expert” – someone claiming special abilities or special knowledge, and able to formulate “recommendations” about “what needs to be done”. Only gradually, and initially in the work of PhD students, the position of the philosopher as a reflective reader emerges.

Key words: *philosophical discourse, discursive position, post-Soviet philosophy, heritage, values*

A philosophical journal / a philosophical community

The space in which the transformation of philosophical discourse in the Republic of Moldova during the last 30 years becomes obvious is the main (partly) philosophical journal of the country, published initially under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences, and currently, after the Academy was restructured and its institutes became formally autonomous, by the Institute for Juridical, Political, and Sociological Research. Accordingly, the title of the journal changed over the years, depending on its subordination and on the fields of research in which the institute coordinating and issuing it was active: *Journal of Philosophy and Law* (issued by the Institute for Philosophy and Law, as it was called during 1991 – 2006), and *Journal of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science* (issued by the inheritor of the former institute—called in various ways, after subsequent reforms, depending on the subdivisions it was including: Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law; Institute of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science; Institute of European Integration and Political Science; Institute for Political and Sociological Research; Institute for Juridical, Political, and Sociological Research). It should be noted that, since 2009, there is no institute that includes the word “philosophy” in its title; moreover, the philosophy section—composed currently of 7 researchers—formerly part of the institute that issues the journal, is, since 2013, part of the Institute of History.

The *Journal of Philosophy and...*—as one might jokingly call it in order to emphasize the continuity—shows, just through its title, the way philosophy is positioned in Moldovan academia: a discipline *among others*, the links it has with these other disciplines having more to do with the institutional subordination (or the memory of former institutional ties, since 2013) than with any intrinsic sympathy or commonality of approach. For reasons of institutional tradition, philosophy still has priority of place, though, in the title of the journal, even if, for quite a long time already, the philosophy sector has a different institutional affiliation than the rest of the disciplines currently included in the title.

The central role of this journal for Moldova’s philosophical community is due to a phenomenon that derives from the Soviet period, and still determines a fracture in the academic community: people who work in universities mainly teach, people who work in research institutes mainly do research. Accordingly, there is much less pressure to publish among Moldovan lecturers, since their main task is teaching and publishing course materials; when they do publish research papers, they mainly do it in collections of conference papers or in the various series of the annual *Studia Universitatis Moldaviae* (which has no specialized philosophy section: philosophy papers are published in the “Humanistic Sciences” fascicle). On the other hand, people who work in the institutes are (informally) required to publish in the academic journals coordinated by the institutes they work for; there is even an informal *pressure* to publish at least one paper a year there, regardless if they publish other papers in foreign journals or in collections of conference papers or not. The journal becomes, this way, both the space that receives the written output of people who specialize in academic philosophy, and an institution that *requires* this written output from researchers, in order to perpetuate its existence and to justify the researchers’ employment at the institution that issues the said journal.

This double status of the journal—as exercising a kind of attraction for researchers, lecturers, and PhD students wanting to publish in the only (partly) philosophical journal of the country, and as pressuring researchers and PhD students to publish there—contributes to giving it a special place in the construction of a Moldovan philosophical discourse and philosophical voice. As a space in which short- to medium-length papers are published, it was, for 30 years, the main field in which (would-be) philosophers explored what a (post-? non-? Soviet) philosophical paper should look like, how would a (post-? non-? Soviet) philosophical voice sound, what are the acceptable topics (would the journal accept this for publication?), what are the acceptable discursive positions (how present an author should be in their text? are they present despite their attempts to be impersonal? does explicit commitment to certain values leak into the voice the paper is written in?).

Another advantage offered by a journal like this is the ability to investigate most of the relevant “yearly philosophical output” of a (small, post-Soviet) country “at a glance”. This is what I will attempt in the present paper: a synchronic examination of the 25 philosophy papers published in the *Journal of Philosophy and...* in two key years, 1992 and 2007. 1992 was the first year after state independence was declared, also the year the journal itself came into its own as *Journal of Philosophy and Law*; 2007—the year the institute issuing it changed its name, so the journal became *Journal of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science*, the title it bears until now. I will pay attention, first of all, to the attempts to construct (and define) a philosophical voice, to the discursive stance that is cultivated in these papers, to explicit commitments the author is taking; in the type of reading that I propose here, the topics themselves, although important, are secondary to the attempt itself to *write philosophy freely* while the authors are finding out for themselves what *writing philosophy* means at all. I will quote at length from the papers I will analyze, usually in my translation (except for the abstracts, originally in English), in order to illustrate the phenomena I am examining. After these two synchronic analyses, I will point out the evolution of certain trends that are also present currently in Moldovan philosophical discourse—having survived since their first formulation in 1992—as well as the emergent divergence from them in the work of, mainly, PhD students.

1992: Reclaiming “heritage”

The first issue of the *Journal of Philosophy and Law*, published in 1992, includes four rubrics: *Philosophy*; *Law*; *Comments on Current Legislation*; *Reviews*. There are three papers published with the rubric *Philosophy*. Two of them are written in Romanian, one in Russian. All the papers include an abstract in 2 languages: English and Russian. Given the fact that Russian is the *lingua franca* of the post-Soviet space, and English—of the Western academic community, the symbolic value of this choice is obvious—the editors of the journal see as their audience *both* the post-Soviet and the Western community, and the abstracts are perceived as possible ways of access for potentially interested researchers.

The first paper, authored by Panteleimon M. Varzari, bears the title *Production and Man: The Creative Potential of the Personality in the Sphere of Work*. The paper is dedicated to various “changes in the sphere of work”—for example, the phenomenon of

unemployment, newly established in law—correlated with the “transformation of personality”. I will quote the last paragraph of the paper:

From what has been said, we can conclude that the formation and consolidation of a free personality can take place only when it can fully manifest its innate capabilities and accumulated skills. Of course, it has to do with their revealing and realization in the main sphere of activity that man has – the sphere of work. But this process can unfold in an easier way if the agents of economic units will have optimal work conditions, if social problems of production will be solved together with other major problems in the interest of workers. Only in this case humanism will express human dignity as a supreme value and as a general goal of social progress. And this will condition an interested attitude of workers towards their work, a raise in production markers, and, as a consequence, a quick sanitation of national economy aiming at the continuous improvement of the population’s living standards and its prosperity. (Varzari 1992: 12)

What can one notice, based on reading a paragraph like this, 30 years later?

First, “work”, in a Marxist framework, is perceived as the “main sphere of human activity”. Reflecting about work and about the desirable “free personality” leads to what I think is essential for the construction of a certain voice, expressed here: a reflection about “what *should* be done” by “economic agents”, by the government, and by society in general. The second thing I would point out is the categorical tone, expressed through “only” – present two times in the paragraph: “only when...” and “only in this case”.

So, as what does the philosopher speak? As one who *knows* what *should* be done, who has confidence in what can happen (and can predict what will happen), and knows that this will happen “only when” certain conditions will be in place—and as one who points out what these conditions *should* be in order to reach a desired future, the “continuous improvement of living standards and prosperity”, with the possibility of establishing dignity as a “supreme value”.

We can retain this futural orientation and confidence in one’s seeing, together with the confidence that *certain things can happen one way only*. We will encounter them again, in other papers.

The second philosophy paper published in this first issue of the journal is *History of Philosophy Research in Moldova. Accomplishments and Perspectives*, by Alexandru I. Babii. My claim is that it anticipates and contains, *in nuce*, most of the subsequent developments in Moldovan philosophy, and here I would just quote and analyze several relevant portions. The first one establishes the concept of *heritage* as a way of conceptualizing the past and, as we shall see, it becomes an essential framework for Moldovan philosophical discourse:

Currently, in the spiritual life of our society, one can notice an increasing interest in knowing the past in general and the past of our Homeland in particular. This fact can be understood in its totality if we seriously entertain the thesis that that the grandeur of the jump towards future, that finds an adequate expression in the process of society’s subsequent development, also determines the need to take into account, in as realistic a way as possible, the lessons of the past, as well as

the appeal to history as a collective memory of the nation. In the process of realizing these necessities, the task that appear in front of the science of history of philosophy are of enormous importance, because the past, in the totality of its manifestations, cannot be conceived without a deep knowledge of philosophy, which, according to Marx, represents a “spiritual quintessence of the period”. Thus, a deep interest in the spiritual heritage of the past results, conceived by larger circles of the society as a real phenomenon of national culture.

The valorization of our cultural heritage, including the philosophical one, requires us to distinguish the concepts of “heritage” and “continuity”. “Heritage” can be assessed as a characteristic of the totality of the social results of human activity, constituting the base of contemporary culture’s social memory. “Continuity” is the totality of meanings that “heritage” acquires as it is appropriated by the culture. As it seems, meaning has to be understood as the capacity of a cultural phenomenon to respond to a certain question that preoccupies contemporary culture. If a certain monument of past culture cannot satisfy any of the actual necessities of contemporary culture, from the latter’s point of view, it loses any meaning, becomes devoid of content.

The task of the history of philosophy consists not just in discovering philosophical monuments of the past, but also in renewing the basis of social memory, as well as revealing the whole complexity of the multitude of meanings of monuments that it researches, in various cultural contexts. Unfortunately, in the real practice of historical-philosophical investigations, this problem was not given its due attention, a fact which caused certain vicissitudes. (Babii 1992: 13–14)

I quoted extensively, because this passage reads like a manifesto for doing a certain type of history of philosophy—one that Babii argues was neglected during Soviet times (and presents several reasons for its neglect). Before going into further details with the analysis of this paper, I would like to point out several aspects of what is going on in this passage:

- The voice of the philosopher becomes that of “someone who notices” and reflects on what can be noticed;
- What one does—performs—when something is noticed is “making distinctions”, as an essential philosophical discursive move (in the case of this paragraph—“heritage” and “continuity”);
- Based on the “noticings” and on “distinctions”, the philosopher can be able to formulate a “task”;
- The history of philosophy is seen as having to do with what is presented as “heritage”—“monuments” that can have meaning for the present—and with revealing the meaningfulness they have *in the present context*—the present questions to which something found in the past can be relevant;
- A neutral reference to Marx is used as a legitimation for focusing on the history of philosophy—one might hypothesize that this is either a habit from the times when quoting Marx was compulsory, or a way to abate criticism from Marxists that

would question his view, maybe even a way to “save the living core of Marx” from his dogmatic interpreters (although saying this might be an over-interpretation);

– This task is presented as having to do with “social progress”, the “jump into the future”; Babii’s insisting on the “lessons of the past” as having a special importance are the ones that emphasize, in his view, the importance of the history of philosophy—as that which helps with finding “meanings” in a whole layer of “monuments of the past” that were neglected due to “vicissitudes”.

The vicissitudes he mentions—the problems with research in the history of philosophy in Moldova—are due to

... the general state of philosophical science in the Soviet Union, determined by a long domination of certain anti-scientific and non-scientific views that consolidated themselves in our country in the period of Stalinism and stagnation. (Babii 1992: 15)

Then, Babii goes on to present a list of the problems he identified, deriving from “an indifferent, cowardly, and limited dogmatism that was clawing its way in the philosopher’s soul, killing any embryo of a fresh idea” (Babii 1992: 15):

– The fact that the history of philosophy was perceived as a struggle between materialism and idealism, without taking into account the local specifics and leading to exclusions of authors;

– The “narrow class approach” that led to “manic attacks” and to “dividing all thinkers in two classes: the ones who were right and the ones who were wrong”;

– Emphasizing the Russian and Ukrainian influence and neglecting the Romanian context of philosophical work carried by Moldovan thinkers;

– The lack of a properly philosophical training of researchers; the fact that, in doctoral training programs, what was encouraged was reading a single author, who often did not even self-identify as a philosopher, and neglecting all others, including the history of philosophy of other nations;

– The lack of specialists that would be familiar with classical languages;

– The lack of critical editions, including the fact that, at that moment in 1992, there were no complete published works of any Moldovan philosopher.

This list of “problems” included in Babii’s “manifesto”, together with the ethos that he proposed—a reverent attitude towards the “heritage” in an attempt to “recover” it—continues to shape Moldovan philosophy at the present moment too. We can note, especially, the insistence on the concept of “heritage”—which has become a shibboleth in the Moldovan philosophical community, being used (as we shall see) as a title for journal rubrics, conferences, book collections, etc. The manifesto tone of this article, in an attempt to mark a break with the “vicissitudes” of the Soviet era (but, at the same time, insisting on “not neglecting the work that was done even then”) can be read as an attempt to create a new philosophical voice—the voice, we might say, of the philosopher as “aware of the task that is imposed to him by the subject matter he chooses”—the “philosophical

heritage” that he is supposed to recover, publish, and where he is supposed to discover “meanings” that he can offer to his present community.

The last paper published in this issue under the rubric *Philosophy* belongs to S. C. Pahopol. It is written in Russian and bears the title *The Culture of Marriage-Family Relationships*. I will quote the abstract first:

In the paper, based on statistical and sociological data, taking into account the specific development of the family in Moldova, we analyze its critical situation and the culture of family relations. The latter are characterized as being determined, first of all, by social conditions. At the same time, we specify certain actions that are required in order to raise the cultural level of these relations. (Pahopol 1992: 37).

Reading the abstract, one might question what is specifically philosophical about an approach such as this one. In a sense, this is the product of taking institutional affiliation of a person as that which defines what they do: if they belong to the philosophy section of a Philosophy and Law institute, what they do *should* count as philosophy, regardless of *what it is* that they do—an empirical research, in this case, together with recommendations such as:

Relationships in a cultured family can be benevolent, calm, the motives for tensions will be eliminated, hidden and obvious grudges will diminish, if the financial situation will be resolved as well. The latter changes substantially the psychological climate in families. (Pahopol 1992: 33)

Or

The spouses that respect themselves and others usually evaluate in a self-critical way their own behavior, accommodate each other, find a way to make concessions, not with the appearance of an offended victim, but with benevolence, because they understand: this way it is going to be better, calmer, more comfortable and more useful for both of us, for the family. (Pahopol 1992: 34)

Leaving aside the question whether this would “count” as philosophical writing—it was published in the *Philosophy* rubric of the journal, after all—what is the most striking is the normative tone of the paper. The author presents an idealized image of “how a cultured family interacts” and, based on responses to questionnaires and other data, points out various issues in family relationships. Even within the normative image of “how a good family should look like”, Pahopol still challenges what is regarded as a “traditional” model of a family, speaking, instead, of a “cultured”, “egalitarian”, and “democratic” one—describing it and proposing it as desirable. So, the voice of “the one who recommends a model”, “the one who offers something as *this-is-what-it-should-ideally-look-like*”.

The second 1992 issue of the *Journal of Philosophy and Law* includes four articles published under the rubric *Philosophy*. The first of these, signed by Petru M. Rumleaschi and Vasile A. Țapoc, bears the title *Fundamental Principles of Human Knowledge and Their Role in Scientific Creation*. I will quote the abstract, originally in English:

The article deals with the essence of the basic principles of the human knowledge applied both to scientific and non-scientific knowledge. The role of the reflection, activity and continuity principles as well as dialectic opposition in the human

creation is researched. These principles, according to the authors' opinion, are sufficient for the scientific system analysis of creation in the limits of the general theory of creation. (Rumleaschi & Țapoc 1992: 11)

The paper contains a general account of what the authors call “the principle of reflection”, “the principle of activity”, and “the principle of continuity”, presented as “fundamental principles of knowledge”. We can notice the schematism of Rumleaschi and Țapoc's attempt, as well as the ambition to present “*the* fundamental principles of human knowledge” (the definite article shows the degree of conviction about these three “principles” and their status) *and* how they are applied to “scientific creation” in an 8-page paper. In a sense, an attempt like this one expresses a deeply-seated confidence in what philosophy can accomplish, and, again, a confidence in the philosopher's *knowledge*. The voice of this paper is one that *states how things are*, with an optimistic epistemology and with confidence in its own abilities—almost surprising for a newly-“freed” field, like philosophy was perceived to be at that moment.

The second paper published in this issue is authored by the Romanian academic Alexandru Boboc—*Philosophy and Value System in the “Enlightenment” Culture* (Boboc 1992). As a paper by a Romanian author, referring to the Enlightenment message and its reception in the Romanian space, it would say very little about the formation of a post-Soviet Moldovan philosophical voice. Its publication can be regarded more as a rekindling of historical connections.¹ The publication of a Romanian colleague's work is intended to illustrate, if we refer to A. Babii's manifesto / program that I previously analyzed, a way of relating to the heritage, being itself a symbolic way of reclaiming (by Moldovans) the Romanian heritage.

Gheorghe Bobână's paper, “*Pro fide et patria*” in *Petru Movilă's View* (Bobână 1992), illustrates the same attitude: a way of reclaiming as “Moldovan philosophical heritage” the work of Petru Movilă / Peter Mogila, regarded here as an author relevant for Moldovan / Romanian philosophy. The paper focuses on a historical description of Mogila's work, presenting his advocacy for equal rights for Orthodox, Catholic, and other Christian denominations. The paper itself is, together with Boboc's, a way of fulfilling Babii's program of a version of doing history of philosophy focusing on “reclaiming a heritage” neglected during the Soviet era—both from a thematic point of view *and* because the historical figure itself was contested. The discursive posture, as in Boboc's case, is that of the philosopher as *reader* and *expositor* of previous material, maybe with a tinge of evaluation—emphasizing the “importance” of what was said by the authors they analyze.

The final paper (in Russian) published in this issue is I. F. Sârbu's *Some Philosophical Problems of General Ecology* (Sârbu 1992). The philosophical voice / posture is closer to Rumleaschi and Țapoc's in the same issue: presenting a “new” topic—ecology in this case—*without any explicit reference to Marxist dogma*, speaking, in 10 pages, about “general ecology”, “human ecology”, and “social ecology”, and “what should these

¹ Moldovans being ethnic Romanians and speaking Romanian—a fact that was denied / questioned during the Soviet times; publishing a Romanian author is clearly intended as a way of recreating a bridge between the Romanian culture and the post-Soviet Moldovan one.

disciplines focus on / study”. We can notice, again, a certain confidence that the author *knows* what the task is for a discipline—and casually presents it for their readers. A deeply-seated enthusiasm and confidence in the possibility of a philosophical discourse marks, thus, the philosophical voices of the first two 1992 issues: it is possible to say what “should” be the case, how reality “should” look like, and what philosophy “should” do. And, at least for the history of philosophy, the initial task is clear and already assumed: reclaiming the neglected “heritage”.

The third 1992 issue of the *Journal of Philosophy and Law* marks a slight change in philosophical voice—the appearance of a more polemic tone, with explicit reference to a set of values that is “supported”, “defended”, or “promoted”. The first example of this is a paper by Alexandru Roșca—*Man as a Subject of Social Action* (Roșca 1992). Roșca starts from the idea that, in the Soviet times, “man” was neglected, leading to the phenomenon of *homo sovieticus* and to a certain lack of creativity. According to him,

... we need a fundamentally new point of view on the problem of relations between man and society, a realistic approach of the interaction between the social determinants and the personal factor, between the objective conditions and human subjectivity, between objectifying and subjectifying acts in the social process. (Roșca 1992: 6)

We can notice, again, a construction of the voice of the philosopher as “the one who knows what we need” – and using classic dichotomies to frame his view of the situation. This scheme leads Roșca to say, at a later point in the paper,

Leaving behind the old univocal approaches, that instituted the absolute priority of society over personality, of the collectivity over the individual, it is important to not turn altogether in the direction of a totalitarian Robinson, of a mad individualism, of the man stuck in his existence and thrown in the opposite direction. It is necessary to not pass from the individual’s depersonalization in the conditions of the old norms to the disintegration and annihilation of society as a result of its reckless transformation. (Roșca 1992: 9)

The philosopher becomes here “the warning voice”, the one who is anticipating possibilities of a “dark future” if “we” decide “recklessly” to go to the “other extreme” than the Soviet collectivist way of being. The *topoi* that the philosopher is using for creating a persuasive effect are actually typical for propaganda: painting something in dark colors by using evocative language: “totalitarian Robinson”, “mad individualism”, imagining even the “disintegration and annihilation of society”, whatever this might mean, as something possible if “we” turn towards “mad individualism”. The philosopher as a voice presenting a dark future *unless “we” do what he is saying*—and what he is saying involves *not leaving behind what was “good” about Soviet times in jumping towards a new mode of being without questioning it at first*.

The next article of this issue, by Lidia Trofăilă, *Divergences in the Family: Social-Psychological Aspect* (Trofăilă 1992) continues the ambiguity of (Pahopol 1992): a paper published under the rubric *Philosophy*, but presenting itself more like a social science one. The paper presents, on the basis on questionnaires, sources of conflicts in 25 couples and proposes ways to “neutralize divergences”, such as:

- Neglecting the non-essential divergences, because their sharpening in unwanted situations could create misunderstandings between the spouses, would create conflict situations;
- Both spouses' effort to help each other in self-perfection, in the tendency to solve all their divergences with benevolence, without hurting personal dignity;
- Emphasizing, in any situation, the best, the essential in the spouse's behavior (Trofăilă 1992: 15).

Leaving aside one more time the question of whether this is “philosophy proper”, and the content itself, we notice, again, that the voice embodied in this paper is presenting a certain behavior as “desirable”, thus, construing itself as “the voice of one who knows how things should be”.

A different kind of questioning voice appears in a paper written in Russian by V. I. Anikin, *Metamorphoses of Social Justice (The Humanistic Aspect)* (Anikin 1992). The context in which the paper is written is put in the following way:

Currently, we claim, everyday practice proposes as a primordial task redefining the concept itself of social justice, its turning towards the human, towards his nature, interest, and necessities. (Anikin 1992: 16)

We notice, again, the language of “tasks” imposed by “reality”—the philosopher being presented implicitly as the one who *notices* the current reality and can formulate the task deriving from it. Then, Anikin continues:

First of all, the powerful pressure of collectivist ideology affected human individuality itself, the social essence of the human was unjustifiably overvalued, his biological necessity was not taken into account, and neither were his personal interests and necessities, which led, in the end, to a levelling of individuality.

As we know, attention to personality, its interests and feelings, in official science were equated with the so-called bourgeois individualism and almost with a betrayal of the proletarian cause. Thus, for decades, according to the authorities' decree, the biological essence of man was gradually excluded from the masses' consciousness, and in the relation between biological individuality and social justice the first was basically ignored.

But, in the end, people could not stop themselves from asking: how can one live in harmony with the community (the collective, the society) without being in harmony with oneself, or how can one be a natural part of a whole if you are not an autonomous cell of that whole? (Anikin 1992: 17).

The philosophical posture here is different from all the papers that we saw previously. First of all, it lacks the pretense of a special kind of “knowing”: the knowing belongs to a “we”—a community of people who can notice. The philosopher's reflection is not about a special knowledge, more about questioning something that was taken for granted. Due to various conditions, it stopped being taken for granted and the community itself started questioning it—so the philosopher deepens this questioning and examines *what were the conditions that made the “we” take it for granted*, and *what were the conditions that led to its stopping being taken for granted*. In the process, the meaning of the concept

itself (“social justice”, in this case) is questioned. The orientation towards the (then recent) past is critical; Anikin presents the general attitude of the Soviet times as problematic. But, at the same time, he points out the critique as something that arose *naturally* for people who start questioning. Here, the philosopher as “the one who takes up reflectively a line of questioning *already present* in the society and *deepens it*” makes their appearance.

The last article published in 1992 in the *Journal* inaugurates a new rubric, responding to Babii’s initial program: *From the Philosophical Heritage*. The paper is coauthored by A. Babii and Emil T. Vrabie (Babii & Vrabie 1992) and appears under the title *A Study Worthy of Attention*. In the logic of “reclaiming heritage”, it is the first republishing of an article by a 19th Century Moldovan philosopher, Alexandru Scarlat Sturdza, *Ideal and Imitation in Fine Arts*, with a short introduction where a biography of the author is presented, together with the assessment of Sturdza’s “ideas”. The authors don’t hesitate to call some of them “justified” and others “mistaken”, but they claim that the justified ones “constitute, compared to the ideas of his predecessors, something new in Russian and Moldovan aesthetic thinking and, as such, they deserve to be studied and known. A part of them did not lose their actuality even in our days” (Babii & Vrabie 1992: 32). We can see here the logic of “heritage” operating: a *given* text of the past is presented as *having something new to say* compared to other texts. The fact itself of *newness* is one reason for studying it, the other being *its relevance for contemporaneity*. The value of the text depends, in the eyes of a historian of philosophy who operates in the logic of “heritage”, on both of these, to which, implicitly, *previous neglect of that text* or the *risk of its not being brought to the attention of the public* is added. What is asked for by the title itself of the presentation is *attention*—the fact of reading it, presumably, and maybe engaging with its ideas. The presence of the adjective “worthy” functions as a proposal for the potential readers to *read it and engage with it*—and the reasons why it is considered “worthy of attention” are presented in the short study that accompanies the republication. The main one remains implicit: it is “ours”, it can be claimed by “us”. So, a new philosophical posture: the philosopher / historian of philosophy that *finds in the past of a community something that they consider worthy of attention for the present audience, republishes it, and comments on what makes it worthy*.

Generalizing, on the basis of this reading, we find, in 1992, three main philosophical voices / postures:

1. The philosopher as the one who “knows what should be done / what will happen / what is *really* happening” and presents their “answer” as normative for the audience.
2. The philosopher as reflective questioner / one who takes up a line of questioning present in society and deepens it.
3. The philosopher as a researcher of the “heritage”, finding bits and pieces that were neglected and that can be reclaimed as “ours” and relevant for the present— and republishing and commenting on them.

2007: The Great Value Controversy

2007 is the year that marked a change in the name of the *Journal of Philosophy and Law*: it became *Journal of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science*—partly in order to proclaim publicly the autonomy of social science and political science, which, as we saw in papers published in 1992, were then still institutionally associated with philosophy and gained “independence” initially through their own rubrics, then through being included in the title of the journal. “Law” disappeared from the title, since the Law department was merged with the History Institute (an institutional move reversed in 2013). At the same time, the “new” journal claimed the “heritage” of the *Journal of Philosophy and Law*: it was edited by part of the previous institutional team, and the same authors continued to publish there. The first difference is the variety of rubrics: the rubric *Philosophy* continues to be the main one for philosophers, but, together with it, philosophy papers by PhD students are published, together with papers by PhD students studying other disciplines, in the rubric *Research Reports*; the *Heritage* rubric, inaugurated in 1992, continues; conference reviews appears in the rubric *Scientific Life*. Alongside, there are special rubrics for *Political Science* and *Social Science*.

The first philosophy paper published in the first 2007 issue of the new incarnation of the journal was Lidia Troianowski’s *Aesthetic values: Globalization Versus Universality* (Troianowski, 2007a). The paper presents itself as a critique of postmodernity in art, citing, among others, authors like Michel Butor or Ihab Hassan:

The inventory of particular resources of globalization culture shows not only a crisis of aesthetical-moral and artistic values, but of emotions, feelings, spirit as well; what is lately claimed to be called art has the mission of triggering indignation, discouraging the elevated audience, educated on the basis of classic works. The crisis that we are reflecting about affected radically all artistic genres, but we attest the most serious consequences in literature, theater, cinematography, painting. Today one is not shocked when one hears as *ultima ratio* about an exhibition that painting, as an artistic genre, is stuck in the past.

Assessing the situation in the field of literature—a genre meant to inform, analyze, cultivate, promote ideals, given that poetry, novels create for the reader the real chance to penetrate fields where the most sensitive human feelings, emotions, and aspirations are dealt with, we observe a crisis situation. Although, through the complex tools that it has, literature, more than other genres, is able to teach love, consideration, respect for tradition, nation, homeland, the last hour creations of a lot of local artists, and not only them, create the impression of being meant to deny these qualities, because a simple monitoring of the titles of works by prose writers like St. Baştovoi and A. Vakulovski [the author refers to A. Vakulovski’s 2002 debut novel, *Pizdeţ*, titled with a Russian vernacular analogous in function to the English *Oh fuck* – A. C.] create an aesthetic-moral discomfort due to indecent, licentious, vulgar language. Thus, one just has to resign oneself with the thought that we can learn patriotism, love, respect for values only from the works of classics like Eminescu, Eliade, Iorga, Blaga, Goethe, Shakespeare, etc., works that even after 300-400 years will remain an unsurpassed model, always actual and valid. (Troianowski, 2007a: 52)

The tone of this paper illustrates a stance that, in the late 1990s-early 2000s, was widespread in the Moldovan cultural establishment—a rejection of “postmodernism”, identified with denial of “traditional values”. So, the author’s voice becomes that of a *cultural critic*—the philosopher as the one who criticizes the “rotten present” in the name of “eternal values”. The author identifies herself with the “elevated audience”, educated on the basis of a “classical canon”, and rejects what creates a visceral reaction of “indignation” due to not “promoting” the values the author identifies with. So, another nuance is present in the critique of “postmodernity”: the voice of the philosopher as “defender” of a cultural corpus and of the values it expresses, in the face of what they perceive as disturbing. The conservative agenda is obvious.

The same topic is continued—but with a different attitude—in Silvia Șaptefrați’s paper *The Status of Value in Postmodernism* (Șaptefrați 2007). Șaptefrați has a more sympathetic view towards postmodernism, and, after a tour through Nietzsche, Scheler, Derrida, Vattimo, Bauman, she states:

Because the hierarchy of values is individual and spontaneous, Max Scheler’s attempt to accomplish an absolute hierarchy of values failed. In the postmodern condition, that rears up both when confronted with definitions and with immutable criteria of classification and hierarchies, such an attempt is meaningless. (Șaptefrați 2007: 60)

And she continues—a position that I think is worth mentioning both in the context of both the previous paper in the issue (Troianwoski 2007a) and the one that follows (Capcelea 2007a):

... an axiological disagreement is neither fatal, nor solvable, representing an inevitable consequence of a pluralistic society. (Șaptefrați 2007: 61)

Thus, Șaptefrați’s claim—and the basic orientation of the philosophical voice she is inhabiting—is one of *quietist noticing of an impossibility*, while attuned to present conditions. The impossibility of reaching a consensus about a hierarchy of values is not decried but presented as “the way things are now”. In these conditions, she does not hesitate to formulate a normative proposal anyway, but with a different rationale:

Neglecting spiritual values inevitably leads to a flattening of axiological competence. [...] Authentic values are not given once and for all, they require a continuous effort of sensitization and understanding [...]. Thus, educationally, the family, society, and educational institutions have to join their efforts, acting not through imposing values, but indirectly, through stimulating axiological necessities, so that young people would seek values, would intuit them, take them up and, ultimately, aspire to create new values. (Șaptefrați 2007: 62)

The normative aspect of Șaptefrați’s proposal is not related to a *concrete type of value*, but to a kind of sensitivity to values *as such*, which, she claims, is needed because without cultivating it something essential about being a human is lost. The voice itself is much more nuanced than others: the voice of “someone who notices” and claims that the deepest problematic issue is not in what *others* think is the substantive issue (“axiological disagreement”), but in something that lies beyond simple disagreement between supporters of one camp or another. Again in contrast to others, the “call to action”, or the

“task” is not a positive program, but cultivating a type of sensitivity. The voice of the philosopher as *unbothered* by what bothers others so much as to enter debates and looking at issues that lie beyond the usual (positive) subject of debates—the philosopher as a *contemplative quietist*.

In contrast to Şaptefraţi, and closer ideologically and structurally to Troianowski, Valeriu Capcelea’s paper (the last one published in the rubric *Philosophy* of this issue) *The Philosophical Dimension of the Category “Tradition” and Its Social Functions* (Capcelea 2007a) presents itself as an unapologetic defense of “tradition” and “traditional values” in the face of the “foreign influence”—both the Soviet past and the contemporary cosmopolitanism. I will quote an excerpt that illustrates these attitudes:

The volume of information contained in the national traditions creates optimal conditions for the assimilation by the young generation of the being, history, and behavioral norms of the people it is a part of. But the nihilistic and indifferent attitude towards the traditions of our people, promoted for decades by the totalitarian regime, determined the rise of a generation that is indifferent to its own past, to historical heritage, to the Homeland [...]. As a consequence, the urgency of the issue of maintaining national memory, continuity of generations, of their solidarity, which would exclude the current tensions, divergences, and antagonisms. A special, and very important place in solving this problem belongs to national traditions, which can help with the reorientation of individual consciousness from cultural values that are foreign to the local environment towards the national memory and the traditional cultural values of our people [...]. Only in this case the socialization process can be efficient, because it will be determined by the experience distilled due to traditions, traditional methods of child rearing (Capcelea, 2007a: 70–71).

Beyond the ideological commitments and the far-right language I would prefer to not comment on, the philosophical position / voice that the author is inhabiting is one of “defender” of what is perceived as “traditional heritage”, proposing a clear normative program and insisting that “only in this case” the future would look bright. So, with the voice nuances that we also saw in other articles, the philosopher as a “critic of the present”, “defender of values”, and “knower of the way out of the present predicament”.

The philosophy paper published in the *Research Reports* rubric – belonging to Alexe Rău, the late director of the National Library of Moldova, a poet and essayist interested in philosophy that decided to study for a PhD late in his life – bears the title *Writing as Daseinogram* (Rău 2007: 87–95). The paper reads like a free-form essay (much more so than any of the papers previously analyzed here), filled with references to Heidegger, Derrida, Bergson, Borges, Plato, A. de Muralt, Merleau-Ponty—mostly names relevant for the continental / phenomenological tradition. The author follows the trail of a basic metaphor:

Traces of beings are a codified information about these beings. Just as we research other living beings based on the tracks they leave in nature, writing can be considered, as well, the trace left by Dasein during its spiritual path, the trace that speaks mostly about the invisible of the human being and about its transcendental dimension (just as a cardiogram shows / tells us almost everything about the heart

without seeing the latter). Writing can thus be also considered as a kind of cardiogram of the less- or not seen part of being, of spirit. Writing is a daseinogram, and the book and the library are, in this sense, a daseinoscope, a being-graph. (Rău 2007: 89)

In reading this excerpt, we can notice a clear commitment to a Heideggerian / Derridean-inspired vocabulary and at least an attempt to “follow” them in disclosing a field that is personally interesting for the author. So an “essayistic” voice of the philosopher as one exploring a topic by using resources offered by the philosophical tradition to which they are committed. One thing that can be emphasized about the paper is that this wholly different kind of voice appears as the voice of a PhD student publishing in the *Research Reports* rubric—of someone exploring a topic and a way of writing about it, not someone who presents their text as a “paper”. We will encounter this kind of innovative voice in other papers published in the same rubric.

The paper published in the *Heritage* rubric, a stable one already in the journal, belongs to Gheorghe Bobâna, and it is called *Mircea Eliade and the Romanian Axiological Identity*. It operates in the same logic of “heritage”, proposed by A. Babii in the first 1992 issue of the journal: taking the work of a philosopher and *reclaiming* it as belonging in some way to the space of Moldovan philosophy (explicitly perceived as part of the Romanian cultural space) and as relevant to the present moment. The text consists, mainly, in presenting Eliade’s theses on Romanian axiological identity. I will quote an excerpt in order to show how Bobâna is doing it:

The history of Romanians, as Mircea Eliade notices, does not know long periods of quiet: this is why the creative spirit could not manifest unless intermittently on the plane of written, scholarly culture. It manifests itself continuously and inexhaustibly only in the popular spiritual creation: only it reveals the constants of Romanian genius (Bobâna 2007: 133).

The voice present here is one of the historian of philosophy operating in the “heritage” logic—the voice of someone who reads and retells something which is part of a tradition they could claim, for various reasons, as “ours”, and most of the time subscribes to what they are retelling. The tone is self-effacing: in the paraphrase, for full paragraphs sometimes, there is no clear boundary between the voice of the quoted author and the voice of the one who is writing *now*—it is almost as if they merge into a single voice. A living philosopher borrowing their own voice to a dead one, deemed “worthy of attention”.

Another take on the heritage logic is present in an article by Lidia Troianwoski published in the *Scientific Life* rubric of the journal (Troianowski, 2007b: 136–139)—a conference review of a symposium dedicated to Mircea Eliade’s 100th anniversary. According to her,

A retrospective of the papers presented by the participants in the symposium shows us Mircea Eliade as one of the most representative figures of modernity; in this temporal span, few could compete with him: a person with an enviable intellectual level that made history, tradition, and religion rhyme; he valorized things, phenomena, views, emotions, and feelings that are worthy of consideration

and which he offered, as a compensation and, simultaneously, with dignity, to future generations. (Troianowski 2007b: 136)

What one can hear in such an account of the conference—the attitude claimed to be expressed by *all* the papers presented, and which is also transparent in the author's own writing—sounds almost like *ancestor worship*, and can be paraphrased, slightly tongue-in-cheek, as: „We have this great figure in our past, and (almost) no one can compete with it; it is *ours*, and it expresses something meaningful *for us*; moreover, it left us a heritage that we cherish and which we gathered to celebrate.”

The second 2007 issue of the *Journal of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science* includes five philosophy papers—for of them, signed by PhDs, published in the rubric *Philosophy*, and one, by a PhD student—in the *Research Reports* section.

The first philosophy paper published in this issue is Arcadi Ursul's *Third Millennium Law: Methodological Aspects* (Ursul 2007a), written in Russian. Focusing on the concept of “sustainable development”, that he abbreviates using the initials of the words (SD), Ursul suggests that this concept has to become a central one for lawmakers, helping bridge “ecological” worries with a new vision of the state and of law. I will quote a passage:

It is important to take into account the fact that any national law about SD has to be fundamentally different from any law that is already adopted or in the process of being adopted. It will signify a further step away from the traditional anthropocentric view the law system to a new, social-natural system, that was already started through the creation of ecologic law as a juridical way of realizing the ecological function of the state. The law will also have its own specific object of juridical regulation. Unlike ecological law, it has to give a juridical explanation not only to the ecological function of the state, but also to its other functions, from the point of view of their accomplishing of SD principles. Thus, it deals not just with an ‘ecological expansion’ of the framework of juridical regulation, but a law that, fundamentally, will become a trampoline between ecological law and all the other compartments of law and would ‘transform’ all other laws that were already passed. Thus, ecological law has an important role in ‘transitioning’ contemporary law to the future SD law. [...] The ecological function of law, in the concepts, principles, and rules of law, has to become a unitary whole with other aspects of SD. (Ursul 2007: 12)

The paper illustrates the discursive position of the philosopher as an “unsolicited advisor” for lawmakers proposing a new legal framework and fundamental concepts for it to work under the guise of an analysis. The voice of the philosopher affirms this discursive position through a kind of confidence in what he is saying, expressed through the imperative mood, and the supposed discerning of the future signification of laws of the type he is describing. The shift towards a form of law based on sustainable development is presented as a desirable one, and the philosopher—as its lobbyist, one who understands why it should be adopted, what are its meaning and fundamental concepts, what is the relation between this proposed lawmaking paradigm and previous ones, etc. Presenting oneself in such a way, the philosopher becomes *an expert figure*, working on the assumption of philosophy as a *special kind of knowledge* that justifies one in saying “what is important” and “what has to be done”.

The second paper included in this issue is Ana Pascaru's *Relation and Motivation in Social Values Conditioning* (Pascaru 2007). The author proposes an analysis of the relation between social change and values, in the context of the post-Soviet societies and their increased openness to other cultures. According to the author, the post-Soviet transition generated a certain lack of sensitivity to transformations / changes that were already taking place, leading to what she considers confused decisions and actions. Like other papers published in the same year—and as the title shows—values are a fundamental concept for this paper too:

... beyond the theoretical debates about national values as an element of the general-human ones, in the community environment there are various perturbations of the value circuit in the dynamics between national and general-human values, and quite often non-values tend to substitute values. Moreover, the crisis of values overlaps with the other crises to which communities are subjected, a fact that facilitates the imposition of non-values in the behavior and actions of the members of society. (Pascaru 2007: 16)

Or

The values of the majority ethnicity did not manage to become the attraction center for the national minorities and to ensure the communication between national values and the general-human ones. (Pascaru 2007: 18)

The predominance of the values discourse—and the attribution of values to a group / community (“a national minority”, “a nation”, or even “general human values” as attributed to “humanity as such”)—in the philosophical papers published in the *Journal* might be read as an attempt to find a topic which would not be claimed by other disciplines, a place that a philosopher could inhabit comfortably and, at the same time, speak to what they consider relevant for the society. Addressing the question of values becomes, thus, a way for philosophers to present themselves *as philosophers* while speaking about social issues. With the exception of (Șaptefrați 2007), Moldovan philosophers working on this topic present themselves as *knowing what is a “true” value, able to make a difference between “value” and “non-value”*, and propose hierarchies of values.

A similar attitude towards values is expressed in a continuation of (Troianowski 2007a)—*Aesthetic Values: Globalization Versus Universality (II)* (Troianowski 2007c). The author continues her diatribe against postmodernism, using an accusatory rhetorical move:

Having its roots in the proto-fascist philosophy of M. Heidegger, postmodernism adopts with nonchalance the idea of a lack of moral truth and of truth in general. Oriented towards destructing traditional normative systems and laws, a flagrant violation of canons, excelling in its already compromised intent of modeling the world and emphasizing the negative in the plane of reason, postmodernism destroys hierarchies, generating/encouraging chaos and grotesque. This phenomenon criticizes traditional values, rationalism, humanism, historicism, it denies the personality's possibility of being responsible for its own acts, decisions, and behavior, and the human individual's capacity to oppose the social-political and ideological stereotypes. In opposition with the traditional and with

modernism, postmodernism insistently postulates the importance of freeing oneself from the force of power, discharging norms, rules, social dependence, with skepticism, relativism, and nihilist tendencies being its peremptory particularities. On this ground, we consider that postmodernism has to be viewed as a diagnosis of contemporary culture, not as its actual state. (Troianowski 2007c: 22)

Again, we see the philosopher in the role of “cultural critic” and “defender of values” in face of their “destruction” by “postmodernism”. We can notice the medicalized language, like in the phrase “postmodernism as diagnosis”; or the implicit accusation of totalitarianism, when the claim is made that postmodernism has its roots in the “proto-fascist philosophy of M. Heidegger”, which is a way of claiming that something of its “proto-fascist” character has been “inherited”; and the fact that the author is deploring the loss / destruction of “traditional values” and the “uniformization” of artistic products in mass culture. In a sense, this “defense of values” is also functioning in the logic of heritage: heritage itself (“traditional values”, “traditional normative systems and laws”) is deemed as “that which needs to be protected” from the threat of its destruction through the attitude of a break with tradition, identified with postmodernism (oddly opposed in this to modernism—also as a rhetorical move; both traditionalism and modernism are deemed acceptable, while postmodernism should be, according to the author, regarded as a diagnosis).

Valeriu Capcelea, in his paper *Functions of Social Norms* (Capcelea 2007b), proposes a review of functions of social norms, trying to construct a “systemic picture” of them, proposing a series of theses on how social norms work and their functions. A representative excerpt:

Social norms as means and forms of expressing deontic representations and reflecting the deontic sphere of social consciousness determine the fact that personality development happens in a deontic situation. Personality development happens in a situation of interactions and communication. Any interaction and communication is ensured, regulated, grounded by the system of social norms, realizing these processes depending on various functions of social norms. Social norms in general and norms of a social group, in particular, ensure the existence, functionality of the group, the inclusion of the individual in that group, in the process and mechanisms of its interaction. The norms of the social group are used not only for regulating the intrinsic behavior and contacts, interactions, and interpersonal relations, but also for transforming interpersonal interactions in a normative behavior in that group, community, or society. (Capcelea, 2007b: 36).

In this paper, the voice is, again, that of the philosopher-as-expert—as the one who *knows, due to their special background, how things really operate*—and tries to present a picture of it to their readers. The author’s own commitments, encouraging the perpetuation of certain forms of social behavior, become “desirable outcomes” and “functions of social norms”.

The last philosophy paper published in the second issue for 2007 is included in the *Research Reports* rubric and belongs to the PhD student Carolina Cheianu: *Criteria for a Classification and Hierarchy of Values in Tudor Vianu and Lucian Blaga* (Cheianu 2007). The author reviews, in the first page of her paper, various ideas about value classification,

and then focuses on two 20th Century Romanian philosophers—Tudor Vianu and Lucian Blaga¹—and their theories about values. The tone that the authors adopts is one of *speaking with* explicitly accepting the point of view of the author she is treating and stating it approvingly. I will quote an example:

Proposing a series of criteria for grouping values, Vianu proves that each value is inscribed in a rational system of coordination, that indicates clearly the place they occupy in a values hierarchy. A value can be real or personal, material or spiritual, free or adhering to its concrete support, persevering or amplifying through its meaning and echo in the desired subject's consciousness. According to these criteria, the philosopher characterizes each category of values in an equivalent succession. Approaching the topic of value structures, together with the great philosopher T. Vianu, we seek the answer to the fundamental axiological problem, i. e. *what is the nature of values?* According to him, values do not become to an absolute rationality, because they are an object of desire and encompass in their interiority elements that surpass the sphere of rationality. The philosopher recognizes that inside the rational sphere of each value its irrational nucleus is hiding. This means that deep inside values there are particular elements that can be reduced to general factors. The nucleus of values is unclassifiable. This nucleus ensures the unicity and irreducibility of each value. Thus it can be explained why two types of values, apparently similar—the moral value and the religious one – profoundly differ in their essence. (Cheianu 2007: 141)

I should mention that the paper also operates in the heritage logic: the two Romanian philosophers the author is writing about are regarded as elements of heritage—supposed to be reintegrated into the Moldovan philosophical scene *as part of what was neglected / insufficiently studied*. The voice is, again, one of a reverent adherent: “approaching the topic... together with the great philosopher... according to him”.

The third 2007 issue of the *Journal of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science* included four philosophy papers—two of them, by already established researchers, published in the *Philosophy* section, and two papers by PhD students.

The first paper published in the *Philosophy* rubric is a continuation of (Ursul 2007a)—*Third Millennium Law: Methodological Aspects (II)* (Ursul 2007b). The author argues that, for sustainable development, a reconceptualization of fundamental concepts of law is needed, and he tries to point out aspects of this reconceptualization. The voice he is constructing is, once again, that of the philosopher as expert—the possessor of a specific kind of knowledge that enables the seeing of *what is needed now*, and the offering of a response to it—a suggestion of “what needs to be changed” in the light of what was noticed.

The second paper is Vasile Guțu's *Eloquence and Argumentation in Plato* (Guțu 2007). It should be mentioned that, out of all the papers published in the *Philosophy* rubric of the journal in the years analyzed in the current article (Guțu, 2007), is the only one that

¹ Both of them are influential aestheticians and literary figures too.

mentions a non-Moldovan philosopher in the title.¹ In this paper, the philosopher positions himself not just as someone who reclaims *the local heritage*, but someone who does *history of (universal) philosophy as such*. The paper starts with an overview of the Ancient Greek social context that led to interest in argumentation and rhetoric, passing then to Plato's work. The author analyzes the explicit attitude about rhetoricians and sophists in dialogues like *Gorgias* or *The Sophist*, proposing then an analysis of the Socratic method of dialogue itself, with an emphasis on its "purification" function, and ending with a positive appraisal of the role of sophists as those who pioneered the study of argumentation and an argumentative ethos:

An especially important role of the Hellenic sophists is the fact that they shattered the grounds of the traditional, dogmatic thinking, whose pillars were considered the authorities of the time. Sophists were not in the least satisfied with the responses of authorities or with dogmatic interpretations. They were requesting that an orator's claims be proven, be argued for, and theoretically grounded. All these contributed to an enlivening of thinking, contributed to an escape from the lethargic state of dogmatic thinking. (Guțu 2007: 19)

This is the first appearance, in the *Journal*, of a philosophical voice that does history of philosophy *with no explicit problematization of "contemporary issues"*, operating outside the logic of heritage and outside the values controversy, proposing a partial reading of classic texts and an appraisal of an avowed anti-traditionalist movement.

The two philosophy papers by PhD students published in the *Research Reports* section are also atypical, compared to the rest of the papers. The first of them, by Nicolae Bodean, bears the title *The Role of the Economic Factor in the Creation and Manifestation of Nation and Nationalism* (Bodean 2007) and it attempts to analyze, from a political economy point of view, the influence of various factors on the rise of nations and nationalism since the 19th Century. The voice continues to be one of the philosopher as an expert—constructing an authority through stating "facts" and proposing explanations—but the difference from other papers consists in the fact that the discursive position is a consciously *theoretical* one, not one of a "defender of values" or of "counselor":

In order to explain why individuals want to engage in nationalist activities, we will start from the following matters of fact: first—most participants in nationalist activities claim that living together with other nationalities presents challenges or prevents the nation's self-expression, destroying its identity; second—sometimes national groups seem to accept "cohabitating" with other national groups only if they hold "power", lead the country; third—sometimes people sacrifice their wealth and life in their fight for national identity and power. (Bodean 2007: 101)

So, at least in part, the philosophical voice is one of *noticing, stating* what can be regarded as obvious—in order to formulate an explanation from a theoretical position. One thing a reader can notice is the presence of qualifications like "most" or

¹ Papers mentioning Romanian / Moldovan philosophers like Sturdza, Eliade, Vianu, and Blaga appeared, during the years analyzed in the present paper, in other rubrics—either *Heritage*, or the PhD students' *Research Reports*

“sometimes”—even if, in other places, the author returns to a more confident voice, speaking in terms of “direct consequence of...” and “only if”:

The nationalization of economic policy was a direct consequence of the extension of national aspirations for the benefit of the whole population. An international order would have been compatible with the national order only if the economy was apolitical. When attention to social aspects substituted the concept of *laissez faire*, the global single economy was substituted by a multitude of national economies, each nation being preoccupied with the welfare of its own members. (Bodean 2007: 98)

Another PhD student publishing in that year is Andrei Perciun, who authored a paper called *Philosophical Considerations Regarding a Noema of Photographic Image* (Perciun 2007: 104–110). The main part of the paper is a reading of Roland Barthes’ *Camera Lucida*—focusing on a single work being an atypical discursive strategy for most of the papers that we analyzed. Another atypical thing that can be noticed is the fact that the work analyzed belongs to a 20th Century foreign author. Moreover, it is the only paper that presents quotes in the original language (French), without translation:

Barthes tries to measure the degree of verisimilarity of the visual image by analyzing in detail a photography in which his aged mother is represented. Barthes’ game is interpretatively involved in vectorial reasoning about time. Presentifying an un-lived past, the paradox of an un-owned one’s own is reached: “Ce n’était pas elle, et pourtant ce n’était personne d’autre”. At the same time, the perceived image remains particularly true, and generally false; differentiating itself in order to recognize identity, the photographic image remains inessential under the aspect of present reality. The visual image’s challenge focuses on the “as if” moment, akin to the definition of a dream. This induces to the gullible consciousness a tempting adventure that unfolds between a knowing and a seeing of reality. Knowing, in the true sense of the word, gradually dissolves, with a serious exuberance, in a circular game of time, reality, and being. Thus, Godard’s formula is reached, “Pas une image juste, juste une image”, where the visual image moves away from the seemingly so desired scientific truth. (Perciun 2007: 108)

The discursive position inhabited by the voice is that of a *reflective reader*: a reader that engages with the text, quotes and paraphrases it, trying to grasp *what is it about* and *as what its topic is presented*: a first attempt to use another’s thinking as the medium for engaging with a topic, in this case—the status of the photographic image.

Generalizing about the papers published in 2007, we can notice a first distinction between *established researchers* and *PhD students*, a difference of topics and of discursive strategies they use. Most of the papers published in the *Philosophy* section dealt, in one way or another, with the topic of values, and most of the authors assumed an already given hierarchy of values and the role of “defenders of the tradition” (with the notable exception of the more relativist and quietist Şaptefraţi), operating in the logic of “heritage” and extending it from reclaiming authors of the past to maintaining the “values heritage of the nation”. At the same time, out of the papers by PhD students, published in the *Research Reports* section, two of them deal with 20th Century European philosophy, and are written either with an essayistic tone, or from the position of reflectively engaging

with a single work; one of them consciously assumes a *theoretical* position—political economy—and tries to make sense of “noticed matters of fact” from its perspective; and one is integrated both in the “heritage discourse” and in the “values discourse”, trying to *speak together* with the “great philosophers included in the heritage” and to present their ideas about values to a contemporary audience.

“Heritage”: continuity and breaks

After these two synchronic analyses—focusing on two key years of the *Journal of Philosophy and...*, the year of its first independent publication in a newly independent country (1992), as *Journal of Philosophy and Law*, and the year of the change of its title in *Journal of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science* (2007), the possibility for a few more general reflections arises.

First, the program proposed in (Babii 1992)—the idea of “reclaiming heritage” as the main impetus for a new way of doing history of philosophy in a post-communist context—was enormously fruitful, and it was adopted by a number of authors who continue to publish in the journal for decades, and by their PhD students as well. Its first applications arose in 1992 through reclaiming “forgotten figures” of “Moldovan philosophy”, such like A. S. Sturdza or P. Mogila, in a double attempt: to present their work to a contemporary audience *and* to position them as “our own precursors”. In 2007, the main field for “reclaiming” was already that of 20th Century Romanian philosophy. Due to the fact that the official cultural policy in Soviet Moldova was to deny its participation in the Romanian culture and its belonging to the Romanian linguistic and cultural space, figures like M. Eliade, T. Vianu, L. Blaga (to mention only those to whom studies were dedicated in the *Journal*) were considered taboo. Even if, in Romania, a multitude of studies touching on them appeared, and they continued to be read even during the years the Romanian communist regime was forbidding them, they were virtually unknown to the Moldovan public. In this sense, the movement of reclaiming them had two basic functions: to emphasize the belonging of Moldovan culture to the larger Romanian cultural areal and to offer relatively easy and accessible topics for doing history of philosophy: their works were relatively available, there was an abundance of secondary literature, and the task for a historian of philosophy deciding to “reclaim” them for the Moldovan space was relatively straightforward.

Second, the main discursive position in 1992—the period in which there was an attempt to find out how a philosophy paper can be written in a post-Soviet context—was that of the philosopher as an expert responding to the requirements of the present moment. There is a deep confidence in the possibility to know “how things should look like” and “what would lead to the desired outcome”. The topics that are touched upon in the papers vary: the rise of unemployment, relationship ethics, social justice, the way to do history of philosophy, and, of course, the emerging topic of “heritage”. 2007, on the other hand, is marked by “the great values controversy”. Values (and “norms”) become a central topic for almost all the philosophers publishing in the *Philosophy* rubric of the journal. The position adopted by most of them is that of a “defender of traditional values” in the face of globalization and “postmodernism”. The only voice that makes an exception

is claiming that no hierarchy of values is possible (in the condition of “postmodernism”), but encourages a certain education of sensitivity to values among the youth, without imposing the content of values. So, the voice of the philosopher becomes that of an active society member, preoccupied with what they see as a threat: either “non-values” or “lack of sensitivity to values” risks affecting / “destructing” the “already established values”, and the philosophers see as their task to point out this phenomenon and, usually, propose explanations—from an “expert position”—as to the sources of the problem and possible strategies.

Third, the journal has established a clear-cut difference between “authors with a PhD” and “PhD students”, publishing their papers in different rubrics: *Philosophy* and *Research Reports* (*Comunicări științifice*, problematically translated, in the English version of the contents, as *Research Papers*). The 2007 papers of PhD students are, indeed, different from those belonging to PhDs: they explore a more essayistic tone and are proposing positive readings of 20th Century continental philosophers, while the papers belonging to PhDs are usually exploring more general topics (“values”, “social norms”), without focusing on a particular author (the only exception in the *Philosophy* section is a paper on argumentation in Plato, and the one in the *Heritage* rubric—on “Romanian axiological identity” in M. Eliade; in the latter case, there is still a continuity of topic—“values”, operating in the logic of heritage, but the paper is focused on the work of a single author). The innovative character of PhD students’ work is due to an attempt to engage *as readers* with continental philosophy, letting the discourse of philosophers they read affect their own voice, the result being a clear difference from their PhD holding colleagues. A similar strategy of *borrowing one’s voice to another* or *speaking with* is adopted by those who write about Romanian philosophers, in a “heritage” logic (the main difference here is one of stylistic experimentation, specific to the PhD students and absent from most established researchers).

These trends have continued and deepened over the years. The contemporary landscape of papers published in the *Journal of Philosophy, Social Science, and Political Science* has a number of similar aspects: the *Heritage* rubric continues to be present in the journal, publishing mainly papers on 19th and 20th Century Romanian philosophers; there is a tendency to write about general issues (considered as relevant for the society), but papers dedicated to single authors have slowly made their way in the *Philosophy* rubric as well; and, after more people influenced by 20th Century continental philosophy have defended their dissertations, a greater stylistic difference is present in the *Philosophy* rubric as well, shifting from the discursive position of the “philosopher as an expert speaking about an issue relevant for the society” to the more modest position of “philosopher as reflective reader”.

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